ONTARIO STUDENT PARTY ACTIVISTS: A NOTE ON DIFFERENTIAL PARTICIPATION IN A VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION

Bien qu'un bon nombre d'études de participation politique aient été faites auprès de publics de masse, le degré de participation de ceux que Ton désigne habituellement d'activistes politiques a été presque complétement ignoré. Cette note de recherche porte sur le degré de participation à l'intérieur de clubs universitaires rattachés à un parti politique á partir de données obtenues au moyen de questionnaires envoyés à un échantillon d'activistes dans plusieurs universités ontariennes au printemps de 1970. L'analyse par classification multiple est utilisée pour mesurer l'effet de plusieurs variables sur le degré de participation. Un résultat important se trouve dans ce que plusieurs variables qui peuvent servir à expliquer pourquoi on devient membre d'une association volontaire telle qu'un club politique sont inutiles pour expliquer le degré de participation dans les activités du club.
Although there have been a number of studies of political participation among mass publics, there have been virtually no efforts made to study differential participation among those conventionally designated as political activists. This research note focuses on differential participation within university political party clubs, using data derived from questionnaires sent to a sample of political club activists in the several Ontario universities in the spring of 1970. Multiple classification analysis is used to assess the impact of several variables on differential participation. A major finding is that some variables, useful for explaining who joins a voluntary organization such as a political club, are unable to explain level of participation in the club's activities.     

LARGE MONETARY INCENTIVES AND THEIR EFFECT ON MAIL SURVEY RESPONSE RATES

The effect of various large monetary incentives was examinedin a mail survey of owners of small construction subcontractingcompanies. The sample was randomly divided into seven groups,each of which received either a different monetary amount enclosedwith the first mailing ($1 cash, $5 cash, $5 check, $10 check,$20 check, or $40 check) or an offer of a $50 check to be sentonce the questionnaire was returned. These groups were comparedagainst each other and against a control group that did notreceive an incentive. Three follow-up mailings were sent tothe nonrespondents in each group. The results indicate that$1 significantly increased the response rate over the no incentivecontrol condition regardless of the number of mailings. Theresponse rate also increased significantly as the incentiveamount increased from $1 to $5 and from $5 to $20. There wasa nonsignificant difference in response rate between the $5check and $5 cash groups. The promise of $50 did not resultin a significantly higher response rate than the control group.Discussion includes a cost-benefit analysis of the incentives,as well as a section about the increased "favorability" of respondentstoward the survey sponsor within the large incentive groups.     

DECOMPOSING TRENDS IN INCOME VOLATILITY: THE “WILD RIDE” AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM

We use 2‐year panels from the Current Population Survey to provide a detailed accounting of family income volatility from 1980 to 2009. Volatility doubled overall, and the increase was most pronounced among the top 1% of the income distribution, but in any given year the level of volatility among the bottom 10% exceeds that of the top. The increased volatility comes from higher instability of head and spouse earnings, other nonlabor income, and from reduced covariance between these income sources with the tax system. This suggests that current tax policy is less effective in mitigating income shocks than previous decades. (JEL J31, I30)