Soziologisches Denken

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

“Sugar and Spice But Not Always Nice”: Gender Socialization and its Impact on Development and Maintenance of Aggression in Adolescent Girls

Aggression in girls is a problem that is gaining increased attention. The indirect forms of relational aggression historically used by girls to harm their victims are increasingly escalating into physical altercations. An understanding of the interplay between the developmental and contextual factors that contribute to learned aggression in girls is needed to inform program development that truly responds to the unique gender socialization of girls. This article examines parental, environmental, and peer factors for their contributions to the development of girls’ aggression. Implications for program development that teaches girls and their families alternative ways of expressing their needs and protecting themselves from harm is discussed.     

A direct derivation of the REML likelihood function

The original derivation of the widely cited form of the REML likelihood function for mixed linear models is difficult and indirect. This paper derives it directly using familiar operations with matrices and determinants.     

A multivariate version of Gini's rank association coefficient

In this paper, we introduce a multivariate generalization of the population version of Gini's rank association coefficient, giving a response to this open question posed in [4]. We also study some properties of this version, present the corresponding results for the sample statistic, and provide several examples.     

Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenditures by Russian Consumers with Different Health Status

The paper uses the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 2003 database to study the types of official and shadow out-of-pocket health care expenditures by consumers with high and low health status. The analysis shows that the inability of less healthy people to pay unofficially for more effective outpatient care results in their higher demand for official inpatient and outpatient treatment. This pattern creates the need to sustain excessive inpatient facilities and slows down health care restructuring. Yet, since the state is incapable of fulfilling its obligations for providing free health care and meet the current demand, in inpatient institutions all consumers, and less healthy ones in particular, spend considerable sums on drugs, even though the latter are guaranteed to be free. Consequently, the current Russian health system itself leads to replacing outpatient with inpatient care, which is more costly both for the patients and for the state.      

Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences

Much work in social choice theory takes individual preferences as uninvestigated inputs into aggregation functions designed to reflect considerations of fairness. Advances in experimental and behavioural economics show that fairness can also be an important motivation in the preferences of individuals themselves. A proper characterisation of how fairness concerns enter such preferences can enrich the informational basis of many social choice exercises. This paper proposes axiomatic foundations for individual fairness-motivated preferences that cover most of the models developed to rationalise observed behaviour in experiments. These models fall into two classes: Outcome-based models, which see preferences as defined only over distributive outcomes, and context-dependent models, which allow rankings over distributive outcomes to change systematically with non-outcome factors. I accommodate outcome-based and context-sensitive fairness concerns by modelling fairness-motivated preferences as a reference-dependent preference structure. I first present a set of axioms and two theorems that generate commonly used outcome-based models as special cases. I then generalise the axiomatic basis to allow for reference-dependence, and derive a simple functional form in which the weight on each person’s payoff depends on a reference vector of how much each person deserves.     

Gamson’s law and hedonic games

This note adds one celebrated coalition formation game due to Gamson (Am Soc Rev 26:373–382 1961a, Am Soc Rev 26:565–573, 1961b) in the list of applications of the theory of hedonic games explored by Banerjee et al. (Soc Choice Welf 18:135–153, 2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (Games Econ Behav 38: 204–230, 2002). We apply their results to study the original Gamson game and offer extensions both to a multi-dimensional characteristics space and to an infinite number of players.     

Clustering and combinatorial optimization in recursive supervised learning

The use of combinations of weak learners to learn a dataset has been shown to be better than the use of a single strong learner. In fact, the idea is so successful that boosting, an algorithm combining several weak learners for supervised learning, has been considered to be the best off the shelf classifier. However, some problems still exist, including determining the optimal number of weak learners and the over fitting of data. In an earlier work, we developed the RPHP algorithm which solves both these problems by using a combination of global search, weak learning and pattern distribution. In this chapter, we revise the global search component by replacing it with a cluster based combinatorial optimization. Patterns are clustered according to the output space of the problem, i.e., natural clusters are formed based on patterns belonging to each class. A combinatorial optimization problem is therefore created, which is solved using evolutionary algorithms. The evolutionary algorithms identify the “easy” and the “difficult” clusters in the system. The removal of the easy patterns then gives way to the focused learning of the more complicated patterns. The problem therefore becomes recursively simpler. Over fitting is overcome by using a set of validation patterns along with a pattern distributor. An algorithm is also proposed to use the pattern distributor to determine the optimal number of recursions and hence the optimal number of weak learners for the problem. Empirical studies show generally good performance when compared to other state of the art methods.     

A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative solution. For such models, Shenoy’s (Int J Game Theory 8:133–164, 1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We present three different versions of his condition in order to compare it to the top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (Social Choice Welfare 18:135–153, 2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies a condition in which Shenoy’s paradox is not present for at least one minimal winning coalition. Conversely, if for each non-null player Shenoy’s paradox is not present for at least one minimal winning coalition containing that player, then the induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property.