Portrayal and betrayal: Bourdieu, photography and sociological life

Through an examination of Bourdieu's Algerian fieldwork the article raises general questions regarding the place of photography in sociological research. In the midst of a colonial war Bourdieu used photography to make visual fieldnotes and record the mixed realities of Algeria under colonialism. Bourdieu also used photography to communicate to the Algerians an ethical and political commitment to their cause and plight. It is argued that his photographs do not simply portrayal or communicate the realities of Algeria. They are, paradoxically, at the same time full of information and mysterious and depthless. In order to read them it is necessary to ethnographically situate them in their social and historical context. It is suggested that the photographs can also be read as an inventory of Bourdieu's attentiveness as a researcher, his curiosity and ultimately his sociological imagination. They betray his concerns as a researcher but also can be used to raise ethical and political questions beyond Bourdieu's own attempts at reflexive self-analysis. The article concludes with a discussion of how Bourdieu's sociological life might contribute to the craft of sociology today.     

Varieties of Sensitivity Training*

Types of sensitivity training groups are distinguished according to their general orientations, practice and aims. Observations are made on the Esalen, Tavistock, and NTL approaches as well as on some sources of the different approaches and suggestions as to their advantages and disadvantages.     

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Limit Order Markets

We characterize and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in a limit order market with a finite number of risk‐neutral liquidity providers. We show that if there is sufficient adverse selection, then pointwise optimization (maximizing in p for each q) in a certain nonlinear pricing game produces a Nash equilibrium in the limit order market. The need for a sufficient degree of adverse selection does not vanish as the number of liquidity providers increases. Our formulation of the nonlinear pricing game encompasses various specifications of informed and liquidity trading, including the case in which nature chooses whether the market‐order trader is informed or a liquidity trader. We solve for an equilibrium analytically in various examples and also present examples in which the first‐order condition for pointwise optimization does not define an equilibrium, because the amount of adverse selection is insufficient.     

Gambling Motivation and Passion: A Comparison Study of Recreational and Pathological Gamblers

The aim of this study was to examine the structural relationship among gambling motivation, gambling passion, and behavioral intentions to gamble between recreational and pathological gamblers. Specifically, this study aimed to shed light on the different ways in which gambling motivation and affective attitude are associated with recreational and pathological gamblers. Using a purposive sampling method, 400 subjects were selected for and participated in this study during their visits to a casino. Study results echoed the notion of distinctive and separate gambling motivations and passions between recreational and pathological gamblers. Also, results identified specific areas to which casino operators or policy makers should pay special attention in developing effective marketing strategies to promote responsible gambling.     

Information in Securities Markets: Kyle Meets Glosten and Milgrom

This paper analyzes models of securities markets with a single strategic informed trader and competitive market makers. In one version, uninformed trades arrive as a Brownian motion and market makers see only the order imbalance, as in Kyle (1985). In the other version, uninformed trades arrive as a Poisson process and market makers see individual trades. This is similar to the Glosten–Milgrom (1985) model, except that we allow the informed trader to optimize his times of trading. We show there is an equilibrium in the Glosten–Milgrom‐type model in which the informed trader plays a mixed strategy (a point process with stochastic intensity). In this equilibrium, informed and uninformed trades arrive probabilistically, as Glosten and Milgrom assume. We study a sequence of such markets in which uninformed trades become smaller and arrive more frequently, approximating a Brownian motion. We show that the equilibria of the Glosten–Milgrom model converge to the equilibrium of the Kyle model.