Major obstacles to control of irregular migrations: prerequisites to policy

This paper examines 3 basic obstacles thwarting all attempts to reduce irregular migration. The 1st, rather well known and analyzed, underscores the dependency of all regulation of migratory flows on the system of economic and political relations between developed and developing countries. The 2nd obstacle resides in the persistance and growth of subsequent dependent irregular migration. This obstacle also reveals the relative autonomy of population movements compared with the employment situation in the labor market. The 3rd generally ignored obstacle is the role played by migration itself, particularly the discriminatory status of foreign workers in the labor market, in producing irregular migration.     

The relevance of the Chinese experience for third world economic development

Conclusion If the ten elements of Chinese development strategy discussed earlier are to provide object lessons relevant for other third world nations, they must be potentially transferable to other societies. The extent to which each element of the strategy is transferable depends on the conditions under which it can be successfully implemented, and on the degree to which these conditions are satisfied in other third world nations. I had also sought to determine what political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions are required for the successful implementation of each of the ten elements of strategy. The results of this analysis are summarized in the form of a matrix in Table 1. Each of the ten elements of strategy under discussion requires at least one - and often many more - of the major features of China's political-economic system. In all cases an effective and extensive system of public administration and/or a massoriented class structure are required, and in most cases a considerable degree of public ownership of the means of production and administrative control of resource allocation is either necessary or helpful. Less often required, but crucial in a few cases, are a central government with the power to mobilize resources on a large scale, a political leadership capable of influencing and involving people on a wide scale, and a ruraloriented class structure.Among the key geographic characteristics considered, large size is necessary or helpful for the successful implementation of two of the ten elements of strategy, but is disadvantageous in many cases because it is then more difficult for the political leadership to establish an effective system of public administration and to influence and involve people on a wide scale. An abundance of labor and scarcity of land is quite generally disadvantageous because it makes the achievement of rapid economic growth more difficult under any development strategy. But ethnological unity can be very helpful for the establishment of a strong state in all three respects I have distinguished.A cultural tradition oriented to cooperative work is quite helpful - if not strictly necessary - for three of the elements of strategy. A heritage of educational and administrative experience is helpful - but not absolutely essential - for all ten elements, since it improves the operation of those basic economic institutions and those characteristics of the state which have played an important role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. The less a society has been subject to foreign domination, the more its environment is likely to be conducive to the success of many elements of the Chinese strategy. And, finally, a profound social revolution would appear to be necessary in most instances for the development of three features of the Chinese political-economic system which as a group are indispensable for the success of all ten elements of the Chinese development strategy.These conclusions suggest that most of the elements of strategy described are currently applicable in only a few third world nations at best. Only a handful of nations have experienced a social revolution of any kind, and not all of these revolutions have been strongly rooted in the rural masses. Moreover, many of the revolutionary societies (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam) have a bitter history of Western imperialist domination to overcome, and most have only a limited heritage of educational and administrative experience to draw upon (e.g., the African nations). Some do not have a cultural tradition conducive to collective modes of operation (most notably Cuba), and many are ethnologically heterogeneous (e.g., Angola, Mozambique). Of all contemporary third world nations, North Korea would appear to come closest to meeting the historical, geographical, and political-economic conditions that have played a significant (and in many cases an essential) role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. But even in the case of North Korea the match is far from perfect in many respects.Do these observations imply that the Chinese experience is essentially unique and therefore largely irrelevant for the rest of the third world? I think not. First of all, the Chinese experience has set new and higher standards for the evaluation of development performance and policy throughout the world: it is no longer enough to promote rapid economic growth, but development planners can and will be held accountable for achieving a balanced pattern of development in which non-growth objectives such as greater equity and self-reliance are promoted along with faster growth.Second, certain elements of the Chinese development strategy do lend themselves to successful application - at least to a certain extent - in other societies which differ considerably from China in their