Material practices of domination: Christian humanism,the built environment,and techniques of Western power

Theory and Society -     

Unspoken Assumptions: Voice and Absolutism at the Court of Louis XIV

This paper indicates how what Norbert Elias described as the disciplining of the aristocracy in 17th-century France, which he took to be essential to the ascendancy of Louis XIV and the growth of the modern state, was itself part of a broader pattern of voiceless politics. The French political bureaucracy and the monarch in this period were able to accumulate power by restraining public political speech, and using a combination of rituals of subjugation and material forms like fortresses to exemplify the power and social efficacy of this political regime. The result was a new form of power, importantly demonstrated in the land and its people: what we have come to call the territorial state.     

Perceived Ambiguity and Relevant Measures

We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S^∞. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are treated as if they were the only marginals possibly governing the state space, and connect them with the measures appearing in the aforementioned representation. These results allow us to interpret relevant measures as reflecting part of perceived ambiguity, meaning subjective uncertainty about probabilities over states. Under mild conditions, we show that increases or decreases in ambiguity aversion cannot affect the relevant measures. This property, necessary for the conclusion that these measures reflect only perceived ambiguity, distinguishes the set of relevant measures from the leading alternative in the literature. We apply our findings to a number of well‐known models of ambiguity‐sensitive preferences. For each model, we identify the set of relevant measures and the implications of comparative ambiguity aversion.     

Out of the Limelight: Discredited Communities and Informal Communication on the Internet

In this article we will suggest that print and related traditional media have been used more successfully in constituting a public sphere than in supporting more private and localized forms of community building (Habermas 1989; Stone 1991). The costs and control of print media, in addition to the stability of the content, have reduced the applicability of these media to the improvisatory and quotidian social processes that groups use to help keep themselves cohesive. In contrast, computer-based interactions have been and are being used extensively to support many of the informal interactions and related activities necessary to communities, giving members new tools for negotiating and rehearsing public forms of group life (Jones 1995). We hope to show how the public aspirations and problems of social groups shape their encounters with computers and encourage them to use computer interaction to manage their public representations.     

Contents Volume 31 2002

Theory and Society -     

The strength of sensitivity to ambiguity

We report an experiment where each subject’s ambiguity sensitivity is measured by an ambiguity premium, a concept analogous to and comparable with a risk premium. In our design, some tasks feature known objective risks and others uncertainty about which subjects have imperfect, heterogeneous, information (“ambiguous tasks”). We show how the smooth ambiguity model can be used to calculate ambiguity premia. A distinctive feature of our approach is estimation of each subject’s subjective beliefs about the uncertainty in ambiguous tasks. We find considerable heterogeneity among subjects in beliefs and ambiguity premia; and that, on average, ambiguity sensitivity is about as strong as risk sensitivity.     

On the Smooth Ambiguity Model: A Reply

We find that Epstein's (2010) Ellsberg‐style thought experiments pose, contrary to his claims, no paradox or difficulty for the smooth ambiguity model of decision making under uncertainty developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Not only are the thought experiments naturally handled by the smooth ambiguity model, but our reanalysis shows that they highlight some of its strengths compared to models such as the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). In particular, these examples pose no challenge to the model's foundations—interpretation of the model as affording a separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude or the potential for calibrating ambiguity attitude in the model.