Do childbirth grants increase the fertility rate? Policy impacts in South Korea

In response to a low fertility rate, a number of municipalities in South Korea have been providing family benefits in the form of childbirth grants and child allowances. Using panel data for 230 municipalities that spans the years 2001–2014, this paper examines the impacts of family benefits on the fertility rate in Korea. I use the fact that different municipalities began providing the family benefits at different times to estimate the impact of family benefits on fertility rates using a difference-in-differences approach. This study finds a positive effect of family benefits on total fertility rate. Moreover, it finds little evidence of an anticipatory response within municipalities that adopted the policy. Given that a 10 million Korean won increase in family benefits is associated with a 3.5% increase in the total fertility rate, an increase in family benefits of about 44 million Korean won per child would be required to raise the total fertility rate to a safe zone above 1.5 children per woman, where population declines are gradual and easily reversed.     

Life satisfaction in China and consumption and income inequalities

This research uses nationally representative data to study how economic resources and inequalities are associated with life satisfaction of Chinese residents. We construct economic resource and inequality measures from expenditure rather than from income, after confirming that expenditure inequality is a better measure in the Chinese context. We find that economic inequalities in general are negatively associated with life satisfaction, and that this association is larger for inequalities in the lower half of the distribution than those in the upper half of the distribution. We further explore the mechanisms under which inequality can be associated with life satisfaction, and find that aspiration is potentially one important channel.     

Precautionary saving in Spain during the great recession: evidence from a panel of uncertainty indicators

The aim of this paper is to empirically study the effect of uncertainty on private consumption using a sample of Spanish households, and therefore, to test the existence of a precautionary motive for saving. Using data provided by the Spanish Survey of Household Finances and the Labour Force Survey we construct several uncertainty measures that are commonly used in the literature and an additional indicator based on job insecurity data, and we consequently estimate different econometric models under the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis, including these measures of uncertainty. Our results are twofold: first, we find evidence in favour of the precautionary saving hypothesis. Secondly, we find that, unlike other variables related to the performance of the labour market (such as the unemployment rate) the job insecurity indicator is an appropriate variable to approximate income uncertainty in any macroeconomic context.     

Wealth and inheritance in Britain from 1896 to the present

Personal wealth has grown since the 1970s twice as fast in real terms as national income. Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the wealth being passed on from one generation to the next? Are we returning to the levels of inheritance found in the 19th century? The aim of this paper is to construct UK evidence on the extent of the transmission of wealth in the form of estates and gifts inter vivos. It takes a long-run view of inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern Estate Duty was introduced, and exploits the extensive estate data published over the years. Construction of a long-run time series for more than a century is challenging, and there are important limitations. The resulting time-series demonstrates the major importance of inheritance in the UK before the First World War, when the total transmitted wealth represented some 20 per cent of net national income. In the inter-war period, the total was around 15 per cent, falling to some 10 per cent after the Second World War, and then falling further to below 5 per cent in the late 1970s. Since then, there has indeed been an upturn: a rise from 4.8 per cent in 1977 to 8.2 per cent in 2006. This increase was more or less in line with the increase in personal wealth, and has to be interpreted in the light of the changing net worth of the corporate and public sectors of the economy.     

Banking crises in the US: the response of top income shares in a historical perspective

This paper examines the response of income concentration in the US to the occurrence of major systemic banking crises since the beginning of the twentieth century. In doing so, the paper analyzes the shape of the upper income tail as well as the national income shares accruing to different groups within the richest decile. The findings suggest that systemic banking crises reduce income concentration within the top decile of the US pre–tax and transfers income distribution, and more generally, that the effect is highly heterogeneous across different top income groups. While the richest income group loses ground, the lower half of the top decile appears to gain in relative terms. However, evidence suggests that the estimated short-term effect of market forces stemming from banking crises can be relatively small in magnitude and even temporary in nature, as it may be quickly reabsorbed. These findings lend indirect support to the idea that only substantial changes in government policies and institutional frameworks can bring about radical changes in income distribution.     

