ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.     

Vector correlation for elliptical distributions

A measure of multivariate correlation between two sets of vectors is considered when the underlying joint distribution is a member of the class of elliptical distributions. Its asymptotic distribution is derived under different situations and these results are used to test hypotheses on vector correlation when the underlying joint distribution is non-normal.     

Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations

We consider a normal-form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. The actions representing other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the sovereign, individual control of the players. We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are stated and we identify conditions under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent. We apply this framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly, typically, a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium. The paradox vanishes if the cartel attains a leadership position. For international pollution abatement treaties, cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.     

On the historical determinants of third sector strength: A qualitative comparative analysis

This study proposes a theoretical explanation for the main causes of the third sector's strength. A Boolean comparative analysis based mainly on the theoretical frameworks of Rokkan and Esping-Andersen indicates that the combination of state-supported urban interests and Protestantism are necessary conditions. This result is very close to Max Weber's explanation of civil society which presupposes the facilitating role of the autonomous state. Thus, the empirical results are reinterpreted within the context of a Weberian explanatory framework. The implications of this endeavor within the historical context of developing countries are further explicated.     

Will they stay or will they go? How network properties of WebICs predict dropout rates of valuable Wikipedians

This paper contributes to our understanding of an increasingly prevalent work system, web-based internet communities (WebICs). We are particularly interested in how WebICs are governed given the fact how different they are compared to more classical forms of organization. We study the governance of a WebIC by studying the structure and dynamics of their edit network. Given the fact that the edit network is a relational structure, social network analysis is key to understanding these work systems. We demonstrate that characteristics of the edit network contribute to predicting the dropout hazard of valuable WebIC members. Since WebICs exist only thanks to the activity of their contributors, predicting drop-outs becomes crucial. The results show that reputation and controversy have different effects for different types of Wikipedians; i.e., an actor’s reputation decreases the dropout hazard of active Wikipedians, while participation on controversial pages decreases the dropout hazard of highly active Wikipedians.     

Network influence and organizational performance: The effects of tie strength and structural equivalence

We combine theory and empirical evidence to develop and test three related claims about how ties strength and structural equivalence affect interorganizational performance similarity. First, network partners attain similar levels of performance because direct network ties facilitate information and resource sharing, and the diffusion of organizational practices. Organizations occupying similar network positions attain similar levels of performance because they face similar competitive constraints. Second, because mechanisms underlying performance similarity implied by direct network ties and similarity in network positions are different, strength of network ties and network position affect different dimensions of organizational performance. Third, we expect that tie strength will affect aspects of performance that are more likely to be influenced by processes activated by the direct contact between network partners. We expect structural equivalence to affect more strongly those aspects of organizational performance that are more directly influenced by competition. An analysis of interorganizational networks and organizational performance within a regional community of hospitals provides evidence in support of these claims. Models estimated on a sample of 8190 interorganizational dyads suggest that the effects of tie strength and structural equivalence on organizational performance are highly differentiated and contingent on specific aspects of performance. We show that these conclusions are robust with respect to a wide variety of other factors that may be responsible for performance similarity including competitive interdependence, structural homophily, and resource complementarity.     

How do actors shape social networks during the process of new product development?

Recent studies on new-idea generation and development have highlighted the role played by network structure in the genesis of new combinations or the process of selecting ideas. However, less attention has been paid to the factors that entice actors to shape social networks during the process of the development of new ideas.This research was conducted in an R&D facility of a semi-conductor company. We analysed the generation of five creative projects and their development over a four-year period. We used a longitudinal approach and collected data through interviews and observations to identify the creative contributions and the actors who were involved at different time periods for each project. We mapped the relationships between actors who contributed to the development of each idea through creative thinking and/or helped it to become accepted both internally and externally over three-year windows. This method generated data on network evolution.We also carried out a qualitative analysis and identified four main factors explaining why actors turn to others during the idea-development process: (1) to gain access to information; (2) to enhance credibility; (3) to exercise one’s influence; and (4) to gain access to knowledge through people or objects. We demonstrate that different types of ties or network structures are relied upon to reap different kinds of benefits. This may partially explain network evolution as an idea progresses through different development stages.     

AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital‐backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements—namely, put and call options, tag‐along and drag‐along rights, demand and piggy‐back rights, and catch‐up clauses. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we show that these clauses can ensure that the contract parties make efficient ex ante investments in the firm. They do so by constraining renegotiation. In the absence of the clauses, ex ante investment would be distorted by unconstrained renegotiation aimed at (i) precluding value‐destroying ex post transfers, (ii) inducing value‐increasing ex post investments, or (iii) precluding hold‐out on value‐increasing sales to a trade buyer or the IPO market. (JEL: G34)     

Identity and Disruptiveness in Boys: Longitudinal Perspectives

After more than 30 years of research on identity, the links between identity and disruptive behaviors are not clear. This study compared the identity formation of boys with stable disruptive behaviors from age 6 to age 15 (n = 16), with the identity formation of boys that were never disruptive during the same period (n = 25). All boys came from low socio-economic status families. At age 9 and 11, identity was assessed with the The Self-Perception Profile for Children (Harter, 1985). At age 15, identity was assessed with the Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (Adams, Bennion, & Huh, 1989) and two scales of the Offer Self-Image Questionnaire (Offer, Ostrov, & Howard, 1981). Differences between disruptive and non-disruptive boys were found only for behavior in childhood and identity in ideological domains at age 15. Explanations for the weakness of the link between identity and disruptiveness are discussed.