Strategic planning for social and political change

Formalized planning is currently applied to planning for operations and capital investment, planning for products and markets, and occasionally for manpower. However, there is little evidence that companies are producing formal plans and programmes to deal with social and political change. Unfortunately, public opinion is moving against business, action groups inside and outside companies are challenging the authority of management, and public officials and politicians are already framing new laws and regulations. Unless managers begin to get more involved in the framing of these controls they are likely to find laws enacted and enforced by people who have little knowledge or sympathy with business. In this article the author points up the necessity to assess the social and political challenge to their business, and formulate and implement social and political strategies and plans aimed at ensuring the survival and prosperity of their organisations.     

Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition

 In this paper we introduce harmonic analysis (Fourier series) as a tool for characterizing the existence of Nash equilibria in two-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games with large electorates. We apply our methods both to traditional proximity models and to directional models. In the latter voters exhibit preferences over directions rather than over alternatives, per se. A directional equilibrium can be characterized as a Condorcet direction, in analogy to the Condorcet (majority) winner in the usual voting models, i.e., a direction which is preferred by a majority to (or at least is not beaten by) any other direction. We provide a parallel treatment of the total median condition for equilibrium under proximity voting and equilibrium conditions for directional voting that shows that the former result is in terms of a strict equality (a knife-edge result very unlikely to hold) while the latter is in terms of an inequality which is relatively easy to satisfy. For the Matthews [3] directional model and a variant of the Rabinowitz and Macdonald [7] directional model, we present a sufficiency condition for the existence of a Condorcet directional vector in terms of the odd-numbered components of the Fourier series representing the density distribution of the voter points. We interpret our theoretical results by looking at real-world voter distributions and direction fields among voter points derived from U.S. and Norwegian survey data. Received: 7 July 1995 / Accepted: 14 May 1996     

A direct derivation of the REML likelihood function

The original derivation of the widely cited form of the REML likelihood function for mixed linear models is difficult and indirect. This paper derives it directly using familiar operations with matrices and determinants.     

Production mondialisée et progrès social: le cas du textile et de l'habillement

La fragmentation de la production au sein de réseaux mondiaux n'obéit pas seulement à l'avantage comparatif, mais aussi aux décisions de localisation des entreprises dominantes en fonction de la capacité de négociation des producteurs locaux et du rôle qu'elles leur assignent dans la chaîne de production. Les auteurs examinent les conséquences de cette spécialisation dans le textile et l'habillement, pour vingt‐six pays où l'offre de main‐d'?uvre est abondante, sur la période 1990–2007. L'étude économétrique montre que le secteur ne tire pas toujours bénéfice de l'intégration commerciale: on observe plutôt une association négative entre spécialisation verticale et salaires réels.     

International-domestic linkages in a developing-country context: the case of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

Since 1978, the Rohingya have been fleeing Myanmar and taking refuge in Bangladesh. The state of Bangladesh is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention and does not recognize refugee rights, but the initial experiences with the Rohingya refugee population led the government to create a temporary and ad hoc domestic policy advisory and refugee management system, which eventually became highly politicized. There was also some degree of slow “externalization” of policy advice through the involvement of international organizations from 2006–2007 onward, mainly through the participation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM). Over 2017–2018, there was a massive influx of refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh. The domestic advisory and refugee management system lacked the capacity to manage the crisis and had to quickly and greatly externalize policy advice and refugee management. The UNHCR and IOM came in with a host of international organizational networks and coordinated with each other and the state through a multi-sectoral approach to manage the crisis. This externalization led to the systematization and institutionalization of the state’s domestic advisory system. However the effect of externalization on politicization is equivocal; on the one hand it decreased politicization of the domestic policy advisory system, but on the other hand, it created new levels of politicization.     

The uncovered set in spatial voting games

In a majority rule voting game, the uncovered set is the set of alternatives each of which can defeat every other alternative in the space either directly or indirectly at one remove. Research has suggested that outcomes under most reasonable agenda processes (both sincere and sophisticated) will be confined to the uncovered set. Most research on the uncovered set has been done in the context of voting games with a finite number of alternatives and relatively little is known about the properties of the uncovered set in spatial voting games.We examine the geometry of the uncovered set in spatial voting games and the geometry of two important subsets of the uncovered set, the Banks set and the Schattschneider set. In particular, we find both general upper and lower limits on the size of the uncovered set, and we give the exact bounds of the uncovered set for situations with three voters. For situations with three voters, we show that the Banks set is identical to the uncovered set.