Information security governance: pending legal responsibilities of non-executive boards

The study shows that a structural conflict of interest in non-executive boards exists due to missing corporate governance structures and a lack of awareness for legal issues with regard to information security risks. Non-executive boards receive information on strategic security threats as a part of their oversight function to fulfill investor interest in transparency. At the same time, they act as representatives of company stakeholders and have an interest to counteract to information security risks based on the stakeholder’s risk disposition. If not properly structured by corporate governance rules, these different interests may lead to regulatory aberrations on non-executive board level. The study analyses a Deutsche Telekom AG case where non-executive board members, employees, and journalists fell victim to a spying scandal subject to the German telecommunications secrecy law in 2005–2006. The analysis demonstrates how the handling of information security on non-executive board level bears governance risks as well as legal risks that are insufficiently addressed in corporate governance research. The paper contributes to avoid a reproduction of events in the future, by suggesting the principle of a segregation of duties on non-executive boards as well as providing an overview of relevant legislative requirements that clarify tasks of non-executive board members with regard to information security. The study therefore helps protecting corporations and their stakeholders from similar consequences of missing corporate security governance.     

Minority and majority private equity investments: firm performance and governance

This paper adds to the literature on the determinants of the effects of private equity (PE) investments. Using an original dataset of 191 target firms in Italy, we study the effects on performance and governance of the stakes acquired by the PE investor. We employ a difference-in-differences approach and compare target and control firms sharing similar characteristics and performance in the years preceding the deal. We find that PE investment has a positive effect on profitability, sales, and employment; these effects are larger for minority investments. We argue that this signals effective governance that follows from complementing rather than substituting incumbent managers in minority investments.     

‘A brutal blow against the democratic normality’: unlearning the epistemology of the political

ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to rethink our understanding of ‘the political’ through an examination of two novels by José Saramago, Blindness and Seeing. Both novels tackle directly a central, if not the central, signature metaphor of Western political thought, namely that of ‘seeing the light’. This metaphor takes many forms and recurs throughout the tradition of Western political philosophy as a source, legitimiser, and validator of knowing, and perhaps even a guarantor of knowledge. In particular, this metaphor has served to make knowable whatever it is that is signified by ‘the political’. By extension, it also means that whatever might be outside of this epistemological frame is rendered unknowable, if not unthinkable. Both of Saramago’s novels provide a fruitful means to recalibrate how we might know ‘the political’. The novels call into question the epistemic signatures that frame our commonly accepted understandings of ‘the political’ and in so doing provoke us further to question how we might move towards unlearning the epistemology of the political.     

Emergency Saving and Household Hardship

Households with limited income and wealth often struggle to access the financial liquidity needed to address unexpected expenses or income drops. Emergency savings can act as form of insurance against such economic shocks and reduce the risk of hardships that influence family wellbeing. Prior research has established that threshold amounts of liquid assets can reduce the risk of economic hardship. This study used a measure of self-reported emergency saving behavior to examine whether households who reported saving for emergencies were less likely to experience subsequent economic hardships in a longitudinal sample of households in disadvantaged neighborhoods from the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Making Connections project. Results across a range of regression models suggest that households who saved for emergencies experienced slightly less overall hardship and were less likely to report several specific hardships, such as food insecurity and having a phone disconnected, three years later. This study supports the idea that small, unrestricted savings may play a protective role for low-income households.     

NPO,Internal Controls,and Supervision Mechanisms in a Developing Country

The premise of this paper is that effective supervision and proper internal control system (ICS) can promote accountability and transparency, and this will attract more donors. However, in a developing country like Malaysia, it is common that proper accounting standards are not available, the laws are not enforced, and charities often struggle for survival. Debates on regulating nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have been sensitive to many and are often left unresolved, and some quarters believe that NPOs should be left to handle their own affairs. This paper provides evidence from a survey of 60 charities on the status of their ICS. It briefly describes the current state of regulations in Malaysia and makes a case for better monitoring of the sector, as this might be the reason NPOs are lacking in their ICS. We propose what type of regulation and assistance can be provided by the authorities to this sector, not only in Malaysia but also in other developing countries facing similar challenges.     

The division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this article we consider the division problem when agents’ participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents’ shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents’ voluntary participation.     

Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.     

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.     

From “dot.org” to “dot.gov”: Professional Crossings in the Brazilian National Policy on HIV/AIDS

This article reflects on the importance of the relations between state and society in policy-making in the area of public health. Several studies in various sectors such as health, education, and social services have made similar observations on organizational dynamics and the institutionalization of different models of partnerships or contracts, often based on the analytical model of three sectors. Individuals and their networks of relationships, however, remain an almost unexplored dimension in these types of research. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to analyze the movement of HIV/AIDS activists to governmental organizations working in this same field. The analysis raises questions concerning the forms of individual and institutional learning that help to maintain the distinct character of innovation of the Brazilian policy. Professionals who cross the borders hold a different profile once they have accumulated experience working with grassroots and local NGOs, and have also had the chance to be trained and enhance their technical and managerial capacities, since the government has supported NGOs for a long period. When combined, these experiences allow them to maintain relationships with social movements and give them the ability to navigate through the government bureaucracy and handle technical information about fighting AIDS epidemics, making it possible for them to negotiate strategic collaborations reflecting the interests of different groups. Hence, they constantly reflect on the differences between government and social spaces, and keep questioning and modifying their roles in the light of potential and existing complementarities.