The effects of co-operating or conflicting over work restructuring: evidence from employees

This paper examines patterns of worker response to the introduction of teamworking at two similar large work sites. We consider whether the patterns of response are significantly different where change has been introduced through a more cooperative or a more conflictual bargaining process. In the cooperative negotiations that more typified one site, trade unions made concessions, generating both dissatisfaction with the terms under which teams were introduced and a decline in job satisfaction. At the site more characterised by conflictual negotiations, employees were more satisfied with teamworking after unions protected manning in teams, negotiated a pay increase for more workers and the side payment of a desired 12‐hours shift pattern. The findings indicate how response to workplace change depended upon the terms under which teams were introduced, in turn shaped in important part by the process of negotiating change.     

Choice Functions with States of Mind

An agent is rational by dominance then states of mind (DSM) if he makes his decisions by, first, preselecting the alternatives that are not dominated by any other alternative in the choice set, and second, by choosing the preselected alternative corresponding to his state of mind. This state of mind is dependent on the previous choices he made. An agent is rational by states of mind then dominance (SMD) if he makes his decisions by, first, preselecting the alternatives corresponding to his state of mind and second, choosing the alternative that is not dominated. We give axiomatizations for SMD-rational or DSM-rational choice functions.      

Does acclamation equal agreement? Rethinking collective effervescence through the case of the presidential “tour de France” during the twentieth century

This article discusses the integrative function frequently assigned to festive events by scholars. This function can be summed up in a proposition: experiencing similar emotions during collective gatherings is a powerful element of socialization. The article rejects this oft-developed idea according to which popular fervor could be an efficient tool to measure civic engagement. It raises the following question: what makes enthusiasm “civic”, “patriotic”, “republican” or simply “political”? Based on a study of French presidential tours in France from 1888 to 2007, this article casts a different light on the topic. The enthusiasm of the crowds interacting with the successive French presidents is not civic because an inquiry may find “patriotism” into participants’ minds. It can be called civic simply because the forms and meaning of the festive jubilation, which may be summarized into the formula: “if spectators applaud, it means they support,” necessarily preexist its multiple manifestations.     

Social Willingness to Pay,Mortality Risks and Contingent Valuation

The Willingness-to-Pay approach is the basic justification for the use of the Contingent Valuation method to evaluate public mortality risk reduction programs. However, aggregating unweighted willingness-to-pay is a valid method only when individuals have the same marginal value of money, an unrealistic assumption in the presence of heterogeneity. We show that heterogeneity on wealth and baseline risk (respectively on risk reduction) leads to systematically overestimate (respectively underestimate) the social value of a risk reduction program. Using a recently published Contingent Valuation analysis, we find this overestimation to be quite modest though, approximately 15% in an upper bound case.     

Statistical vs. identified lives in benefit-cost analysis

Evaluation of projects that affect mortality risk usually assumes that risk changes are small and similar across individuals. In reality, risks differ among individuals and information about risk heterogeneity determines the extent to which affected lives are “statistical” or “identified” and influences the outcome of benefit-cost analysis (BCA). The effects of information about risk heterogeneity on BCA depend on, inter alia, whether information concerns heterogeneity of baseline or change in risk and whether valuation uses compensating or equivalent variation. BCA does not systematically favor identified over statistical lives. We suggest some political factors that may explain the apparent public bias.

Utilitarianism or welfarism: does it make a difference?

We show that it is possible to reconcile the utilitarian and welfarist principles under the requirement of unanimity provided that the set of profiles over which the consensus is attained is rich enough. More precisely, we identify a closedness condition which, if satisfied by a class of n-tuples of utility functions, guarantees that the rankings of social states induced by utilitarian and welfarist unanimities over that class are identical. We illustrate the importance of the result for the measurement of unidimensional as well as multidimensional inequalities from a dominance point of view.     

Taming future mobilities: biopolitics and data behaviourism in the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I critically engage with the European Travel Authorisation and Information System (ETIAS), looking at the rationalities underlying its introduction, its system architecture and its proposed functionalities. Tracing the biopolitical problematisation of the border that led to ETIAS, I argue that the system embodies a shift towards data behaviourism in the regime of truth underlying the biopolitical regulation of the EU border. Data behaviourism establishes a new way of seeing conduct, adding a potential future layer to it. Taming future mobilities through data-mining and future-oriented algorithmic processing, ETIAS imagines mobile subjects in terms of their motility and thereby produces dividuals and blurs the spatio-temporal boundedness of the EU border. ETIAS thereby complicates resistance by avoiding fixed identities and instead rarefies subjects through seeing them as being constantly emergent through new correlations.     

The Impact of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Labor Supply in a Simulated Nash-bargaining Framework

Several theoretical contributions have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Yet very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of labor supply for policy analysis. In this paper, we implement a Nash-bargaining model with external threat points (divorce) into the microsimulation of tax-benefit policy reforms in France. The observation of divorced individuals is used to predict outside options and (some) of the preferences for individuals living in couples. Benchmark simulations are conducted in a way that guarantees consistency with the Nash bargaining setting, regularity conditions and observed behavior. We examine how the labor supply of couples adjusts to shocks on threat points, either hypothetical or generated by a radical tax-benefit reform.