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111.
Family therapists can learn a great deal that would be of utility to them in their clinical work from normal families grieving over the death of an infant. When a baby dies, families begin a long and difficult journey, a search for security and meaning in a world that for them has gone insane. The researcher discusses 10 probing, extremely difficult questions family members commonly pose in the aftermath of an infant death and offers guidelines that could be helpful to family therapists hoping to be of service to families in the process of healing and growing through this tragedy.  相似文献   
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This paper presents an algorithm for the construction of optimal or near optimal change-over designs for arbitrary numbers of treatments, periods and units. Previous research on optimality has been either theoretical or has resulted in limited tabulations of small optimal designs. The algorithm consists of a number of steps:first find an optimal direct treatment effects design, ignoring residual effects, and then optimise this class of designs with respect to residual effects. Poor designs are avoided by judicious application of the (M, S)-optimality criterion, and modifications of it, to appropriate matrices. The performance of the algorithm is illustrated by examples.  相似文献   
114.
Although surveys are extensively used in sociology, there has been a relative neglect of the effect of task definition upon results obtained. The present article examines the effects of one such task variable, length and specificity of the cue, on response sets concerning the frequency and quantity of alcohol consumed. In one survey format, respondents were asked to report the average number of days drinking per month, and the average number of drinks consumed on each of these occasions. In the second format, questions concerning the monthly frequency of alcohol consumption and quantity consumed were decomposed by twelve drinking locations. The results indicate dramatic increases both in terms of frequency and quantity between the two questionnaire formats. Implications of these results are discussed within the framework of the methodological phenomena of telescoping and the social psychological tendency to under-report threatening behaviors.  相似文献   
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John T. Barr 《Risk analysis》1991,11(3):373-373
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While applying theclassical maximum likelihood method for a certain statistical inference problem, Smith and Weissman [5] have noted that there are conditions under which the likelihood function may be unbounded above or may not possess local maximizers. Ariyawansà and Templeton [1] have derived inference procedures for this problem using the theory of structural inference [2,3,4]. Based on numerical experience, and without proof, they state that the resulting likelihood functions possess unique, global maximizers, even in instances where the classical maximum likelihood method fails in the above sense. In this paper, we prove that under quite mild conditions, these likelihood functions that result from the application of the theory of structural inference are well-behaved, and possess unique, global maximizers. This research was supported in part by the Applied Mathematical Sciences subprogram of the U.S. Department of Energy under contract W-31-109-Eng-38 while the author was visiting the Mathematics and Computer Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois.  相似文献   
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The importance of client beliefs in career counseling depends on their ability to add unique information about the client over and above that contributed by aptitudes and interests. The Career Beliefs Inventory was administered to 200 Australian students in grade 10 together with measures of Holland's RIASEC interest themes and scholastic aptitudes. The correlations between scales from the three domains showed clearly that beliefs made a contribution distinct from that provided by aptitudes and interests. Even though the results may reflect possible sampling or method variance, career beliefs in this sample added unique information to that traditionally used in career counseling.  相似文献   
120.
A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Voter preferences are characterized by a parameter s (say, income) distributed on a set S according to a probability measure F. There is a single issue (say, a tax rate) whose level, b, is to be politically decided. There are two parties, each of which is a perfect agent of some constituency of voters, voters with a given value of s. An equilibrium of the electoral game is a pair of policies, b 1 and b 2, proposed by the two parties, such that b i maximizes the expected utility of the voters whom party i represents, given the policy proposed by the opposition. Under reasonable assumptions, the unique electoral equilibrium consists in both parties proposing the favorite policy of the median voter. What theory can explain why, historically, we observe electoral equilibria where the ‘right’ and ‘left’ parties propose different policies? Uncertainty concerning the distribution of voters is introduced. Let {F(t)} t ε T be a class of probability measures on S; all voters and parties share a common prior that the distribution of t is described by a probability measure H on T. If H has finite support, there is in general no electoral equilibrium. However, if H is continuous, then electoral equilibrium generally exists, and in equilibrium the parties propose different policies. Convergence of equilibrium to median voter politics is proved as uncertainty about the distribution of voter traits becomes small.  相似文献   
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