A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

This paper concerns the two‐stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two‐person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.     

Identification of non-technical skills from the resilience engineering perspective: a case study of an electricity distributor

Training in non-technical skills (NTS) does not usually question the design of the work system, and thus focuses narrowly on workers as the unit of analysis. This study discusses how the identification of NTS, a major step for developing an NTS training program, might be re-interpreted from the perspective of resilience engineering (RE). This discussion is based on a case study of identifying NTS for electricians who perform emergency maintenance activities in an electricity distribution power line. The results of the case study point out that four data analysis procedures might operationalize the RE perspective: (a) identifying factors that make the work difficult and which could be integrated into NTS training scenarios; (b) identifying recommendations for re-designing the system, in order either to reduce or eliminate the need for NTS; (c) classifying the NTS into pragmatic categories, which are meaningful for workers; and (d) regarding the identification of NTS as an opportunity to give visibility to adaptations carried out by workers.     

Bargaining and Reputation

The paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining. The idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining ‘postures’ on bargaining outcomes. A complete information bargaining model a la Rubinstein is amended to accommodate ‘irrational types’ who are obstinate, and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands. A strong ‘independence of procedures’ result is derived: after initial postures have been adopted, the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently. The latter analysis yields a unique continuous‐time limit with a war of attrition structure. In the continuous‐time game, equilibrium is unique, and entails delay, consequently inefficiency. The equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types. As the probability of irrationality goes to zero, delay and inefficiency disappear; furthermore, if there is a rich set of types for both agents, the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference.     

Constructing Identities in Multicultural Learning Contexts

In this article we examine two concepts that aid our understanding of processes of identification in multiethnic schools. The first concept focuses on the complementarity of “three processes of identity” (identifying the other, being identified, and self-identification). This is brought together with the concept of sociocultural coupling introduced to examine the co-constructions of changes in practices (across places and times) and changes in identification. The analysis draws on an interview with a pupil, Monifa, a Black African (Nigerian) girl (aged 10 years), and on an interview with a Pakistani teacher, Shazia. Although Shazia and Monifa belonged to different generations (i.e., a pupil/daughter and a teacher/mother) and different cultural groups (British-born Black African and Pakistani Kashmiri), the same identity processes could be applied to the data. They both articulated accounts of “identifying the other,” “being identified,” and “self-identification,” which emphasized their transitions between cultural practices and multiple communities. Furthermore, we propose that sociocultural coupling has enabled us to understand the means by which aspects of cultural practices borrowed from home and school allows them to reproduce aspects of their home cultural identity and at other times to transform these identities.     

Performance indicators for collaborative networks based on collaboration benefits

Collaborative networks are typically assumed to bring clear benefits and competitive advantage to the participating members. However, the identification and characterisation of objective and measurable collaboration benefits is an important element for the wide adoption of this paradigm. Departing from a brief categorisation of the intuitive advantages of collaboration, this paper introduces an approach for the analysis of benefits in collaborative processes, introducing a number of performance indicators. The potential application of the indicators derived from this analysis is then discussed in the context of a virtual organisation's breeding environment. Finally, experimental results based on data from two existing collaborative networks are presented and discussed.     

Bubbles and Crashes

We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This synchronization problem together with the individual incentive to time the market results in the persistence of bubbles over a substantial period. Since the derived trading equilibrium is unique, our model rationalizes the existence of bubbles in a strong sense. The model also provides a natural setting in which news events, by enabling synchronization, can have a disproportionate impact relative to their intrinsic informational content.     

Bargaining,Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided, as the perturbation probabilities approach zero. Behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent's play. In equilibrium, rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues. How much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining? In both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the “Nash bargaining with threats” (NBWT) theory developed for two‐stage games. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, she can guarantee herself virtually her NBWT payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy: in every period, ask for (and accept nothing less than) that player's NBWT share and, while waiting for the other side to concede, take the action Nash recommends as a threat in his two‐stage game. The results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others. This is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems, to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two‐sided reputational perturbations, and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go.     

Assessment of quality of sleep and sleepiness in workers with rotating shifts

The study aims to evaluate the sleep quality and presence of daytime sleepiness in workers.     

Ergonomic assessment of porridge roaming sale system

This paper makes suggestions for the realization of an ergonomic intervention, guided by the method of Moraes and Mont'Alv?o (2009), in the system of street vending of porridge, to improve the working conditions of this sales segment. Specifics are given about this practice and its problems, from ergonomic analysis comes to suggestions for improvements to be applied to a new system.