Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

An empirical examination of cost-adjusting in outpatient clinics

This paper presents an empirical methodology for examining cost-adjusting in relation to multiple-output health care providers. The methodology is subsequently implemented using a sample of California outpatient clinics. The empirical evidence is that these clinics do cost-adjust; that is, the clinics respond to low Medicare reimbursement by using lower quality to control the marginal costs of those patient groups not insured under a government-sponsored plan. In addition, clinics do not cost-adjust with respect to Medi-Cal patients, implying that various government reimbursement systems have different effects on a provider’s cost-adjusting behavior.     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.     

Three Kinds of Anti-Intellectualism: Rethinking Hofstadter*

Hofstadter's landmark analysis of anti-intellectualism in American life is interpreted within the framework of the sociology of knowledge. His analysis suggests three analytically distinct types of anti-intellectualism: religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism. Each type arises from within its own distinctive institutional matrix. Although Hofstadter fails to anticipate the growing cultural impact of mass media institutions, he demonstrates convincingly that anti-intellectualism is not a unitary phenomenon.     

Two earner family migration A search theoretic approach

This paper represents the first attempt to model the two earner family decision to migrate using a joint search theoretic approach. In so doing, the paradox of a couple whose members would both migrate if single but decide not to migrate because they are married to each other is discovered and explained. Furthermore the impact of the rising number of working women and reentry of wives into the labor force on the extent and regional pattern of migration is discussed. Extensions to the model are addressed, as well as future avenues of research, both theoretical and empirical. It is suggested that the search theoretic approach, not previously applied to models of family migration, is the most appropriate.