A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof,efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, tops-onlyness, and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem. We are grateful to an associate editor of this journal for comments that helped to improve the presentation of the paper and to Matt Jackson for suggesting us the interest of identifying a maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules. We are also grateful to Dolors Berga, Flip Klijn, Howard Petith, and a referee for helpful comments. The work of Alejandro Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya, and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB unde r a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya.     

Measuring and implementing equality of opportunity for income

Departing from the welfarist tradition, recent theories of justice focus on individual opportunities as the appropriate standard for distributive judgments. To explore how this philosophical conception can be translated into concrete public policy, we select the income as relevant outcome and the income tax as the relevant redistributive policy, and we address the following questions: (i) what is the degree of opportunity inequality in an income distribution? (ii) how to design an opportunity egalitarian income tax policy? Several criteria for ranking income distributions on the basis of equality of opportunities are derived. Moreover, we characterize an opportunity egalitarian income tax and we formulate criteria for choosing among alternative tax schedules. I would like to thank Peter Lambert for his encouragement and guidance, and Walter Bossert, Maurice Salles, and partecipants at the 1998 Social Choice and Welfare Conference, Vancouver, and at the Conference on Non–Welfaristic Issues in Normative Economics in Caen for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support of the Ministero dellIstruzione, Università e Ricerca (Italy) is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any remaining deficiency is mine.     

Population monotonic rules for fair allocation problems

We consider the property of population monotonicity in the context of fair allocation problems in private good economies. It is already known that the property is compatible with the equal division lower bound. We show that if the equal division lower bound is replaced with no envy, the compatibility does not hold. We also show that the incompatibility persists even though no envy is weakened to no domination or -no domination. Hence, among the fairness criteria mentioned above, only the equal division lower bound is compatible with population monotonicity.This part of my dissertation thesis. I thank to my advisor William Thomson for many valuable comments. I also thank to Youngsub Chun and Yangkyu Byun for their comments. All remaining errors are, of course, mine.     

Monotonicity of ‘ranking by choosing’: A progress report

Procedures designed to select alternatives on the basis of the results of pairwise contests between them have received much attention in literature. The particular case of tournaments has been studied in depth. More recently weak tournaments and valued generalizations thereof have been investigated.The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent these choice procedures may be meaningfully used to define ranking procedures via their repeated use, i.e. when the equivalence classes of the ranking are determined by successive applications of the choice procedure. This is what we call ranking by choosing. As could be expected, such ranking procedures raise monotonicity problems. We analyze these problems and show that it is nevertheless possible to isolate a large class of well-behaved choice procedures for which failures of monotonicity are not overly serious. The hope of finding really attractive ranking by choosing procedures is however shown to be limited. Our results are illustrated on the case of tournaments.I am grateful to Hervé Raynaud and Jean-Claude Vansnick for stimulating discussions. Jean-François Laslier, Thierry Marchant, Bernard Monjardet, Xavier Juret and an anonymous referee made very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this text. Special thanks go to Patrice Perny who introduced me to the subject and to Olivier Hudry for his help with Slater orders. The usual caveat applies. Part of this work was accomplished while I was visiting the Service de Mathématiques de la Gestion at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (Brussels, Belgium). I gratefully acknowledge the warm hospitality of the Service de Mathématique de la Gestion as well as the support from the Belgian Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique and the Brussels-Capital Region through a Research in Brussels action grant.     

Choice,freedom, and freedom of choice

This paper argues in favour of a distinction between freedom and freedom of choice – a distinction that economists and political philosophers have so far either ignored or drawn wrongly. Drawing the distinction correctly may help to resolve a number of disputes in contemporary political philosophy and non-welfarist normative economics regarding the so-called preference-based account of freedom and the relevance, to judgements about freedom, of degrees of similarity between agents options. The paper begins by setting out three much discussed axioms for the measurement of freedom (of choice?) originally put forward by Pattanaik and Xu. It is suggested that the problems these axioms give rise to can be solved by distinguishing correctly between freedom and freedom of choice. The paper then sets out definitions of freedom, choice and freedom of choice, justifying these in philosophical terms and arguing their superiority to alternative definitions. Finally, on the basis of these definitions and with reference to Pattanaik and Xus axioms, it is shown that an agent can enjoy freedom without enjoying freedom of choice, and that she can enjoy an increase in one of these without enjoying an increase in the other. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I should like to thank Keith Dowding, Martin van Hees, Matthew Kramer, Marco Negri, Serena Olsaretti, Olof Page, Mario Ricciardi, Alan Ritter, Hillel Steiner, Kotaro Suzumura and audiences at seminars in Manchester, Palermo, Pavia and Oxford. I am grateful to the Italian Ministry for Higher Education (MURST) and the Italian National Research Council (CNR) for funding that facilitated the completion of the paper.     

