The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Financial and political resources of nine major public sector unions in the 1980s

Current research offers two potentially competing perspectives on union strength: membership and financial/political resources. We update and broaden the research on the financial and political resources of nine major public sector unions in the U.S. by reporting these unions’ financial assets, net worth, revenues, and political action committee (PAC) receipts during the 1980s and the early 1990s. We find that unions may expand their financial and political resources even though membership levels stagnate or decline. Overall, the unions have amassed larger asset bases, even though some have actually lost members. On a per member basis, federal executive branch unions do not appear as financially weak as the level of their financial resources suggests. Postal unions as a group are clearly the strongest in terms of per member financial and political resources. Federal executive branch unions have experienced a striking reduction in their PAC activity, while the postal and the state and local union PACs have grown substantially. Our analysis indicates that union membership may not adequately measure union strength.     

The political influence of unions and corporations on COPE votes in the U.S. senate, 1979–1988

The political influence of unions and corporations is examined by analyzing Senate roll-call votes on COPE-identified legislation for the period 1979–1988. Union PAC contributions and union membership both have significant positive effects on three different types of COPE legislation: Narrow Union, General Labor, and Non-Labor. In addition, corporate PAC contributions to senators’ opponents reduce their pro-union voting behavior on Narrow Union and General Labor bills. There is no evidence that the political influence of unions in the U.S. is declining.     

Union commitment and membership support for political action: An exploratory analysis

Union political activity has always been controversial, even among union members. Research has shown that a sizable minority of union members question the propriety of union political involvement and disagree with union leaders on public policy issues. It has also shown, however, that union members’ commitment to the union may be positively associated with members’ political support. This study extends this research by statistically estimating the relationship between union commitment and members’ support for their national union’s political involvement. Based on the questionnaire responses of several hundred local union members, the findings support a positive relationship between union commitment and political support. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Cynthia Fisher and an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. They also wish to thank the numerous union participants in the study.     

Class struggle in campaign finance? Political action committee contributions in the 1984 elections

Pluralist and class-based theories offer alternative hypotheses about the political behavior of organized interests in the United States. Using network methods and data on political action committees' (PAC) contributions to congressional candidates in the 1984 elections, we identify interest groups with politically similar behavior in an attempt to assess these perspectives concerning elites in the United States. The analysis includes corporate, labor, membership association, and nonconnected PACs. Counter to pluralist expectations, we find just two large groups—one primarily business oriented and the other primarily labor/public-interest oriented. Our findings thus support a class-based interpretation of the nature of organized interests. These findings are framed in terms of the meaning of unity and fragmentation.     

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

We model the behavior of a vote-maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. We show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with non-hostile constituencies. These results support our theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior.     

The impact of legislator attributes on union PAC campaign contributions

Unions are shown to have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and to allocate their political resources based on this understanding. Two different tests of this hypothesis are presented. First, using a chi-square test, we show union contributions go disproportionately to members of committees with legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over their activities. Second, using logistic regression analysis, we demonstrate that this result is robust with respect to the inclusion of other institutional variables such as seniority, voting record, party, and electoral competitiveness. The authors thank James Bennett, Kevin Grier, Melvin Hinich, Brian Roberts, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S. Congressional Hearings

Using both a new data set of labor union appearances in congressional hearings and archival data on union organizational resources, this article analyzes factors that determine whether a labor union will be represented in congressional hearing testimony in a given year. Consistent with the expectations of resource mobilization theory, organizational resources are important predictors of participation in congressional hearings. For example, membership is an important predictor of testimony in hearings, as is the number of lobbyists on staff and the character of a union's primary industry. However, membership in the AFL‐CIO federation is negatively related to hearing participation, and some of the benefits of having a large membership base may be diminishing over time. Implications for the study of interest group politics and organizational political strategies are discussed.     

