COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in the market, however, potentially lowering welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects their pricing behavior. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is observed less frequently when they also compete in the market. Communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data provide no evidence of seller collusion in the market. (JEL D43, D71, H40, O3)     

TRANSACTION COST, TWO-PART TARIFFS, AND COLLUSION

When two goods exhibit demand complementarity, the sellers would generally charge lower prices under collusion than under rivalry–a cartel internalizes cross effects that independent firms ignore. For the particular case of "two-part" tariffs consisting of entrance fees and per-unit prices, this paper shows that entrance fees are indeed lower under collusion than under rivalry, but that per-unit prices are unaffected. The demand complementarity arises from transaction costs borne by consumers who enter the market. The policy implication is that collusion can be socially preferable to competition in the presence of such transaction costs.     

COLLUSION FACILITATING AND COLLUSION BREAKING POWER OF SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AND DESCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near-competitive levels. ( JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)     

COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION

Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.     

Automated Pricing Rules in Electronic Posted Offer Markets

Internet markets are heralded as enhancing efficiency by providing buyers and sellers with an abundance of information. In these electronic markets, firms have the opportunity to employ "pricebots," computerized algorithms that automatically adjust prices to prevailing market conditions. This article uses laboratory methods to examine the potential market impact of the endogenous selection of three automated pricing algorithms: undercutting, low-price matching, and trigger pricing. We find that the undercutting algorithm leads to prices similar to the game-theoretic prediction. Low-price matching generates significantly higher prices, and trigger pricing results in market prices below the game-theoretic prediction.     

AN EXPERIMENT ON INNOVATION AND COLLUSION

This paper examines the relationship between product innovation and the success of price collusion using novel laboratory experiments. Average market prices in low innovation (LO) experiments are significantly higher than those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments. This price difference is attributed to LO experimental subjects' greater common market experience. The data illustrate how collusion can be perceived as the “only way to make it” in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable strategy for increasing profits. They suggest that product homogeneity can be a proximate cause, and product innovation an ultimate cause, of collusion. (JEL L41, L10, C92)     

WHY DO FIRMS CONTRIVE SHORTAGES? THE ECONOMICS OF INTENTIONAL MISPRICING

Given buyers' product-specific information capital, firms may increase long-run profits by "under-pricing" (rationing) rather than clearing markets when demands or costs rise transitorily. To minimize resulting shortages' costs, sellers predictably would distinguish among customer groups, managing any queues of disappointed loyal buyers that materialized (but largely ignoring transitory buyer queues), and would discourage resale. Unlike other shortage models, short-run excess demand necessarily implies neither buyers who prefer consuming in groups, nor waiting costs that are negligible. Any sense of "unfair" price increases would arise endogenously from sellers'failures to value appropriately customers' otherwise prudent informational investments.     

TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a "collusion incubator" environment based on a type of public, symmetrically "folded" and "item-aligned" preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non-public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, "folded" and "item aligned" patterns of preferences, creating head-to-head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a "maverick." ( JEL L50, L94, D43)     

AN EFFICIENCY EXPLANATION FOR WHY FIRMS SECOND SOURCE

Firms facing research costs and demand uncertainty may engage in second-sourcing, in which potential suppliers agree to pool production facilities. I show how sellers and buyers both can benefit from the practice. Second-sourcing allows firms to meet a wider range of possible rates of demand and often to supply a given rate of demand at a lower total cost than under non-cooperation. Buyers benefit through a reduced probability of stock-outs and frequently a lower purchase price. Semiconductor industry data are found to be consistent with the paper's predictions.     

FACTOR DEMAND UNDER CONDITIONS OF PRODUCT DEMAND and SUPPLY UNCERTAINTY

The paper develops a theory of factor demand under uncertainty, that encompasses neo-classical factor demand and Keynesian effective factor demand as special cases. The model allows factor demand and output to move positively with product demand, even with a constant product price. This, in turn, permits real wages to move pro-cyclically in response to product demand shocks. In addition the model provides a new perspective on the "adding-up" problem (which posits that total factor payments exceed output if increasing returns to scale exist), and generates positive uncertainty profits that are similar in spirit to those of Frank Knight.     

INFORMATION STRUCTURES OF PRODUCT MARKETS

Buyers demand continuing information flows to guide their choices among competing product brands. They select portfolios of information types, some supplied by sellers of the branded goods, some not. This paper investigates the determinants of businesses' outlays on information (media advertising, sales force, other sales promotion). They include buyers' overall demands for information, buyers' access to sources not controlled by the seller, the relative efficiency of seller-supplied information, and competitive conditions in the product market. The hypotheses about effects on sellers' total information outlays are strongly supported. Some evidence appears on determinants of the mixture of information types they provide.     