Is proximity preservation rational in social choice theory?

We establish a strong impossibility theorem of a rational social choice that the proximity preservation (also called weak proximorphism WPX) and the diagonal surjectivity are logically inconsistent. The result is valid for finite or infinite alternatives, discrete or continuous. It generalizes the Baigent theorem, largely weakening his antecedent. For continuum set of alternatives, we clarify the notion of WPX by showing (1) WPX almost implies the continuity, (2) WPX is almost rigid. These observations raise the issue whether WPX is a natural condition for a social welfare function. A splitting reformulation of the proximity preservation which is weaker but rational is suggested.     

KNOWING TOO MUCH ABOUT OTHERS: MODERATORS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAVESDROPPING AND RAPPORT IN SOCIAL INTERACTION

This study examined the association between a partners ability to eavesdrop on nonverbal cues and an actors feelings of rapport during interaction, as well as neuroticism and self-monitoring as moderators of this effect. Eavesdropping ability was defined as lower sensitivity to cues of the face, a source of overtly displayed emotions, relative to sensitivity to cues of the body, a source of leakage of covert or hidden emotions. Results showed that actors felt less rapport the higher their partners eavesdropping. High neuroticism actors were especially likely to feel worse about their interaction and themselves when their partners were good at eavesdropping. In both instances, the eavesdroppers nonverbal behavior seems to have mediated the associations to a small degree.Both authors contributed equally to this paper. This research was supported by a Mary Switzer Research Fellowship to Tickle-Degnen from the National Institutes of Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the US Department of Education, a Sargent College of Boston University Accelerated Research Grant, and funding from the American Occupational Therapy Association, Inc., the American Occupational Therapy Foundation, and Boston University through the Neurobehavioral Rehabilitation Research Center for Scholarship and Research.     

Fiscal equalisation: Principles and an application to the European Union

The paper derives a normative model for partial fiscal equalisation based on a number of axioms and makes special allowance for the existence of a specific fiscal need in the jurisdictions. A simple version of this idealised equalisation scheme relates net contributions to the equalisation funds to deviations of a jurisdictions gross income from average gross income and a jurisdictions specific needs from average specific needs. The theoretical model is then empirically tested for the case of the European Union using data from 1986–97. It is found that most restrictions of the model appear to hold, in particular, relatively richer countries contribute more and those with greater fiscal needs, approximated by the importance of the agricultural sector, pay less. However, in the EU, an adjustment of net payments to changes in the actual importance of the specific fiscal need for a country is lacking.The paper was presented at the CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics 2001 in Munich and at a research seminar in Berlin. Thanks to the participants, Matthias Brückner, Johann Brunner, Jeremy Edwards, Friedrich Heinemann, Eckhard Janeba, Roland Strausz, and Alfons Weichenreider for helpful comments. Special thanks to an anonymous referee for many detailed suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.     

Promoting Philanthropy? News Publicity and Voluntary Organizations in Canada

This paper reports exploratory data from a broader study that examines media representations of the voluntary sector in Canada. It specifically identifies the resources and organizational attributes of Canadian voluntary groups that appear to be important for receiving mainstream news coverage. The data identifies four sets of characteristics of more than 500 voluntary organizations: demographic variables, association type, noneconomic resources, and economic expenditures. These characteristics are examined in terms of their relationship to news coverage. The data suggest that area of activity is significantly related to the amount of media attention that organizations receive. However, the amount of media attention that an organization receives is most strongly influenced by its yearly budget. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to both current debates about advocacy in the voluntary sector and important contextual developments that are transforming the communication environment in which charities and nonprofit organizations in Canada operate. We also draw comparisons to news coverage of the voluntary sector in other liberal democratic countries.     

Global Complexity and Global Civil Society

This paper argues that recent struggles against neoliberal axioms such as free trade and open markets have led to a militant reframing of global civil society by grassroots social movements. It contests that this struggle to invest the concept of global civil society with transformative potential rests upon an identifiable praxis, a strange attractor that disturbs other civil society actors, through its re-articulation of a politics that privileges self-organization, direct action, and direct democracy. The paper further suggests that the emergence of this antagonistic orientation is best understood through the lens of complexity theory and offers some conceptual tools to begin the process of analyzing global civil society as an outcome and effect of global complexity.