MONEY DEMAND AND QUANTITY CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE SOVIET INTERVIEW PROJECT

This paper examines the effects of shortages on the demand for money of Soviet citizens. It is the first to examine the demand for money in a centrally planned economy using cross-section data in which alternatives to income and interest rates are used to explain money demand. We find demand for broad money and liquid assets depends on income, illiquid wealth, participation in the underground economy, and the severity of quantity constraints as well as demographic factors. Our findings show that quantity constraints decrease demand for the national currency and increase demand for convertible currencies and barter transactions.     

MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING

In franchising, many of the elements of moral hazard models merge. Issues of two-sided moral hazard, bonding, and asset specificity all play a role. We extend the literature by considering how asset specificity creates an implicit bond and affects incentive pay. This approach implies that if one party posts a larger bond, this improves their incentives and allows enhancement of the other party's incentives through a larger residual income claim. Our empirical work supports this approach. For example, reductions in the specificity of the franchisee's investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee. (JEL L14, 533)     

Team Building, Inter-agency Team Development and Social Work Practice

Correspondence to Paul Iles, Human Resources Strategy Lecturer, Open Business School, Open University School of Management, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK 76A Y Summary The need to improve the effectiveness of working teams in socialwork practice has often been recognized, and a variety of teamdevelopment techniques exist which aim to develop teamwork skills.Some of the more important techniques are reviewed, along withthe evidence for the effectiveness of team development strategies.Such approaches have however primarily been employed with teamsin single autonomous organizations, and their transferabilityto multi-disciplinary or inter-agency teams remains problematic.Drawing on an intervention with a Community Drug Team involvingsocial work, health and other professionals, and an action researchproject designed to promote better collaboration between hospitalsocial workers and nursing staff in a hospital maternity unitante-natal clinic, a framework for inter-agency team developmentis described and its relevance for social work practice discussed.     

The Side Effects of Intervention?

Summary Are families worrying too much about ordinary, everyday difficultiesor are we trying too hard to help, resulting in a kind of systemsoverdose? Through the use of two case examples, the authorsexplore these questions, concluding that social work and otheragencies might be in danger of over-reacting, thereby addingto a family's difficulties. Strategies for change at the familylevel and within the welfare network are discussed.     

CHARITIES, NO; LOTTERIES, NO; CASH, YES: MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS IN A CANADIAN INCENTIVES EXPERIMENT

The effects on response rates to mail surveys of prepaymentcash incentives, charitable donations, and the chance to wina lottery prize are examined in a true experimental design.A survey on environmental issues was conducted during the fallof 1994 among 3,088 households drawn from the Grand River watershedregion of southwestern Ontario, Canada. The 20-cell incentivesexperiment crossed three levels of prepaid monetary cash incentive($2, $5, and $10) with a control group (no cash incentive),plus the offer to make a charitable donation ranging from $2to $10 on behalf of the respondent, or participation in a lotteryfor prizes of $200. The overall response rate to the survey,with three follow-ups, was 70.7 percent with the effects ofthe prepaid cash rewards demonstrated, but not those for thelottery or charitable donations. Logistic regression analysisof response rate supports a main effects model for cash incentivesbut does not support either of two alternative models for maineffects of the lottery and charitable donations or interactions.Further analysis demonstrates a pattern of earlier responseas a result of prepaid incentives. The findings are discussedin terms of their cost-benefit implications and with respectto conceptualizations of respondents' motives for completingmail questionnaires.     

MANDATORY RETIREMENT AS A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRACT

This paper postulates the existence of an "employment insurance contract" in which firms insure the employment of workers, at a predetermined wage, against potential, age related declines in productivity. To limit its liability the firm establishes an age limit to its promise ––– the mandatory retirement age. It is demonstrated that Pareto-efficient contracts exist which involve mandatory retirement at a specific age. The existence of these contracts, including mandatory retirement, increases workers' life-time utility and encourages the accumulation of human capital. Empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.