Political instrumentality perceptions and desires for union representation

This paper examines the concept of union instrumentality in light of theoretical literature and contemporary trends in union political activity. A broad concept of union instrumentality, including a place for the concept of union political instrumentality (e.g., union influence on general elections or legislation), is suggested. The practical importance and applicability of the political instrumentality concept is demonstrated in empirical models of nonunion worker voting intent in union representation elections. As predicted, workers perceiving higher levels of union political instrumentality are significantly more likely than others to indicate a pro-union voting intent. Given the importance of political versus economic activity as a defining characteristic of labor movements and given recent increases in political activity by U.S. unions, these results have significant implications for the way we think about U.S. unions and for future union organizing and political activities. The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper from Mario F. Boganno, Frederic C. Champlin III, William N. Cooke, James A. Craft, John T. Delaney, Richard B. Freeman, Daniel G. Gallagher, Cynthia L. Gramm, Charles R. Greer, Wallace E. Hendricks, Marick F. Masters, Lee P. Stepina, and William A. Wines. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, New York, NY, December 1985.     

利益代表与社会整合——法团主义视角下的武汉工会(1945-1949)

针对多元主义这一社团政治理论预设存在的盲区,本文以法团主义理论为视角,以战后武汉工会为研究对象,考察其是否具有利益代表职能及强组织凝聚力,并执行社会整合功能。研究发现,战后武汉工会不具备法团主义整合方案所要求的基本条件,其整合模式既异于国家法团主义模式,又不同于社会法团主义模式。究其原因,弱势独裁的政府始终未能实现行政权力的集中化、分层化与制度化;政府对社会的专制控制使得民间社会趋于萎缩,无法发展出充分专业化分工的社会团体。先天的不足使武汉工会只有法团主义的形而无其神,最终无法担负起社会整合的功能。     

Government Behaviors and Union Protest: Systematizing the Relationship

I develop a theory of the relationship between government actions and union political protest that uses conjunctures and structures to explain government-related factors which influence union political protest. Conjunctures are dramatic political developments that have the potential to tilt the status quo in industrial relations against, or in favor of, union vested interests. Here, the core conjunctures are significant debts and budget deficits concurrent with governments preaching severe budget cuts and public sector restructuring that, if implemented, can undercut unions. Structures are the policy tools that governments use to implement their agendas. Together, conjunctures and structures constitute a distinct government logic that influences the likelihood of union protest.     

Compensation,employment, and the political activity of public employee unions

It has been hypothesized that because public employee unions are politically influential, they have a bargaining advanatage over their private-sector counterparts. Previous studies, however, have not directly measured the political activities of public employee unions and have instead usually used some type of unionization proxy. This paper uses unpublished data from the International City Managers Association to develop a more direct measure of union political activity. Using this measure, it is found that an increase in union political activity leads to higher compensation and employment for public employee union members.     

Just another brick in the wall? The relationship between classroom-based political education and the political interest of young adults in Switzerland

This article asks whether political education at upper secondary school – i.e. shortly before or at the age when young people receive the right to vote – affects individual political interest as well as differences in political interest between social groups. Empirically, we use a novel data set combining individual student data with information on classroom-based political education as well as teacher characteristics. We do not find support for a more or less automatic and positive effect of classroom-based political education on young people’s political interest. Whereas we analyzed three dimensions of political education (knowledge, skills, arousing interest in politics), the skills dimension was the only one that exhibited a consistent positive (and mostly significant) relationship with young peoples’ political interest. Moreover, classroom-based political education seems not to compensate for a lack of political socialization at home but rather tends to affect students with politically interested parents most strongly.     

AFSCME as a political union

AFSCME has emerged as the third largest union in the U. S. and the largest public-sector affiliate of the AFL-C1O. Since the 1960s, its leadership has vigorously pursued organizing and political action. Despite its highly visible role in U.S. politics, little systematic research exists on the union in this context. I examine AFSCME's political apparatus, the scope of its electoral and legislative involvement, its political ideology and legislative priorities, and its political effectiveness. I also explore the controversy regarding the use of compulsory dues for political purposes, and AFSCME's resulting rebate procedure. I find that AFSCME donates a considerable portion of its resources to political action (between 10 percent to a third of its budget at the international level), that its political ideology is focused heavily on expanding the rights and economic status of public employees, and that AFSCME has emerged as a prominent, if not the prominent, political union in the U.S. labor movement.     

