Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence

We formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose between time sequences of monetary outcomes. The model assumes that a decision maker uses, sequentially, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a decision between some pairs of options, while the other options are incomparable according to that criterion. When the first criterion is not decisive, the decision maker resorts to the second criterion to select an alternative. We find that: (1) traditional economic models based on discounting alone cannot explain a significant (almost 30%) proportion of the data no matter how much variability in the discount functions is allowed; (2) our model, despite considering only a specific (exponential) form of discounting, can explain the data much better solely thanks to the use of the secondary criterion; (3) our model explains certain specific patterns in the choices of the “irrational” people. We reject the hypothesis that anomalous behavior is due simply to random “mistakes” around the basic predictions of discounting theories: deviations are not random and there are clear systematic patterns of association between “irrational” choices.     

Population monotonic path schemes for simple games

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.     

Pooling designs associated with unitary space and ratio efficiency comparison

Let mathbbF^(2n+d)_q²mathbb{F}^{(2nu+delta)}_{q^{2}} be a (2ν+δ)-dimensional unitary space of mathbbF_q²mathbb{F}_{q^{2}} , where δ=0 or 1. In this paper we construct a family of inclusion matrices associated with subspaces of mathbbF^(2n+d)_q²mathbb{F}^{(2nu+delta)}_{q^{2}} , and exhibit its disjunct property. Moreover, we compare the ratio efficiency of this construction with others, and find it smaller under some conditions.     

Accuracy of approximate progressively censored reliability sampling plans for exponential models

Reliability sampling plans provide an efficient method to determine the acceptability of a product based upon the lifelengths of some test units. Usually, they depend on the producer and consumer’s quality requirements and do not admit closed form solutions. Acceptance sampling plans for one- and two-parameter exponential lifetime models, derived by approximating the operating characteristic curve, are presented in this paper. The accuracy of these approximate plans, which are explicitly expressible and valid for failure and progressive censoring, is assessed. The approximation proposed in the one-parameter case is found to be practically exact. Explicit lower and upper bounds on the smallest sample size are given in the two-parameter case. Some additional advantages are also pointed out.     

Estimating a sensitive proportion through randomized response procedures based on auxiliary information

Randomized response techniques are widely employed in surveys dealing with sensitive questions to ensure interviewee anonymity and reduce nonrespondents rates and biased responses. Since Warner’s (J Am Stat Assoc 60:63–69, 1965) pioneering work, many ingenious devices have been suggested to increase respondent’s privacy protection and to better estimate the proportion of people, π _A , bearing a sensitive attribute. In spite of the massive use of auxiliary information in the estimation of non-sensitive parameters, very few attempts have been made to improve randomization strategy performance when auxiliary variables are available. Moving from Zaizai’s (Model Assist Stat Appl 1:125–130, 2006) recent work, in this paper we provide a class of estimators for π _A , for a generic randomization scheme, when the mean of a supplementary non-sensitive variable is known. The minimum attainable variance bound of the class is obtained and the best estimator is also identified. We prove that the best estimator acts as a regression-type estimator which is at least as efficient as the corresponding estimator evaluated without allowing for the auxiliary variable. The general results are then applied to Warner and Simmons’ model.