political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions. For example, the promotion of mass-oriented human resource development could be carried out with some success in a nation with a reasonably strong state (in terms of its capacity for resource mobilization and public administration) and a political leadership somewhat oriented to the masses. A strategy of restriction of luxury consumption is potentially more widely transferable, for it requires mainly a mass-oriented political leadership and, up to a point, does not depend on an unusually effective state apparatus. Some degree of economic diversification of regions and localities, as well as some degree of amelioration of rural-urban imbalance, can be successfully accomplished provided that the political leadership is sufficiently rural-oriented and can rely upon an effective and extensive administrative system. In all these cases the necessary configuration of political-economic conditions is possible (if not very likely) in a society that has not undergone a profound social revolution and that operates within a predominantly capitalist institutional framework. More revolutionary change would be more conducive to success, but not absolutely essential for some progress to be made.Third, and more important, some of the key conditions required for the successful implementation of much of the Chinese development strategy can be realized in the future even if they do not obtain at present in most third world societies. Here it is important to distinguish between those aspects of the setting of any given society which are virtually immutable and those aspects which are amenable to change under appropriate historical circumstances. The key geographical characteristics that I have discussed clearly involve stable features of a society's environment; nothing short of massive territorial annexation, massive migration, or genocide could alter the size, the resource endowment, or the ethnological structure of contemporary third world nations. The historical characteristics I have cited vary considerably in their susceptibility to change. Cultural traditions built up over centuries (and in some cases millenia) cannot be transformed within a generation. The amount of time it takes to overcome the effects of Western imperialism depends of course on the force and the longevity of its imposition, but in many areas at least a generation might be needed. And a substantial degree of educational and administrative experience can only be built up with several decades of concerted effort. The possibility of significant change in any of these three historical characteristics hinges on some kind of decisive break with the past which ushers in new political leadership determined to bring about large-scale change. Such a decisive break need not involve a revolutionary redistribution of power from dominating to oppressed classes, but it does require at least the accession to power of strongly nationalist forces determined to modernize their country (i.e., to increase its resemblance to the powerful industrialized nations of the modern world). Social revolution is the most fundamental historical characteristic of all, for it underlies the establishment of many of the key features of China's political-economic system and (not incidentally) also creates a context in which the needed changes in the other three historical characteristics become more readily achievable. Profound social revolutions, in which formerly oppressed classes do succeed in wresting power from formerly privileged classes, are not made overnight, but they can be brought about after a period of revolutionary organization and struggle. If the revolutionary movement is to be truly rooted in the masses (and the rural masses in particular), and if it is to succeed in a contemporary international context in which privileged classes in third world nations can often count on support from major foreign powers, it is bound to take a great deal of time and effort. But the point I am making here is that it has been done in some countries in the past, and there is every likelihood that it will eventually be done in some other countries in the future.At present it would be foolhardy to attempt to predict where Chinese-style revolutions might succeed in generating historical and political-economic conditions approximating those which have contributed to the success of the Chinese strategy of development. But there are many third world nations with one or more relevant geographic and historical characteristics already similar to China's. For example, India, Indonesia, and Brazil share China's large size, some of the Latin American nations are ethnologically quite homogeneous, many East and Southeast Asian nations have cultural traditions resembling those of the Chinese, the people of India and some of the other semi-industrialized nations of the third world have already acquired a substantial degree of educational and administrative skills, and nations such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan were not thoroughly restructured by foreign powers. Profound social revolutions in any of these nations - however distant the prospect may now appear- would go a long way toward establishing the conditions under which many of the lessons from the Chinese strategy of development could indeed be successfully applied. As for the immediate future, there is little likelihood that the Chinese experience will be of much relevance to development planning in the rest of the third world. For the great majority of third world nations are still dominated by propertied or otherwise privileged elites, and, as one observer has put it, revolution is precisely the fate which [they] are striving to avert through their development.

