SOME EVIDENCE ON LUMP SUM VERSUS CONVEX COSTS OF CHANGING PRICES

Two models in which price stickiness results from price adjustment costs are tested. One, an (s,S) pricing model, assumes lump-sum adjustment costs and predicts firms will make relatively large, infrequent price changes. The other assumes convex adjustment costs and predicts frequent, partial price adjustments. Survey data of firms' price behavior reveal patterns consistent with the (s,S) model. However, many of the patterns are also consistent with partial-adjustment rules, although the high percentage of firms which fix prices for a quarter or more casts doubt on the plausibility of the partial-adjustment hypothesis.     

OPTIMAL INVENTORIES: THE SQUARE ROOT RULE AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

Inventory models are usually based on the existence of transaction costs and explain inventories from efficiency considerations alone. The simplest model involves a "square root rule" where inventory varies with the square root of its determinants. Accounting for profit maximizing behavior relaxes those rigid results and alters their interpretation. The analysis integrates inventory demand theory with the neoclassical theory of the firm and industry.     

OCCUPATION AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN CANADA: THE 1974 FEDERAL ELECTION*

Des données professionnelles sont examinées pour les candidats au Parlement en 1974. Pour tous les parties politiques, les professions de rang élevéétaient sur-représentées, par comparaison aux données du marché du travail, et principalement dans les parties Libérale et Conservateur. Uniquement dans le cas du Crédit Social, a-t-on rencontré une majorité numérique de candidats venants de professions de rang inférieur. En examinant le succes électoral, on a trouvé que indépendamment de l'attache politique, un candidat d'une profession de rang élevé a presque une probabilité deux fois plus grande d'être élu qu'un candidat d'une profession d'un rang inférieur. Les données montrent un phénomène double, dans le sens que premièrement l'ensemble de tous les candidats constitute une plus grande proportion de personnes de rang élevé que la population adulte du Canada et deuxièmement les membres finalement élus constituent encore une plus grande proportion de personnes de rang élevé. Occupational data were examined for all candidates for Parliament in 1974. For all parties, high status occupations were over-represented, relative to labour force statistics, expecially in the Liberal and the Progressive Conservative parties. Only in the Social Credit party did we find a numerical majority of lower status candidates. In examining electoral success, it was found that regardless of political affiliation, a high status candidate had almost twice as high a probability of election as a low status candidate. The data illustrate a two-step phenomenon, wherein the pool of all candidates contains a larger proportion of higher status persons than the total adult Canadian population, while the elected members contain yet a larger proportion of high status persons.