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Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Krishna K. Ladha 《Social Choice and Welfare》1993,10(1):69-85
This paper generalizes Condorcet's jury theorem to the case of symmetrically dependent votes with the help of de Finetti's theorem. Thus, the paper relaxes Condorcet's assumption of independent voting while preserving his main result: In jury-type situations a majority of voters is more likely than any single voter to choose the better of two alternatives.I am indebted to Professors Steven Brams, Arnold Buss, Gary Miller and Norman Schofield for their comments and questions. This paper is supported, in part, by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-9210800). 相似文献
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Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - Group decision making is commonly used in juries, businesses, and in politics to increase the informational basis for a decision and to improve judgment accuracy.... 相似文献
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