Gamson’s law and hedonic games

This note adds one celebrated coalition formation game due to Gamson (Am Soc Rev 26:373–382 1961a, Am Soc Rev 26:565–573, 1961b) in the list of applications of the theory of hedonic games explored by Banerjee et al. (Soc Choice Welf 18:135–153, 2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (Games Econ Behav 38: 204–230, 2002). We apply their results to study the original Gamson game and offer extensions both to a multi-dimensional characteristics space and to an infinite number of players.     

The Industry of Illegal Migration: Social Network Analysis of the Brazil‐US Migration System

In this article, we analyse the process of migration by applying a social network methodology. Using the personal network approach, we focus on a case study of the Brazil‐US migration system to analyse the formation of the so‐called “industry of illegal migration”. We suggest that in migration systems, brokerage evolves not only because of historical and cultural changes, but also because the changes emerge within a structured environment in which brokerage can thrive, and this, in turn, causes the social networks to support and produce specialized actors (individuals and organizations) embedded in the “right positions” of the social structure in the migration process. In this particular case study, we suggest that brokerage seems to take place through gender‐oriented networks and the personal experience and structural power of returned migrants. These returned migrants usually have more varied social contacts and types of relationships from which they can obtain richer information about the migration system.     

Disabled Persons Support: The Serial Literature

Abstract

The authors anticipate that the primary use of this analysis will be to demonstrate journal price fluctuations by discipline and country of origin to department heads, university and hospital administrators, and others concerned (or who should be concerned) with the costs of health information. The authors expect to repeat this study on an annual basis and would welcome any comments.     

Managing a Low-Incidence Risk: The Example of Toxic Shock Syndrome

This article demonstrates a methodology that allows individuals to reach a personal decision on the use of products which carry very small risks to health and life but also offer considerable benefits. A combination of the principles of dominance, extended dominance, and various methods of direct risk-benefit tradeoffs are shown to reduce the number of possible decisions regarding product use to the one optimal for the value structure of a particular individual. An historical examination of toxic-shock syndrome identifies tampons as a product with risks too small to warrant public intervention but too sizeable to be ignored. The methodology described here can be applied for all such products.     

An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories

Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorates with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters voted sincerely, the third candidate — a Condorcet loser — would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enables majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternate as election winners.     

Semi-Markov Disability Insurance Models

In this article, we present a stochastic model for disability insurance contracts. The model is based on a discrete time non homogeneous semi-Markov process (DTNHSMP) to which the backward recurrence time process is introduced. This permits a more exhaustive study of disability evolution and a more efficient approach to the duration problem. The use of semi-Markov reward processes facilitates the possibility of deriving equations of the prospective and retrospective mathematical reserves. The model is applied to a sample of contracts drawn at random from a mutual insurance company.