BARGAINING WITH SHARED INFORMATION*

This paper formulates and analyzes models of two-party bargaining behavior where each side possesses private information about its preferences that is unavailable to the other. We examine the strategic behavior that bargainers might exhibit when disclosing information either to an arbitrator or to each other. Our results show that when bargaining is over one issue, it is relatively uncomplicated analytically to calculate the optimal strategy, but, despite this, even sophisticated bargainers tend to make wrong assumptions about the behavior of others and to use strategies that are far from optimal. When the bargaining encompasses several factors, computation of optimal strategies becomes very cumbersome and the use of an optimal strategy does not gain a bargainer much over what he could have achieved with truthful revelation. Thus, in theory, truthful revelation is not the best course of action to adopt for a bargainer interested in maximizing individual gain, but in practice the alternatives may involve mistaken assumptions about the behavior of others and may therefore turn out to be inferior to truthful revelation.     

Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n‐person unanimity bargaining game. As is well‐known, in this game every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (also as a subgame perfect equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient and if n & 2). Moreover, delays in agreement are also possible in such equilibria. By limiting ourselves to a plausible notion of complexity that captures length of memory, we find that the introduction of complexity costs (lexicographically with the standard payoffs) does not reduce the range of possible allocations but does limit the amount of delay that can occur in any agreement. In particular, we show that in any n‐player game, for any allocation z, an agreement on z at any period t can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the game with complexity costs if and only if t≤n. We use the limit on delay result to establish that, in equilibrium, the strategies implement stationary behavior. Finally, we also show that ‘noisy Nash equilibrium’ with complexity costs sustains only the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocation.     

INFERENCE IN DIRICHLET PROCESS MIXED GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS BY USING MONTE CARLO EM

Generalized linear mixed models are widely used for describing overdispersed and correlated data. Such data arise frequently in studies involving clustered and hierarchical designs. A more flexible class of models has been developed here through the Dirichlet process mixture. An additional advantage of using such mixture models is that the observations can be grouped together on the basis of the overdispersion present in the data. This paper proposes a partial empirical Bayes method for estimating all the model parameters by adopting a version of the EM algorithm. An augmented model that helps to implement an efficient Gibbs sampling scheme, under the non‐conjugate Dirichlet process generalized linear model, generates observations from the conditional predictive distribution of unobserved random effects and provides an estimate of the average number of mixing components in the Dirichlet process mixture. A simulation study has been carried out to demonstrate the consistency of the proposed method. The approach is also applied to a study on outdoor bacteria concentration in the air and to data from 14 retrospective lung‐cancer studies.     

Cost and Shortage Trade-Offs in Aggregate Production Planning*

It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to measure shortage costs. To bypass this difficulty in aggregate production planning, this paper develops an optimal policy function (piecewise linear or a curve) for trade-offs between shortages and the sum of production and inventory costs. The optimal management decision is based on this function. It should be of major interest in production planning since similar functions for inventory management have been successfully applied in practice.     

Hip‐hop Imaginaries: a Genealogy of the Present

In this article, I track the emergence of Hip‐hop imaginaries in the enunciatory present, focusing on three disparate scenes: democratic change in Bolivia, cultural resistance in Hawaii, and the foundations of Hip‐hop that emerged from New York City. I position Hip‐hop as a mode of cultural expression that gives resistant form to marginalized existences abjected from dominant society through political and economic exclusion. I trace the origins of Hip‐hop in New York in order to show how the idea of existential resistance provides a useful interpretive framework in which to theorize the relationships between cultural resistance and political change. I utilize this framework by looking at Hip‐hop in two disparate locations, first analyzing the music of Hawaiian Hip‐hop group Sudden Rush and contextualizing it within the contemporary Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement. Second, Bolivia’s newly emergent Hip‐hop scene amidst a turbulent culture of political protest provides a useful contrast to that of Hawaii’s. In the end, I argue that Hip‐hop imaginaries in Hawaii and Bolivia demonstrate inter‐related strategies of national and cultural decolonization which carry distinct political implications.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supply Chain Disruptions on Long‐Run Stock Price Performance and Equity Risk of the Firm

This paper investigates the long‐term stock price effects and equity risk effects of supply chain disruptions based on a sample of 827 disruption announcements made during 1989–2000. Stock price effects are examined starting one year before through two years after the disruption announcement date. Over this time period the average abnormal stock returns of firms that experienced disruptions is nearly –40%. Much of this underperformance is observed in the year before the announcement, the day of the announcement, and the year after the announcement. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that firms do not quickly recover from the negative effects of disruptions. The equity risk of the firm also increases significantly around the announcement date. The equity risk in the year after the announcement is 13.50% higher when compared to the equity risk in the year before the announcement.