Power: A Conceptual Framework*

Symbolic interactionism lacks a coherent conception of power. This paper defines power in a manner consistent with the interactionist perspective. Power is conceptualized as a collective transaction characterized by a division of labor, movement toward a common end, and flexible coordination between opponents. Power is distinguished from other types of collective transactions by asymmetrical interaction, a conflict of interests between opponents, and the intentional production of compliance. Some implications of considering power as a collective transaction are then examined.     

Family Therapy Process in a Family Therapy Seminar

The interaction between leaders and members in a year-long family therapy seminar is systematically compared to the process that unfolds between therapist and family during the course of family therapy. A five stage developmental process common to both is postulated and described: (1) Battle for Structure, (2) Naive Enthusiasm, (3) Conflictual Frustration, (4) Task Orientation, and (5) Mutuality. The dynamic elements of each stage are analyzed and factors affecting their development are identified. It is concluded that this five stage process occurs in all similar groups, but that the content of each stage may vary widely from group to group.     

Some computational problems related to multinomial trials

Efficient numerical algorithms are developed to evaluate several probabilities related to multinomial trials.In the first part of the paper, the probability distribution of the number of trials until the alternatives j, j = 1,… m, have occurred at least i_j times is computed. The multinomial trials involve the m alternatives l,…, m, with positive probabilities P_l-P_m of occurrence. In the second part, several aspects of a multinomial subset selection problem, discussed by S. S. Gupta and K. Nagel, are investigated.     

Life tables for worker honeybees

Summary Life tables for worker honeybees covering all life span, and those for adults, were prepared for three seasonal cohorts,June bees, July bees andwintering bees. Survivorship curves forJune andJuly bees show a convex type being exceptional for insects, with relatively high mortality at egg and feeding larval stages and at later adult stage after most bees became potential foragers. Adult longevity greatly lengthens inWinteriing bees and survivorship curve drops approximately with the same rate. A remarkable similarity of survivorship curves for men and honeybees was demonstrated, apparently due to highly developed social care in both. Some comments were given on mortality factors. The importance of life tables for population researches was shown by applying our result to the population growth curve made byBodenheimer, based upon the data byNolan. At the asymptote of the uncorrected curve, the ratio of total population estimated by uncorrected curve to that by corrected curve reaches about 3∶2. Contribution No. 821 from the Zoological Institute, Faculty of Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. Contributions from JIBP-PT No. 45. This study was in part supportod by a grant in aid from the Ministry of Education for the special project research, “Studies on the dynamic status of biosphere.” Population and bioeconomic studies on the honeybee colonies. II. We express our sincere thanks to Dr. YosiakiIt?, National Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Tokyo, for his kind stimulation and advices to the present work.     

Wage indexation: Social benefits and private incentives

The question addressed in this paper is: Do social benefits from wage indexation coincide with private incentives to incorporate COLA clauses in union contracts? In general, market forces provide an “approximately correct” solution so that legislative remedies are not required. Based on the work of Gray and Fischer, full indexation is beneficial when the economy is subjected to stochastic nominal shocks, but only partial indexation is optimal when real disturbances dominate. If unions and management of firms are risk-averse they both have an incentive to adopt full indexation when monetary uncertainty exists. On the other hand, when the economy faces real shocks, union negotiators oppose indexation if the demand for labor is elastic, but insist on full indexation if demand is inelastic. Managers of firms prefer nominal wage contracts in either case. This suggests that both parties will agree to omit COLA clauses in the first case, but are likely to compromise with partial indexation in the second case. A role for government intervention is indicated only to the extent that bargaining strength may dictate a degree of indexation that deviates from the social optimum. The analysis is extended briefly to other assumptions about the utility function of the two parties at the bargaining table.