Self-interests and group-interests in employee involvement programs: A case study

What happens in a unionized setting when a participatory management system is adopted? This question is examined based on a field study of a union manufacturing facility that has been operating under a gainsharing system for four years. As suggested by the political science literature on transforming political systems from authoritarian rule to democracies, the events resemble a complicated chess game among management, union officers, and union members pursuing their self-interests or group-interests during and after the transitional process. Although gainsharing bonuses have been minimal, the democratization of organizational structures and relationships has generated multiple beneficial organizational and individual outcomes for management and union members.     

Interregionalism in Transnational Interest Networks: Euro-Asian Civil Society and the EU–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

The study of interest groups is still a relatively small field of political science. The process of globalization has brought about the evolution of interest networks from national organizations to regional and transnational networks. This article uses the modes of political participation framework created by Jayasuriya and Rodan, in order to study the created spaces used by public interest networks at an interregional level. The empirical case study relates to Asia-Europe Meeting: the Europe-Asian interregional institution, and the work of public interest networks stemming from the civil society organizations that shadow it in opposing the EU–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) free trade agreement (FTA). We find that the ‘modes of political participation’ model explains quite accurately the political spaces created by civil society in the EU–ASEAN FTA. We extend the framework by adding a fifth space, lobbying, which appears out of isomorphism. This concept represents the adoption by organizations of practices carried by other institutions they interact with. In this case, public interest networks have adopted the practice of directly influencing policy-makers that was the prerogative of private interest groups.     

The Political and Civic Lives of Public Sector Workers: Unions and “Public Service Motivation”*

Public sector employees are highly engaged in civic and political life, from voting to volunteering. Scholars have theorized that this political activity stems from “public service motivation,” or the selection of publicly oriented individuals into public work. We build on this work by analyzing the role of public sector unions in shaping participation. Unions are central mobilizing organizations in political life, and one in three public sector workers are unionized. Special supplements of the Current Population Survey provide data on various forms of participation, sector, union membership, and union coverage. Logistic regressions find that unionized public sector workers have much higher odds of engaging in a range of activities compared to non‐union public workers, including protest, electoral politics, and political communication. Union membership impacts service work to a lesser extent, suggesting that unions are more central to political lives. These findings have implications for the consequences of union decline, including the class, race, and gender composition of who participates in democratic life.     

Campus politics,student societies and social media

The university campus has often been seen as an important site for the politicization of young people. Recent explanations for this have focused attention upon the role of the student union as a means to enable a ‘critical mass’ of previously isolated individuals to produce social networks of common interest. What is missing from these accounts, however, and what this article seeks to address, is how these factors actually facilitate the development of political norms and the active engagement of many students. Drawing upon qualitative data from three countries we argue that it is the milieu of the smaller student societies that are crucial for facilitating the habitus of the student citizen. They provide the space for creative development and performance of the political self, affiliations to particular fields and access to cultural and social capital. Moreover, we contend that these processes of politicization are increasingly enacted through social media networks that foreground their importance for developing political habitus in the future.     

“Your Agenda Is Our Agenda”: State Legislators‘ Perspectives of Interest Group Influence on Political Decision Making

ABSTRACT

Political decision makers often argue that their agenda is driven by the needs, values, and wants of constituents, yet little evidence exists documenting the transmission of agendas from the constituents to the decision maker. Interest groups play a crucial role in educating political decision makers about issues and persuading their response; therefore, this study begins to explore the transmission of agendas from interest groups to political decision makers by conducting individual interviews with nine state legislators. The results reveal that state legislators view interest groups as essential to making informed political decisions congruent with the constituents' agenda. Implications for practice and research are discussed.     

Shaping the Political Arena: A Comparative Approach Between American Lobby and Euro-Groups

Nowadays, interest groups are regarded as the efficient alternative to political parties, due to the pejorative image acquired through the process of ‘politicization’ of the latter. However, the efficacy of these representative institutions depends on the political system in which they activate. Therefore, a comprehensive difference should be noticed between the European pressure groups and the American ones. The most significant distinction is given both by the influencing environment and the strategic pathways followed in the lobby process. This article also analyses the similarities between the two political actors, focusing on the legitimacy in the name of which the interest groups formulate and implement their lobbying strategies.