Emerging wealth disparities after the storm: Evidence from Spain

We examine how the recession that started in December 2007 in the United States impacted wealth accumulation and inequality among Spanish households. We find that overall wealth dropped by 15 percent between 2008 and 2011, with losses concentrating among households in the mid and top wealth quintiles. The most hard hit wealth components were business assets, primary home equity, and durable assets, which declined by 40 percent, 23 percent and 19 percent, respectively. Wealth losses among all households were likely sustained by restricted access to credit. Nonetheless, in part due to their more diversified wealth portfolios, households in the top wealth quintile amassed a greater share of the country’s wealth during the recession. Consequently, wealth inequality, which receded during the expansionary years of 2002 through 2005, rose by 2008 and continued its trend in 2011.     

From classes to copulas: wages,capital, and top incomes

Public debates about the rise in top income shares often focus on the growing dispersion in earnings, and the soaring pay for top executives and financial-sector employees. But can the change in the marginal distribution of earnings on its own explain the rise in top income shares? Are top executives replacing capital owners in the group of top-income earners, or are we rather witnessing a fusion of top capital and top earnings? This paper proposes an extension of the copula framework and uses it for exploring the changing composition of top incomes. It illustrates that changes in top income shares can easily be decomposed into respective changes in the marginal distributions of labour and capital income and the changing association between the two types of income. An application using tax record data from Norway shows that the association between top labour and capital incomes grew stronger between 1995 and 2005 in the top half of the wage and capital income distribution, though it declined for the top 1% of capital income receivers. A gender decomposition demonstrates that the association of wage and capital incomes at the top is particularly striking for men, whilst women are largely under-represented in the top halves of the two marginal distributions.     

The effects of separate taxation on labor participation of married couples. An empirical analysis using propensity score

Up to 1987 the Spanish Income Tax imposed compulsory joint filing for married couples. However, the 1988 reform allowed spouses to choose between joint and separate taxation, involving a reduction in tax rates for secondary earners. Our aim is to analyze this reform as a quasi-natural experiment, assessing the effects of tax changes on labor participation. To find out the causal effect we adopt the difference-in-differences technique. We use data from the ‘Spanish Income Tax Panel 1982–1998’. Our results show that, as a consequence of differential tax changes, married women in families more strongly affected by the fiscal reform increase their labor participation more than secondary earners from families less affected by the reform. The participation rate for secondary earners in the treatment group increases by 9.4 percentage points whereas the control group increases their participation rate by 7.8 percentage points. We define the treatment group as those secondary earners in relatively low-income families in year 1987 and the control group as those in middle-high income families, because the former experiences a stronger reduction in tax rates than the latter. As a result, we can attribute the 1.6-percentage-point-increase in participation rates to the 1988 income tax reform.     

How to measure and proxy permanent income: evidence from Germany and the U.S.

Permanent income (PI) is an enduring concept in the social sciences and is highly relevant to the study of inequality. Nevertheless, there has been insufficient progress in measuring PI. We calculate a novel measure of PI with the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Advancing beyond prior approaches, we define PI as the logged average of 20+ years of post-tax and post-transfer (“post-fisc”) real equivalized household income. We then assess how well various household- and individual-based measures of economic resources proxy PI. In both datasets, post-fisc household income is the best proxy. One random year of post-fisc household income explains about half of the variation in PI, and 2–5 years explain the vast majority of the variation. One year of post-fisc HH income even predicts PI better than 20+ years of individual labor market earnings or long-term net worth. By contrast, earnings, wealth, occupation, and class are weaker and less cross-nationally reliable proxies for PI. We also present strategies for proxying PI when HH post-fisc income data are unavailable, and show how post-fisc HH income proxies PI over the life cycle. In sum, we develop a novel approach to PI, systematically assess proxies for PI, and inform the measurement of economic resources more generally.