Identification and Estimation of Average Partial Effects in “Irregular” Correlated Random Coefficient Panel Data Models

In this paper we study identification and estimation of a correlated random coefficients (CRC) panel data model. The outcome of interest varies linearly with a vector of endogenous regressors. The coefficients on these regressors are heterogenous across units and may covary with them. We consider the average partial effect (APE) of a small change in the regressor vector on the outcome (cf. Chamberlain (1984), Wooldridge (2005a)). Chamberlain (1992) calculated the semiparametric efficiency bound for the APE in our model and proposed a √N‐consistent estimator. Nonsingularity of the APE's information bound, and hence the appropriateness of Chamberlain's (1992) estimator, requires (i) the time dimension of the panel (T) to strictly exceed the number of random coefficients (p) and (ii) strong conditions on the time series properties of the regressor vector. We demonstrate irregular identification of the APE when T = p and for more persistent regressor processes. Our approach exploits the different identifying content of the subpopulations of stayers—or units whose regressor values change little across periods—and movers—or units whose regressor values change substantially across periods. We propose a feasible estimator based on our identification result and characterize its large sample properties. While irregularity precludes our estimator from attaining parametric rates of convergence, its limiting distribution is normal and inference is straightforward to conduct. Standard software may be used to compute point estimates and standard errors. We use our methods to estimate the average elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to total outlay for a sample of poor Nicaraguan households.     

Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Political Failure: Reflections on the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy

Objectives . Economic models of politics typically make two assumptions about voters: first, their motives are egocentric, not sociotropic; second, their beliefs are rational, not subject to systematic bias. Political scientists have presented strong evidence against the first assumption (Mansbridge, 1990), but have become increasingly willing to accept the second (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Marcus and Hanson, 1993). This article tests these two assumptions, then explores the tests' broader implications. Methods . I use the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy to test for egocentricity of motivation and rationality of belief. Results . Both standard assumptions fail for the case where the economic approach would seemingly be most relevant: economic beliefs. Conclusions . This is not necessarily cause for greater optimism about the efficiency of democracy: sociotropic voters with biased economic beliefs are more likely to produce severe political failures than are selfish voters with rational expectations.     

Job Satisfaction,Work Environment,and Rewards: Motivational Theory Revisited

A model of job satisfaction integrating economic and work environment variables was developed and used for testing interactions between rewards and work environment hazards. Data came from a representative panel of Danish employees. Results showed that psychosocial work environment factors, like information about decisions concerning the work place, social support, and influence, have significant impacts on the level of job satisfaction. Maximizing rewards did not compensate public employees to an extent that ameliorated the negative effects on job satisfaction of experiencing low levels of any of these factors whereas influence did not impact job satisfaction of private employees.