An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule

This paper proposes an experimental test to evaluate the performance of the serial cost sharing rule, originally proposed by Shenker [Sigmetrics, 241–242 (1990)] and then analyzed by Moulin and Shenker [Econometrica 60, 1009–1037 (1992)]. We report measures of the performance and efficiency of the serial mechanism by comparing the choices and payoffs attained by the subjects to the expected equilibrium allocations. Experimental evidence shows that learning is needed for the subjects to converge to the equilibrium strategy. However, in terms of efficiency, the serial mechanism leads to almost efficient allocations.     

Gay Affirmative Practice: A Model for Social Work Practice with Gay,Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth

Gay affirmative practice has recently been introduced into the social work literature as a culturally sensitive model for working with gay, lesbian, and bisexual (GLB) adults, however, this model has rarely been applied to practice with GLB youth. In this article, the authors review the literature to present the main tenets of gay affirmative practice, outline the challenges that GLB youth face, and delineate the environmental and individual strengths that can be enhanced to promote well-being. The authors then apply the gay affirmative practice model to GLB youth, offering concrete information about the specific knowledge, attitudes, and skills that social workers should acquire to better serve the unique, yet diverse, needs of GLB youth.     

Über Macht und Ehre in Vereinen und Verbänden: Ein Rückblick auf Forschung und Politik

Cultural and professional associations are the expression of the modern society with structured organisations. The 19th century was the marking epoch of the constitution of associations in Germany. The involvement of associations in the political live, specially the professional ones, is typical in Germany. While political sciences focus on the analyses of interest representation and mediation functions of organisations, sociology research covers the full range of social, psychological, political and economical functions of organisations. Management and especially human resource management topics are presently gaining a growing importance within the research community which focuses on the cultural and professional organisations.     

Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners

We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which, at any preference profile over alternatives, give the list of admissible preference profiles over sets of alternatives. It turns out to be that requiring from a set to be a Condorcet winner at every admissible preference profile is too demanding, even when the set of admissible preference profiles is fairly narrow. However, weakening this requirement to being a Condorcet winner at some admissible preference profile opens the door to more permissive results and we characterize these sets by using various versions of an undomination condition. Although our main results are given for a world where any two sets – whether they are of the same cardinality or not – can be compared, the case for sets of equal cardinality is also considered. Received: 15 March 2001/Accepted: 31 May 2002 This paper was written while Barış Kaymak was a graduate student in Economics at Boğazi?i University. We thank ?ağatay Kayı and İpek ?zkal-Sanver who kindly agreed to be our initial listeners. The paper has been presented at the Economic Theory seminars of Bilkent, Ko? and Sabancı Universities as well as at the Fifth Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, July 2001, Ischia, Italy and at the 24^th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design, August 2001, Bodrum, Turkey. We thank Fuad Aleskerov, İzak Atiyas, ?zgür Kıbrıs, Semih Koray, Gilbert Laffond, Bezalel Peleg, Murat Sertel, Tayfun S?nmez, Utku ünver and all the participants. Remzi Sanver acknowledges partial financial support from İstanbul Bilgi University and the Turkish Academy of Sciences and thanks Haluk Sanver and Serem Ltd. for their continuous moral and financial support. Last but not the least, we thank Carmen Herrero and two anonymous referees. Of course we are the sole responsible for all possible errors.     

Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.