Risk Analysis for U.S. Offshore Wind Farms: The Need for an Integrated Approach

Wind power is becoming an increasingly important part of the global energy portfolio, and there is growing interest in developing offshore wind farms in the United States to better utilize this resource. Wind farms have certain environmental benefits, notably near‐zero emissions of greenhouse gases, particulates, and other contaminants of concern. However, there are significant challenges ahead in achieving large‐scale integration of wind power in the United States, particularly offshore wind. Environmental impacts from wind farms are a concern, and these are subject to a number of on‐going studies focused on risks to the environment. However, once a wind farm is built, the farm itself will face a number of risks from a variety of hazards, and managing these risks is critical to the ultimate achievement of long‐term reductions in pollutant emissions from clean energy sources such as wind. No integrated framework currently exists for assessing risks to offshore wind farms in the United States, which poses a challenge for wind farm risk management. In this “Perspective”, we provide an overview of the risks faced by an offshore wind farm, argue that an integrated framework is needed, and give a preliminary starting point for such a framework to illustrate what it might look like. This is not a final framework; substantial work remains. Our intention here is to highlight the research need in this area in the hope of spurring additional research about the risks to wind farms to complement the substantial amount of on‐going research on the risks from wind farms.     

Inference on Causal Effects in a Generalized Regression Kink Design

We consider nonparametric identification and estimation in a nonseparable model where a continuous regressor of interest is a known, deterministic, but kinked function of an observed assignment variable. We characterize a broad class of models in which a sharp “Regression Kink Design” (RKD or RK Design) identifies a readily interpretable treatment‐on‐the‐treated parameter (Florens, Heckman, Meghir, and Vytlacil (2008)). We also introduce a “fuzzy regression kink design” generalization that allows for omitted variables in the assignment rule, noncompliance, and certain types of measurement errors in the observed values of the assignment variable and the policy variable. Our identifying assumptions give rise to testable restrictions on the distributions of the assignment variable and predetermined covariates around the kink point, similar to the restrictions delivered by Lee (2008) for the regression discontinuity design. Using a kink in the unemployment benefit formula, we apply a fuzzy RKD to empirically estimate the effect of benefit rates on unemployment durations in Austria.     

Entry and Exit in OTC Derivatives Markets

We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium and socially optimal decisions of banks to enter, trade in, and possibly exit, an OTC market. Although we endow all banks with the same trading technology, banks' optimal entry and trading decisions endogenously lead to a realistic market structure composed of dealers and customers with distinct trading patterns. We decompose banks' entry incentives into incentives to hedge risk and incentives to make intermediation profits. We show that dealer banks enter more than is socially optimal. In the face of large negative shocks, they may also exit more than is socially optimal when markets are not perfectly resilient.     

THE INEFFICIENCY OF WORKER TIME USE

Much work is carried out in short, interrupted segments. This phenomenon, which we label task juggling, has been overlooked by economists. We study the work schedules of some judges in Italy documenting that they do juggle tasks and that juggling causally lowers their productivity substantially. To measure the size of this effect, we show that although all these judges receive the same workload, those who juggle more trials at once instead of working sequentially on few of them at each unit of time, take longer to complete their portfolios of cases. Task juggling seems to have no adverse effect on the quality of the judges' decisions, as measured by the percent of decisions appealed. To identify these causal effects we estimate models with judge fixed effects and we exploit the lottery assigning cases to judges. We discuss whether task juggling can be viewed as inefficient, and provide a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation of the social cost of longer trials due to task juggling.     

Exploring the antecedents of potential absorptive capacity and its impact on innovation performance

This paper builds upon the theoretical framework developed by Zahra and George [Absorptive capacity: a review, reconceptualization, and extension. Academy of Management Review 2002;27:185–203] to empirically explore the antecedents of potential absorptive capacity (PAC), i.e. the ability to identify and assimilate external knowledge flows. Based on a sample of 2464 innovative Spanish firms, we find evidence that R&D cooperation, external knowledge acquisition and experience with knowledge search are key antecedents of a firm's PAC. Also, during periods of important internal reshaping, when there are significant changes in strategy, design of the organization and marketing, firms exert more effort to accumulate PAC. Finally, we find that PAC is a source of competitive advantage in innovation, especially in the presence of efficient internal knowledge flows that help reduce the distance between potential and realized capacity.     

Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

A seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of which she privately knows. Buyers compete by offering menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can privately trade with several buyers. In this setting, we show that an equilibrium exists under mild conditions and that aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique. Although the good for sale is divisible, in equilibrium the seller ends up trading her whole endowment or not trading at all. Trades take place at a price equal to the expected quality of the good, conditional on the seller being ready to trade at that price. Our model thus provides a novel strategic foundation for Akerlof's (1970) results. It also contrasts with competitive screening models in which contracts are assumed to be exclusive, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Latent contracts that are issued but not traded in equilibrium play an important role in our analysis.     

Sektion Soziologische Theorien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Society as Text: Essays on Rhetoric,Reason, and Reality,by Richard Harvey Brown

Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences , by George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer.