Institutional Constraints and Deforestation: An Application to Mexico

Following North (1990), this article hypothesizes that effective rural institutions may impose additional costs on tropical deforestation through agricultural conversion. This allows a formal agricultural household analysis of institutional constraints on deforestation and therefore a method of empirically testing whether there is any significant difference in the actual level of forest land conversion under institutional constraints compared to the level of conversion under pure open access. A dynamic panel analysis for agricultural planted area in Mexico at state level and over the 1960–85 period confirms that institutional constraints on land clearing affected deforestation during the pre-NAFTA era.     

Nichts genaues weiss man nicht!?

What do voters really know about party platforms and how do they perceive the contents? Are there any relationships between party election platforms and electoral behavior? Despite of much research on parties, there are hardly any answers to these questions. If political parties devise programmes in order to influence political attitudes or electoral behavior, it will be necessary that these programmes are read by people. But it seems to be unclear if and how people do so. This article shows clearly that voters don’t know much about party manifestoes. Still, programmes are more important for voters than many people believe. Programmes are also an important factor for electoral behavior. But there is still a lack of data to get evident results.     

A Strategic Approach to Rights: Lessons from Clientelism in Rural Peru

International norms of social, economic and political rights are presented as a means of transforming social relations in developing countries. Yet, when rights norms are introduced into domestic practice, they do not always produce liberal, democratic results. Instead, rights and local practices of clientelism mix. This article examines this political process in rural Peru. Alternatives to clientelism emerge when NGOs and international development agencies forge strategic and selective coalitions between urban middle‐class sectors and the rural poor. This calls for an explicit politics of advancing rights by any means necessary: accepting hybrid forms when inevitable, incorporating excluded groups when possible, and striking alliances that displace traditional elites.     

Statistical modeling for Bayesian extrapolation of adult clinical trial information in pediatric drug evaluation

Children represent a large underserved population of “therapeutic orphans,” as an estimated 80% of children are treated off‐label. However, pediatric drug development often faces substantial challenges, including economic, logistical, technical, and ethical barriers, among others. Among many efforts trying to remove these barriers, increased recent attention has been paid to extrapolation; that is, the leveraging of available data from adults or older age groups to draw conclusions for the pediatric population. The Bayesian statistical paradigm is natural in this setting, as it permits the combining (or “borrowing”) of information across disparate sources, such as the adult and pediatric data. In this paper, authored by the pediatric subteam of the Drug Information Association Bayesian Scientific Working Group and Adaptive Design Working Group, we develop, illustrate, and provide suggestions on Bayesian statistical methods that could be used to design improved pediatric development programs that use all available information in the most efficient manner. A variety of relevant Bayesian approaches are described, several of which are illustrated through 2 case studies: extrapolating adult efficacy data to expand the labeling for Remicade to include pediatric ulcerative colitis and extrapolating adult exposure‐response information for antiepileptic drugs to pediatrics.     

Übertragung und Gegenübertragung im Coaching

The author describes the use of psychoanalytic concepts in coaching work. At first, the classical issue of transference and its modern forms will be discussed, later the classical issue of countertransference and its modern forms. Finally, the author presents two case studies on transference and countertransference in coaching work.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CULTURAL TRANSMISSION: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper emphasizes the two‐way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural transmission of civicness. The returns to being uncivic are increasing in the generosity of unemployment insurance; but this generosity is decreasing in the number of uncivic individuals. In this context, I determine the evolution of preferences across generations and show that cultural heterogeneity is sustained over the long‐run. The dynamics of cultural transmission can generate a long lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and an increase in people's willingness to live off government‐provided benefits. Hence, it offers an explanation to the ‘European unemployment puzzle’ due to the coexistence of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s.     

Sentiments

This paper develops a new theory of fluctuations—one that helps accommodate the notions of “animal spirits” and “market sentiment” in unique‐equilibrium, rational‐expectations, macroeconomic models. To this goal, we limit the communication that is embedded in a neoclassical economy by allowing trading to be random and decentralized. We then show that the business cycle may be driven by a certain type of extrinsic shocks which we call sentiments. These shocks formalize shifts in expectations of economic activity without shifts in the underlying preferences and technologies; they are akin to sunspots, but operate in unique‐equilibrium models. We further show how communication may help propagate these shocks in a way that resembles the spread of fads and rumors and that gives rise to boom‐and‐bust phenomena. We finally illustrate the quantitative potential of our insights within a variant of the RBC model.     

Optimal Inattention to the Stock Market With Information Costs and Transactions Costs

Information costs, which comprise costs of gathering and processing information about stock values and costs of deciding how to respond to this information, induce a consumer to remain inattentive to the stock market for finite intervals of time. Whether, and how much, a consumer transfers assets between accounts depends on the costs of undertaking such transactions. In general, optimal behavior by a consumer facing both information costs and transactions costs is state‐dependent, with the timing of observations and the timing and size of transactions depending on the state. Surprisingly, if the fixed component of the transactions cost is sufficiently small, then eventually, with probability 1, a time‐dependent rule emerges: the interval between observations is constant and on each observation date, the consumer converts enough assets to liquid assets to finance consumption until the next observation. If the fixed component of transactions costs is large, the optimal rule remains state‐dependent indefinitely.