The “Practice of Humanity”

“Practice of Humanity” examines visual and legal representations of transnational sex and domestic work. Specifically, we analyze a 2003 United Nations public service announcement, Cleaning Lady; the 2000 UN Protocol on Human Trafficking; the 2000 US Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act; and current trends in the sociological literatures of both types of work. We demonstrate how these texts allow particular connections between domestic and sex workers, while foreclosing others. We draw out the ways these regimes suppress understandings of work in favor of moralizing about workers; how the “domestic” in domestic work, and “work” in sex work continue to vex humanitarian operations; and the ways national and racial privilege cut across connections between domestic and sex work.     

‘Active Families’: Familization,Housing and Welfare across Generations in East Asia

Debates around welfare change have tended to concentrate on the balance between market and state provision. Although there is increasing reference to a mixed economy of welfare, this generally signifies a greater emphasis on a third sector of voluntary/community level provision. However, the family sphere has been, and still remains, an important and dynamic source of welfare provision across changing regimes and between generations. With this as background, the article addresses three particular questions. First, how has the role of families in the welfare mix changed over time? Second, how do family ‘strategies’ adapt to structural changes in order to maximize collective/individual benefits in certain areas and how do these strategies evolve over generations? Third, is such family engagement in welfare influenced by policy shifts appropriately conceptualized as ‘re‐familization’ or ‘de‐familization'? These issues are explored in the comparative socio‐economic and cultural contexts of China and Japan and draw on qualitative research with three generations of families in Shanghai and Tokyo.     

Status,Intertemporal Choice,and Risk‐Taking

This paper studies endogenous risk‐taking by embedding a concern for status (relative consumption) into an otherwise conventional model of economic growth. We prove that if the intertemporal production function is strictly concave, an equilibrium must converge to a unique steady state in which there is recurrent endogenous risk‐taking. (The role played by concavity is clarified by considering a special case in which the production function is instead convex, in which there is no persistent risk‐taking.) The steady state is fully characterized. It displays features that are consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and gamble over upside risk, and it generates similar patterns of risk‐taking and avoidance across environments with quite different overall wealth levels. Endogenous risk‐taking here is generally Pareto‐inefficient. A concern for status thus implies that persistent and inefficient risk‐taking hinders the attainment of full equality.     

Cultural and Other Barriers to Motion Pictures Trade

The global success of the American film industry facing rising costs of production, foreign protectionism, and liberal trade policies at home is an enigma. The basis for American dominance is found in market size and structure. In turn, market characteristics and microdata explain protectionist strategies—leading to a complex gravity-iceberg model of U.S. exports. Besides purchasing power and spatial distance, cultural variables as well as protectionist strategies are important influences on U.S. motion pictures trade. Competitors nonetheless fail to match the magical American combination of movie stars, economies of scale, and popularity of English speech.     

Dialogue on Private Events

The Analysis of Verbal Behavior - In the fall of 2003, the authors corresponded on the topic of private events on the listserv of the Verbal Behavior Special Interest Group. Extracts from that...     

The AFL-CIO v. CTW: The competing visions, strategies, and structures

As the AFL-CIO approached its twenty-fifth biennial convention in July 2005, seven unions formed a new Change to Win (CTW) coalition to challenge the federation for lead position as the voice of the labor movement. These unions, most of which have disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO, formed the CTW to demonstrate their unsparing discontent with John Sweeney’s leadership of the federation. We examine the reasons for the current breach in the house of labor, the competing visions offered by the AFL-CIO and CTW, and the likelihood that the CTW’s strategy will revive unions. We find that the gulf between the two factions is philosophically deep and practically irreconcilable. The CTW advocates an “engineered breakthrough” approach to revitalize labor whereas the AFL-CIO relies on a more conservative “accelerated evolution” path. There are no guarantees that the CTW’s strategy will work. It presupposes an unmet demand for unions that can be tapped through vast new investments. If the current model of unionism is lacking, as the CTW suggests, a viable replacement must be found. The CTW, with its limited resources, will have to experiment until it finds the right model, if one does indeed exist. The task of rebuilding labor is daunting, but it arguably requires a bold and fundamentally different course from what has been pursued. From this perspective, the breakup seems a logical development.     

Group Selling,Product Durability,and Consumer Behavior

Firms producing complementary goods often strategically form groups and jointly sell their products to better coordinate their decisions. For consumer durables, decisions about such collaboration might be complicated due to two factors. Because of their durability and presence of used goods markets, such products engender “future” price competition between new and used goods. On the other hand, consumers of such products might be forward‐looking and patient, both of which affect their purchasing behavior. In this study, we study how the above product and consumer characteristics interact to affect the group selling decisions of complementary firms. We do so through a two‐period model consisting of a value chain with two upstream manufacturers and a downstream retailer. When consumers are relatively impatient and reluctant to wait to buy later, group selling by manufacturers will take place only when the end product is relatively perishable, that is, product durability is low. However, if consumers are patient, that is, willing to wait, collaboration happens only when the end product is quite durable; for relatively perishable products the manufacturers sell their products separately. We also comment on how our results are affected by factors like manufacturers directly selling to end consumers or there being multiple opportunities to decide whether or not to use group selling strategy.     

The Farsighted Stable Set

Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new dominance relation incorporating farsightedness, but retained another feature of the stable set: that a coalition S can impose any imputation as long as its restriction to S is feasible for it. This implicitly gives an objecting coalition complete power to arrange the payoffs of players elsewhere, which is clearly unsatisfactory. While this assumption is largely innocuous for myopic dominance, it is of crucial significance for its farsighted counterpart. Our modification of the Harsanyi set respects “coalitional sovereignty.” The resulting farsighted stable set is very different from both the Harsanyi and the vNM sets. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a farsighted stable set containing just a single‐payoff allocation. This condition roughly establishes an equivalence between core allocations and the union of allocations over all single‐payoff farsighted stable sets. We then conduct a comprehensive analysis of the existence and structure of farsighted stable sets in simple games. This last exercise throws light on both single‐payoff and multi‐payoff stable sets, and suggests that they do not coexist.