Co‐opetition and Investment for Supply‐Chain Resilience

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss‐sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non‐cooperative game. We describe an incentive‐compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal “gain” for all players, when the solution is “interior” (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an “information rent” in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.     

Research on global strategy

This paper reviews the extant literature on global strategy. We argue that the literature has developed along three major directions, namely: (1) the literature identifying the emergence of a global village; (2) the literature identifying the advantages to a firm following a global strategy; and (3) the literature addressing the management challenges and the implementation issues faced by an international firm. We find that the literature has arrived at a number of important conclusions, namely: (1) the global environment places conflicting demands on participating firms; (2) there is no one strategy called global strategy, firms adopt different strategies to compete in the global arena; (3) the benefits accruing from a global strategy are contingent on the industry environment; (4) it is imperative to have multidimensional capabilities in the global arena; (5) matrix structures are becoming increasingly vital in implementing global strategies; and, finally, (6) the actual benefits of adopting matrix structures are contingent on the adoption of appropriate management processes. We identify the trends in the literature and suggest some directions for further research on the topic.