Sociology and the graduate program at the university of massachusetts-amherst

The Department of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst offers a unique graduate program. The program is demanding but collegial, with faculty and students working together to produce mutually authored articles, monographs, and books. Many students concentrate their doctoral dissertations on applied topics, that is, social policy and evaluation research. These students are trained in theory and methods of sociology; their graduate training is the same as all other students in the program. Graduates have been well placed in the academy and in other occupational sectors.     

A Factor Analytic Comparison of Ecological and Individual Correlations: Some Methodological Implications

Comparisons of factor analytic results based on a matrix of total (individual) correlations and three matrices of between-groups (ecological) correlations revealed fundamental differences in factor patterns when the unit of analysis shifted from individuals to aggregates. The major difference involved the marked tendency for a highly individualistic General Ability Factor derived from the matrix of total correlations to become more and more sociological in content as individuals were aggregated. Results are discussed in terms of their bearing on the problem of determining the "appropriateness" of a given unit of analysis, individuals vs. aggregates, for certain levels of inquiry, i.e., psychological vs. sociological. It is concluded that whether the researcher should heed the traditional warning about the use of aggregate data relationships as a basis for making inferences concerning individuals ought to depend in part on whether his interest is in psychological or sociological propositions about indivduals.     

Experimental and contextual models of program evaluation

Evaluation research is one of the most rapidly evolving fields of applied behavioral science. As demand for program assessment has increased, the number of alternative evaluation approaches has also grown. As a result, everyday practitioners have often lacked sufficient guidelines for the choice of appropriate evaluation strategies.The present paper articulates an underlying epistemological distinction between (a) experimental evaluation models which simplify program realities in generalizable analyses of discrete causes and effects, and (b) contextual evaluation models which holistically examine particular program operations. These two evaluation approaches are directed at different purposes and are applicable to different program settings. A topology of program characteristics (breadth of goals, scope of treatment, specificity of results, and clarity of theory) is developed and linked to the appropriateness of experimental and contextual evaluation.     

Creating Deviance Rules: A Macroscopic Model*

In this paper we propose a macrolevel model for analyzing the creation of deviance rules. We begin by placing the phenomenon within the context of the social factist and social definitionist sociological traditions, identifying the insights and difficulties the social problems literature presents for explaining deviance rule creation. We suggest that the theoretical difficulties can be resolved by placing the process within a sociology of knowledge framework. The consequent dialectical model of deviance designation is based on the assumption that society is composed of a number of general interests in varying degrees of conflict with prevailing definitions of deviance representing outcomes of previous contests. This balance or accommodation becomes vulnerable with the introduction or increase in strain which is a potential resource for interest groups desiring a new definition. The outcome of the ensuing conflict is seen as dependent on the ability of the combatants to employ resources in the battle. We conclude by identifying the advantages the model has for studying the deviance rule creation process.     

An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity

This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact on state and local revenues.