Windows to the Soul? Deliberate Eye Contact as a Cue to Deceit

Although people overwhelmingly believe that liars avoid eye contact, meta-analyses of deception literature have shown a non-significant relationship between gaze and deception. In the present experiment we measured eye movements in an innovative way. We coded the extent to which interviewees deliberately made eye contact with the interviewer. Liars take their credibility less for granted than truth tellers. They therefore may have a greater desire to be convincing and hence more inclined to monitor the interviewer to determine whether they seem to be being believed. We therefore hypothesized that liars would give more appearance of deliberately making eye contact than truth tellers (a relationship which opposes the stereotypical belief that liars look away). A total of 338 passengers at an international airport told the truth or lied about their forthcoming trip. As well as the deliberate eye contact variable, we coded the amount of time the interviewees looked away from the interviewer (e.g., gaze aversion), which is typically examined in deception research. Liars displayed more deliberate eye contact than truth tellers, whereas the amount of gaze aversion did not differ between truth tellers and liars.     

Using Prior Risk‐Related Knowledge to Support Risk Management Decisions: Lessons Learnt from a Tunneling Project

The authors of this article have developed six probabilistic causal models for critical risks in tunnel works. The details of the models' development and evaluation were reported in two earlier publications of this journal. Accordingly, as a remaining step, this article is focused on the investigation into the use of these models in a real case study project. The use of the models is challenging given the need to provide information on risks that usually are both project and context dependent. The latter is of particular concern in underground construction projects. Tunnel risks are the consequences of interactions between site‐ and project‐ specific factors. Large variations and uncertainties in ground conditions as well as project singularities give rise to particular risk factors with very specific impacts. These circumstances mean that existing risk information, gathered from previous projects, is extremely difficult to use in other projects. This article considers these issues and addresses the extent to which prior risk‐related knowledge, in the form of causal models, as the models developed for the investigation, can be used to provide useful risk information for the case study project. The identification and characterization of the causes and conditions that lead to failures and their interactions as well as their associated probabilistic information is assumed to be risk‐related knowledge in this article. It is shown that, irrespective of existing constraints on using information and knowledge from past experiences, construction risk‐related knowledge can be transferred and used from project to project in the form of comprehensive models based on probabilistic‐causal relationships. The article also shows that the developed models provide guidance as to the use of specific remedial measures by means of the identification of critical risk factors, and therefore they support risk management decisions. Similarly, a number of limitations of the models are discussed.     

“Too Weird for Banknotes”: Legitimacy and Identity in the Production of Danish Banknotes 1947–2007

In this article I argue that questions of banknote design are closely related to ideas of the national collective. Using the Danish banknote design competitions from 1947 to 2007 as an exemplary case I show how the Danish central bank, Nationalbanken, continuously sought to balance banknote iconography between different and evolving perceptions of the national community in an attempt to underpin the legitimacy and authority of Danish banknotes. I suggest that concepts from institutional theory can explain this equipoise relationship and I argue that banknote designers need to somehow reconcile conflicting ideas about the national community. As such, this article contributes to a more detailed understanding of the considerations and challenges facing banknote‐issuing authorities.     

Efficient and effective learning for safety from incidents

Learning from incidents is important for improving safety. Many companies spend a great deal of time and money on such learning procedures. The objectives of this paper are to present some early results from a project aimed at revealing weaknesses in the procedures for learning from incidents and to discuss improvements in these procedures, especially in chemical process industries. The empirical base comes from a project assessing organizational learning and the effectiveness of the different steps of the learning cycle for safety and studying relations between safety-specific transformational leadership, safety climate, trust, safety-related behavior and learning from incidents. The results point at common weaknesses in the organizational learning, both in the horizontal learning (geographical spread) and in vertical learning (double-loop learning). Furthermore, the effectiveness in the different steps of the learning cycle is low due to insufficient information in incident reports, very shallow analyses of reports, decisions that focus at solving the problem only at the place where the incident took place, late implementations and weak solutions. Strong correlations with learning from incidents were found for all safety climate variables as well as for safety-related behaviors and trust. The relationships were very strong for trust, safety knowledge, safety participation and safety compliance.