Repeated measurements designs with unequal period sizes

Summary This paper is concerned with the designs in which each experimental unit is assigned more than once to a treatment, either different or identical. An easy method of constructing balanced minimal repeated measurements designs with unequal period sizes is presented whenever the number of periods is less than the number of treatments. Strongly balanced minimal repeated measurements designs with unequal period sizes are also constructed whenever the number of periods is less than the number of treatments.     

The S‐Curve Effect of Lean Implementation

There is currently no theory that explains the pattern of change in a plant's performance as it implements a lean program. Does it improve at a declining, increasing, or constant rate, or in some other pattern? We use empirical data from the implementation of the Volvo Group's lean program worldwide to develop a grounded theory to explain this pattern. We find that the pattern roughly follows an S‐curve shape: as a plant progresses in its implementation of lean production, its operational performance improves slowly first, then grows rapidly, and finally tapers off. The initial stage can be characterized by “exploration”, during which the plant is essentially discovering and experimenting with lean principles, and the later stages by “exploitation”, during which the plant is realizing their benefits. We derive the grounded theory from quantitative internal company data and find additional qualitative support for it from our visits to 45 Volvo plants on 5 continents and 210 interviews with employees in these plants and Volvo headquarters. The S‐shape pattern has important implications. Practitioners must assess a plant's maturity in lean implementation and adjust their targets, action plans, and expectations accordingly. Scholars must take the position of the plant on the S‐curve into consideration when they analyze the impact of lean programs.     

MADE IN THE WORLD: THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF PRODUCTION

We are moving rapidly into an age of transnational manufacturing, where things made in one country are shipped across national borders for further work, storage, sales, repair, remanufacture, recycle, or disposal; but our laws, policies, and management practices are slow in adjusting to this reality. They are often based on inaccurate premises. This article examines these premises and suggests what they imply for management of manufacturing. First, a common view is that manufacturing investment in the industrialized nations is declining and shifting to the developing countries. This is not true. Investment in manufacturing in both industrialized and developing nations is increasing and, in absolute value, there is a lot more investment in industrialized countries than in developing countries. Second, a related view argued by many is that manufacturing does not have a bright future in the rich countries. I argue that manufacturers can thrive in the industrialized countries if they learn how to add more value for the end users. They must go beyond productivity improvement to producing more technologically advanced and customized products, responding faster to changing customer demands, and appending more services to their products. Doing all this is easier in the industrialized countries because the needed skills and infrastructure are more readily available there. Third, another potentially misleading notion is related to why companies invest in manufacturing abroad. Access to low-cost production is not the main motivation in most cases; rather it is access to market. Superior global manufacturers use their foreign factories for much more: to serve their worldwide customers better, preempt competitors, work with sophisticated suppliers, collect critical marketing, technological, and competitive intelligence, and attract talented individuals into the company. They build integrated global production networks, not collections of disjointed factories that are spread internationally. Thus their investment in manufacturing abroad is not a substitute for investment at home, it is a complement. Building and managing such integrated global factor networks is the next challenge in manufacturing.     

POM Forum: Transfer of Changing Production Know‐How

Even with the rich literature on knowledge management, we still don't know enough about how the rate of change in production‐know‐how affects the choice of mechanisms for its transfer. Codifying tacit know‐how helps, but codification becomes more challenging as the know‐how changes more frequently. Transfer of tacit know‐how becomes much more complicated when it changes often. We need more research in this area, particularly to help production and operations managers who must ultimately use the new know‐how and change their companies' production processes. The paper suggests a framework as a step in that direction. The framework focuses on the interplay between the level of codification and the rate of change of production know‐how, and identifies four zones for classifying production know‐how: “slow and codified,” “slow and tacit,” “fast and codified,” and “fast and tacit.” Examples from McDonald̂s, Club Med, Intel, and AOL are used to illustrate primary transfer mechanisms for each zone (manuals and systems, people, joint‐development, and projects, respectively). Appropriate absorptive capacities in the production units for each zone are also identified. Since the ultimate responsibility of operations managers is to improve (i.e., change) their production know‐how as fast as possible, they would be wise to adopt policies that are closer to those suited for the “fast and codified” zone. Intel and Toyota show good models.