Responsible Conduct of Research Measure: Initial Development and Pilot Study

Although much discussion has been focused on research misconduct (RM) and questionable research practices, to date no self-report measures exist to examine this phenomenon. To help fill this void, the authors developed the Responsible Conduct of Research Measure (RCRM) through multiple pilot study waves involving researchers in the social and behavioral sciences. Preliminary results reveal adequate validity and reliability. The authors discuss limitations of the study as well as some possible directions for future research on this topic.     

Which Fox in What Henhouse and When? Conjectures on Regulatory Capture

This article takes an interdisciplinary lens to the treatment of regulatory capture (RC). RC ensues when government bureaucrats, regulators, and public sector agencies receive adverse publicity for ceasing to serve the wider collective public interest. The work is divided into four sections. The first takes the point of view of each of the participants in the capture situation and provides an overview of the three variations on the RC story. Each subsequent section focuses on a version of the story. RC 1, the libertarian free market version celebrates capture as inevitable and desirable. RC 2, the regulators' communitarian take on capture places it in the context of a cycle story with regulators dutifully doing the public's shifting will. In the RC 3 version, the public finds it difficult to piece together a coherent version of the morally charged narrative. The article concludes with a discussion of the relevance of each of these three versions of RC in order to understand dominant–submissive relationships between business and government.     

TOWARD A POSITIVE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ANTITRUST

Most economists associate antitrust policy with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nonetheless, there is in England and America a much older body of antitrust law, namely, the common law of restraint of trade. This regulation, like language and markets, evolved over a long period of time. This article examines whether the rules that the common law courts developed can be explained by a hypothetical wish to maximize social wealth and concludes that many of them can be. The last part of the article outlines a theory of legal evolution.     

LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION

A long-run tendency of industry profit rate to converge to a single competitive level has been a fundamental tenet of the industrial organization approach to the study of competitiveness in a market economy. This paper shows that for the post World War II period a weak equalization can be econometrically identified with different reaction speeds by industry. However, persistent profit rate differences endure. Finally, a portfolio theory of risk is considered as an explanation of these differentials.     

A TALE OF TWO QUESTIONS: BENEFITS OF ASKING MORE THAN ONE QUESTION

In the last two months have you had a physical examination?The ability of 660 people to accurately report on their ownrecent health procedures was assessed by comparing the recollectionsof patients to information extracted from their medical records.A major finding was that when people were asked whether theyhad a specific procedure in a given reference period (e.g.,physical exam within the last two months), overreporting occurred.A simple technique reduced overreporting: The technique entailedasking people about the procedure twice, first in connectionwith a different reference period (e.g., physical exam withinthe last six months) and then in connection with the referenceperiod of interest (e.g., physical exam within the last twomonths). Our data support a "Precision" hypothesis: The advantageof the two–time frame questioning procedure is that itconveys to the respondent that the interviewer wants greaterprecision in dating than the single–time frame questionimplies.     

IDENTIFYING THE EFFECT OF OPEN ACCESS ON CITATIONS USING A PANEL OF SCIENCE JOURNALS

An open‐access journal allows free online access to its articles, obtaining revenue from fees charged to submitting authors or from institutional support. Using panel data on science journals, we are able to circumvent problems plaguing previous studies of the impact of open access on citations. In contrast to the huge effects found in these previous studies, we find a more modest effect: moving from paid to open access increases cites by 8% on average in our sample. The benefit is concentrated among top‐ranked journals. In fact, open access causes a statistically significant reduction in cites to the bottom‐ranked journals in our sample, leading us to conjecture that open access may intensify competition among articles for readers' attention, generating losers as well as winners. (JEL L17, O33)     

LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE IN THE WEAK‐LINK GAME

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four‐player weak‐link game. A weak‐link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto‐ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41)