The ranking assumption

This paper is an attempt to raise some general objections to the whole concept of making decisions on teleological principles. Its scope is finally the whole concept of how we rationally decide, on a teleological basis, to do any act at all. However the arguments developed here arise from the recent discussions about one particular species of teleological decision-making - utilitarianism. Therefore, while I hope that the paper has consequences that are important far beyond this one ethical theory, my objections are phrased in terms of direct arguments about utilitarianism. The recent lively debates on this topic make it easy to ask some interesting questions about this sort of goal-oriented theory. However, if my objections are correct, the scope of these questions is much wider than any one utilitarian theory (or cluster of theories) because my objections are about an assumption that is common to all teleological theories and not just to classical utilitarianism.     

The utilitarian contract: A generalization of Rawls' theory of justice

In a series of major papers culminating in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls constructs an alternative to utilitarianism by developing a social contract theory of moral and political philosophy. Unfortunately, Rawls formulates the two basic principles upon which the theory rests in such a way as to restrict (unduly) the contract theory's applicability (see Section I). In this paper we present a more general discussion of the theory of justice that avoids the problems of Rawls' formulation and yet retains the important idea of justice as fairness and the contractarian approach (Section II). Later it is argued that this more general theory constitutes a bridge between the pure utilitarian theories and the social contract doctrines (Sections V and VI). The theory's advantages are demonstrated by applying it to a problem discussed by Rawls, intergenerational equity, and comparing the two solutions (Section III). Further comparisons are made and inferences drawn in the concluding three sections.Without implicating them, we would like to thank James M. Buchanan and David Lyons for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Young People's Images of Self and Others

In an analysis of the validity of popular stereotypes of youthful conflict with adult society, based upon surveys carried out in Melbourne, the attitudes of young people are compared with the attitudes which they impute to their friends, parents and teachers. The results indicate that young people are influenced in their estimate of the friends' attitudes by the popular stereotype of young people which may in turn, influence their own attitudes. This interpretation explains the distribution of responses along the conservative-innovative continuum, except in regard to opposition to de-humanization where the respondents are more likely to attribute innovative responses to themselves than to their friends. Most young people perceive their interpersonal environment to be supportive of their own attitudes.     

Neonatal euthanasia: attributions of students and nurses

An attributional analysis of neonatal euthanasia was undertaken in two studies to compare the responsibility attributions of nursing and non-nursing students (Study 1) and nurses (Study 2) toward a physician for a critically ill neonate's death. In both studies, vignettes about a newborn's death differed with respect to the physician's treatment of the critically ill newborn. In the student study, the physician was attributed the least responsibility for the newborn's death when cardiopulmonary resuscitation was attempted but failed, followed by the physician's issuance of either a "Do Not Resuscitate" order or an order to turn off the infant's respirator. Greatest responsibility was attributed to the physician when he ordered the infant's nutritional and hydration support to be terminated. In addition, the student's major (nursing vs. non-nursing) and the nursing student's educational cohort impacted the level of physician responsibility attributed. In contrast, the nurses' study found that the termination of nutritional and hydrational support was viewed as different from the physician's other three actions.     

The value of a statistical life: A comparison of two approaches

Using an original data set, this article presents the first effort to compare systematically the values of a statistical life obtained from the two main methodologies existing in the literature—the revealed-preference approach (wage-risk analysis) and the contingent-valuation approach—applied to the same sample of individuals. A survey was conducted in the Montreal area with a questionnaire containing two series of questions: one set of contingent-valuation questions and one set of questions pertaining to the information necessary for performing a wage-risk study. The results show that the values of a statistical life obtained from each method are different from each other.This research was supported by the Fonds F.C.A.R. of the Quebec government, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and by the Fondation Mercure of l'École des Hautes Études Commerciales. The authors want to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for their useful comments.