Regression analysis with partially labelled regressors: carbon dating of the Shroud of Turin

The twelve results from the 1988 radio carbon dating of the Shroud of Turin show surprising heterogeneity. We try to explain this lack of homogeneity by regression on spatial coordinates. However, although the locations of the samples sent to the three laboratories involved are known, the locations of the 12 subsamples within these samples are not. We consider all 387,072 plausible spatial allocations and analyse the resulting distributions of statistics. Plots of robust regression residuals from the forward search indicate that some sets of allocations are implausible. We establish the existence of a trend in the results and suggest how better experimental design would have enabled stronger conclusions to have been drawn from this multi-centre experiment.     

Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model

A decision maker (DM) is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects choices that are rational in an “objective” sense: the DM can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models choices that are rational in a “subjective” sense: the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. In the context of decision under uncertainty, we propose axioms that the two notions of rationality might satisfy. These axioms allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities and a single utility index. It is “objectively rational” to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is “subjectively rational” to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (with respect to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. In other words, the objective and subjective rationality relations admit, respectively, a representation à la Bewley (2002) and à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our results thus provide a bridge between these two classic models, as well as a novel foundation for the latter.     

A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels

We provide a simple behavioral definition of ‘subjective mixture’ of acts for a large class of (not necessarily expected‐utility) preferences. Subjective mixtures enjoy the same algebraic properties as the ‘objective mixtures’ used to great advantage in the decision setting introduced by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). This makes it possible to formulate mixture‐space axioms in a fully subjective setting. For illustration, we present simple subjective axiomatizations of some models of choice under uncertainty, including Bewley's model of choice with incomplete preferences (2002).