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Perceived morbidity, utilisation of health services and factors affecting it in a rural area

A survey of perceived morbidity was carried out in rural population in eight villages and four wards of Saoner town, covering a total population of 8,876. The nature of illness was assessed by weekly visits to the families. History regarding treatment taken for disease and its source was taken. The overall incidence of perceived morbidity was 176.35 spells of sickness per 1000 population per month. Health care agency was contacted for 36.7 per cent spells of sickness. Utilisation of health services was found to be affected significantly by factors like age (chi 2 = 138.36), literacy (chi 2 = 14.123), type of occupation (chi 2 = 433.74), nature of illness (chi 2 = 83.578) and accessibility of health services. A health behaviour model of the population has also been discussed in this paper.     

On some characteristics of China's population--analysis of the ten percent sampling tabulation of the 1982 third national population census

Advance results from the 1982 census of China are presented based on a 10 percent sample. Sections are included on age distribution, centenarians, marriage patterns, educational status, and the labor force. Several characteristics of China's population are described in this article, based on a 10% sampling tabulation of the production teams and resident groups of the whole country. Data are included for 100,380,000 people. The proportion of the population aged 0-14 is 33.60%, which marks a decline from figures in the 1964 census (40%). This decline is attributed to family planning and population control efforts. The median age is 22.91 years, which is 2.71 years older than that in the 1964 census. The % of the population aged 15-64 rose from 55.7% in 1964 to 61.5%. The dependency ratio dropped from 79.4% (1964) to 62.6%. There were 3,765 centenarians as of July, 1982; the overwhelming majority live in villages, and most (94.77%) are illiterate or semiliterate. The number of female centenarians is 2.4 times that of males. Marriages are comparatively stable in China. 63.6% of the population aged 15 and over are married, and .59% are divorced. The % of the population remaining single after age 50 is .21% for females, 2.97% for males. The average 1st marriage age is 22.80 years for females and 25.49 years for males. 60.35% of the people have had primary education or above; .44% are college graduates. In 1964, 33.58% of the population illiterate or semiliterate. At present, among people aged 12 and over, 31.90% are illiterate or semiliterate. The rural illiteracy rate is more than twice the urban rate. 51.94% of the total population is employed. Of these, 92.08% are engaged in manual labor. Males exceed females in all professions and occupations. The median age of the employed population is 30.84 years. The level of education among the employed is relatively low: 28.26% are illiterate or semiliterate, and 34.35% have had primary education only.     

Priority Setting for the Distribution of Localized Hazard Protection

We address the problem of distributing safety-enhancing devices across a region, where each identical device provides for only local protection of the population. The devices protect nonidentical sectors of the population. The sectors of population are exposed to nonidentical intensities of hazard. A method for the screening and prioritizing of needs for the protective devices is described. An approach of risk-benefit-cost analysis under uncertainty is recommended as follows. Measures of hazard intensity and population exposure are identified. Exogenous parameters that influence assessments of risks, benefits, and costs are identified. Uncertainties of the exogenous parameters are propagated by interval analysis. Several tiers of the plausibility of need for protection are identified. The tiers are useful in setting priorities for the distribution of the safety devices. The method is demonstrated in an engineering application to roadway lighting, but has implications for disaster preparedness, anti-terrorism, transportation safety, and other arenas of public safety.     

Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management of Lahar Flow Threat

