Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

Child Care “Packaging” Among TANF Recipients: Implications for Social Work

This article reports the results of a study that examined the ways in which current and recent TANF recipients assembled or “packaged” their child care arrangements among formal and informal providers. The findings are drawn from in-person, in-depth interviews with current and former welfare recipients. The study found that most of the respondents used multiple providers within the category of informal child care for reasons including availability, the use of a network of social acquaintances as a problem-solving resource, the need to accommodate irregular work hours, and personal trauma that contributed to a distrust of strangers in formal settings. The findings can affect the efficacy of practice with TANF recipients by contributing to social workers’ understanding of the context of decision-making regarding child care.     

Predictive Bayesian Microbial Dose-Response Assessment Based on Suggested Self-Organization in Primary Illness Response: Cryptosporidium parvum

The probability of illness caused by very low doses of pathogens cannot generally be tested due to the numbers of subjects that would be needed, though such assessments of illness dose response are needed to evaluate drinking water standards. A predictive Bayesian dose-response assessment method was proposed previously to assess the unconditional probability of illness from available information and avoid the inconsistencies of confidence-based approaches. However, the method uses knowledge of the conditional dose-response form, and this form is not well established for the illness endpoint. A conditional parametric dose-response function for gastroenteric illness is proposed here based on simple numerical models of self-organized host-pathogen systems and probabilistic arguments. In the models, illnesses terminate when the host evolves by processes of natural selection to a self-organized critical value of wellness. A generalized beta-Poisson illness dose-response form emerges for the population as a whole. Use of this form is demonstrated in a predictive Bayesian dose-response assessment for cryptosporidiosis. Results suggest that a maximum allowable dose of 5.0 x 10(-7) oocysts/exposure (e.g., 2.5 x 10(-7) oocysts/L water) would correspond with the original goals of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Surface Water Treatment Rule, considering only primary illnesses resulting from Poisson-distributed pathogen counts. This estimate should be revised to account for non-Poisson distributions of Cryptosporidium parvum in drinking water and total response, considering secondary illness propagation in the population.     

Communication of risk: health hazards from mobile phones

Summary. Possible health hazards from mobile phones arise from the use of the phones themselves and via the base stations that relay signals. Except for an increase in traffic accidents induced by the use of mobile phones in cars the evidence for a health hazard is at most indirect, but it cannot be entirely dismissed; the phones have not been widely used for sufficiently long for direct epidemiological studies to have high sensitivity for detecting any induced incidence of cancer, for example. The background and evidence are briefly reviewed and the steps taken in the UK to make information widely available described.     

On the Third Law of Demand

The Alchian and Allen theorem predicts that it will be harder to find "good" apples in the State of Washington, a prime apple-growing region, than in, say, New York City, where the addition of shipping charges makes "bad" apples comparatively more expensive. We recast the theorem as a testable proposition by explicitly taking the supply side into account and identifying plausible scenarios in which a fixed cost either has no effect on the relative prices of high and low quality grades of the same good in distant markets or, indeed, causes more of the bad apples to be shipped out.