Managing Technology for Competitive Advantage : Editors

Objectives. This article tests the hypothesis that social capital—measured in terms of civic group involvement, social and racial trust, and political engagement—leads to charitable behavior by individuals. Methods. I introduce measures of the “social capital elasticity of giving,” which facilitate comparisons between the effects on charity of different social capital types. Using data from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, I estimate these elasticities with tobit regression models. Results. I find strong links between changes in social capital stocks and changes in giving levels. Furthermore, I find that different social capital types have differing levels of impact on giving. Conclusions. Charitable giving appears to be a beneficial consequence of some types of social capital.     

Does Social Capital Make You Generous?*

Objectives. This article tests the hypothesis that social capital—measured in terms of civic group involvement, social and racial trust, and political engagement—leads to charitable behavior by individuals. Methods. I introduce measures of the “social capital elasticity of giving,” which facilitate comparisons between the effects on charity of different social capital types. Using data from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, I estimate these elasticities with tobit regression models. Results. I find strong links between changes in social capital stocks and changes in giving levels. Furthermore, I find that different social capital types have differing levels of impact on giving. Conclusions. Charitable giving appears to be a beneficial consequence of some types of social capital.     

No Country Left Behind? Performance Standards and Accountability in US Foreign Assistance

The accountability movement in public policy hails a new programme for US foreign assistance – the Millennium Challenge Account established in 2004 with the aim of ‘picking winners’ for grants among developing countries based on their demonstrated quality of governance. This article uses the MCA's own rating system to dispute its claim to know in advance which countries are best positioned to meet major development goals. High governance scores alone bear little or no relationship to growth in national income or decline in poverty. Attempting to measure public‐policy performance limits the range of choice available to policy‐makers, and may inadvertently limit true performance.     

Evaluating the Simplified Conjoint Expected Risk Model: Comparing the Use of Objective and Subjective Information

The simplified Conjoint Expected Risk (CER) model by Holtgrave and Weber posits that perceived risk is a linear combination of the subjective judgments of the probabilities of harm, benefit, and status quo, and the expected harm and benefit of an activity. It modifies Luce and Weber's original CER model—that uses objective information to evaluate financial gambles—to accommodate activities such as health/technology activities where values of the model variables are subjective. If the simplified model is a valid modification of the original model, its performance should not be sensitive to the use of subjective information. However, because people may evaluate information differently when objective information is provided to them than when they generate information on their own, the performance of the simplified CER model may not be robust to the source of model-variable information. We compared the use of objective and subjective information, and results indicate that the estimates of the simplified CER model parameters and the proportion of variance in risk judgments accounted for by the model are similar under these two conditions. Thus, the simplified CER model is viable with activities for which harm and benefit information is subjective.     

Exploitation in Contemporary Capitalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Case of Taiwan

Abstract

Using data for manufacturing firms in Taiwan, we developed a measure of exploitation and analyzed its prevalence in the labor force. Our results indicated that almost two-thirds of the firms in our sample exploit at least some of their workers. For these firms, the average profit rate is 34 percent, but three-fourths of this figure derives from the expropriated wages of their workers. Female and blue-collar workers are the largest groups that are underpaid relative to their productivity (that is, exploited). Managers, professionals, and workers with seniority are not exploited by our definition because our data showed that these groups are paid according to the market value of their productivity, at least on average. Our analysis demonstrates the feasibility of the empirical investigation of exploitation, which should be further considered in future research.