The 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines is considered one of the most violent and destructive volcanic activities in the 20th century. Lahar is the Indonesian term for volcanic ash, and lahar flows resulting from the massive amount of volcanic materials deposited on the mountain's slope posed continued post-eruption threats to the surrounding areas, destroying lives, homes, agricultural products, and infrastructures. Risks of lahar flows were identified immediately after the eruption, with scientific data provided by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology, the U.S. Geological Survey, and other research institutions. However, competing political, economic, and social agendas subordinated the importance of scientific information to policy making. Using systemic risk analysis and management, this article addresses the issues of multiple objectives and the effective integration of scientific techniques into the decision-making process. It provides a modeling framework for identifying, prioritizing, and evaluating policies for managing risk. The major considerations are: (1) applying a holistic approach to risk analysis through hierarchical holographic modeling, (2) applying statistical methods to gain insight into the problem of uncertainty in risk assessment, (3) using multiobjective trade-off analysis to address the issue of multiple decisionmakers and stakeholders in the decision-making process, (4) using the conditional expected value of extreme events to complement and supplement the expected value in quantifying risk, and (5) assessing the impacts of multistage decisions. Numerical examples based on ex post data are formulated to illustrate applications to various problems. The resulting framework from this study can serve as a general baseline model for assessing and managing risks of natural disasters, which the Philippines' lead agency-the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC)-and other related organizations can use for their decision-making processes.     

One-dimensional optimal bounded-shape partitions for Schur convex sum objective functions

Consider the problem of partitioning n nonnegative numbers into p parts, where part i can be assigned n_i numbers with n_i lying in a given range. The goal is to maximize a Schur convex function F whose ith argument is the sum of numbers assigned to part i. The shape of a partition is the vector consisting of the sizes of its parts, further, a shape (without referring to a particular partition) is a vector of nonnegative integers (n₁,..., n_p) which sum to n. A partition is called size-consecutive if there is a ranking of the parts which is consistent with their sizes, and all elements in a higher-ranked part exceed all elements in the lower-ranked part. We demonstrate that one can restrict attention to size-consecutive partitions with shapes that are nonmajorized, we study these shapes, bound their numbers and develop algorithms to enumerate them. Our study extends the analysis of a previous paper by Hwang and Rothblum which discussed the above problem assuming the existence of a majorizing shape. This research is partially supported by ROC National Science grant NSC 92-2115-M-009-014.     

A Conceptual Model for Researching the Creation and Operation of Supply Networks1

This paper presents a conceptual model for the creation and operation of supply networks. Existing conceptual research relating to interorganizational relationships and networks is reviewed in terms of its relevance to understanding supply networks; this research is drawn from the fields of strategic management, channel management, industrial marketing and purchasing, organizational behaviour and supply‐chain management. The different perspectives each field has on networks are highlighted. Contributions made by each in assisting to understand supply networks are discussed and synthesized. Findings from an exploratory survey are used to structure the design of a conceptual model for analysing the processes involved in the creation and operation of supply networks. The authors identify nine different types of networking activities and discuss the nature of these activities in the context of supply. Four different types of contextual factors relating to supply networks are identified. The model is tested in eight in‐depth case studies and a validating survey of 58 focal firm networks. It is concluded that it provides a robust structure that enabled complex, cross‐case analysis of multi‐variable, multi‐disciplinary data from interorganization product/service supply networks, but that further testing by other researchers is required.     

Global liberalization on homosexuality: Explaining the African gap

We are trapped in two divergent worlds when it comes to global views on homosexuality. There is the liberal world epitomized by Spain and other nations, where homosexuality is increasingly accepted; gays and lesbians are claiming their human rights; and laws are changing to codify that transformation. The second is the extremely anti-gay world symbolized by Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia, where attitudes are favorable to criminalization. This research explains the “African Gap” in attitudes toward homosexuality in a comparative analysis of six African nations and Argentina and Canada, South and North America's most liberal nations on gay rights. Using Pew's 2015 Spring Global Attitudes Survey data, we find that the major variables have essentially similar effects on opinion in any context. Africa's distinction is explained by its comparatively higher levels of factors such as religion, morality dogma, and low socioeconomic status that generally retard support for homosexuality, at the same time of lower levels of factors such as education, urbanization, and personal liberty that increase gay support. Africa's extreme anti-gay outlook is mutable. Two social forces will facilitate this softening: expansion of liberalizing agents such as education and urbanization, and repositioning away from “traditionalism” toward modernism emphasizing individualism, civil rights, and personal liberties.