Trade shows and the creation of market and industry

This study addresses the question of the constitution of markets in advanced societies. Specifically, the article studies the role of the traveling trade show in creating the real time computing market, which is part of the US electronics sector, during the mid‐1990's. Real time computing products assist the transfer, storage and processing of digital signals in real time and support many of the internet applications we use today. By applying ethnographic methods, we explore the general question of how economic actors cope with uncertainty in the phase of market‐making and at the cutting edge of technology. The paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, it shows that the attempt to organize a trade show in real time computing was triggered by the uncertainty experienced by sellers regarding the identity of prospective buyers and about the exact use to which they would put the emergent technology which is offered for sale. Secondly, we trace the history of an emergent market. We claim that trade shows for innovative products are important venues at which markets coalesce. The identification and ordering of market actors, the institutionalization of a distinct business culture and the social networks developed among market actors and across the subsidiary markets provided the basic social infrastructure for what later became known as the real time computing industry.     

CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS AND MARKET PERFORMANCE

We conduct laboratory markets to evaluate the effects of consumer search costs on market performance. The primary research goal is to assess the behavioral relevance of Diamond's [1971] paradoxical conclusion that the injection of a small consumer search cost alters the equilibrium price prediction from competitive to monopoly levels. Although monopoly prices are not consistently observed, we find that search costs do tend to raise prices. Additional experimentation indicates that below-monopoly prices are not explained by buyer avoidance of high-pricing sellers, but that prices increase as search costs are raised.     

SCHOOL QUALITY AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOUSING MARKET

In this article, we investigate the relationship between school quality and information disclosure in housing markets. When presented with the option of identifying their local public school in a real estate listing, we find that sellers with homes assigned to higher‐performing schools are more likely to provide this information. We find more evidence of selective disclosure in 2001–2002 than in 2006–2007, when the costs of gathering and disclosing information on school assignments and quality were lower. Furthermore, we find more evidence of strategic behavior among sellers of large single‐family units that presumably appeal to families with children. After controlling for school quality, information disclosure does not appear to affect housing prices. Taken together, our results support the findings of the education literature on the importance of school quality capitalization in residential real estate and they provide the first evidence of strategic information disclosure in housing markets. (JEL L15, I20, R31)     

THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS ON SPATIAL COMPETITION

We present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms. Firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market. Identical consumers with non-increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line. We solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor. The set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs. In laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance, we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes. Non-binding communication led to collusion.     

COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND FREE ENTRY

This paper investigates the properties of industry equilibrium under price uncertainty given free entry and exit. For any form of risk-averse behavior, it is shown that an increase in demand uncertainty (as measured by a mean-preserving spread) increases mean output price and reduces output of firms in long-run equilibrium.     

A GUIDE TO THE PITFALLS OF IDENTIFYING PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper demonstrates that plausible cost-based explanations exist for what are commonly perceived to be cases of price discrimination. We explain such commonly discussed problems as the price spreads of retail gasoline products, the "high" price of dinners at restaurants, the "high" price of popcorn at movie theaters, and the fact that airline ticket prices vary with how long the ticket is purchased before the flight's departure. Our explanations benefit from not relying on consumer ignorance or implicit collusion among numerous sellers.     

Auctions of companies

Auctions of companies are conducted in ways that contradict received auction theory. The major puzzles are: (1) sellers restrict the number of bidders; (2) sellers restrict the number of bidders; (3) bidders are screened by an initial round of non-binding bids; and (4) bidders offer - and sellers sometimes accept - preemptive bids. Puzzles (1), (2), and (4) are explained by assuming that some information concerning the company can, if released, reduce the value of the company. Puzzle (3) is explained as a way for sellers to select the highest-valued bidders; equilibrium is maintained by using the initial bids to set a reserve price for the final bidding round.     

REPUTATION EFFECTS IN THE MARKET OF CERTIFIERS: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUDIT INDUSTRY

Certifiers verify unobserved product characteristics for buyers and thereby alleviate informational asymmetries and facilitate trade. When sellers pay for the certification, however, certifiers can be tempted to bias their opinion to favor sellers. Indeed, accounting scandals and inflated credit ratings suggest sellers may prefer to select dishonest certifiers. I test this proposition by estimating the effect of adverse quality signals on audit demand. Exploiting the natural experiment of Arthur Andersen's demise, I find that auditors with worse quality signals experience a fall in demand. This suggests that reputation effects are at work even in the presence of conflicts of interest. (JEL L15, L8, M4)     

Rational exchange and trust: Business relationships in a fishing community

This paper assesses the hypothesis that in markets where information is lacking concerning the price and the quality of a commodity and the commodity is variable in its supply, sellers will tend to form long‐term, stable relationships with buyers. Data from a coastal Alabama community are used to test the nature of exchange relations between commercial shrimp fishers and the dealers to whom they sell. It is further hypothesized that the social aspects of these exchanges will better predict stable relationships than will economic aspects. The evidence presented supports the stated hypotheses. Finally, the relevance of this research for social theory is discussed.