Risk Management and the Wisdom of Aldo Leopold

Human demands on nature have increased due to our burgeoning population. The applications of scientific knowledge to the development of increasingly powerful technologies and consumptive lifestyles by more and more people have created a modern category of human‐caused disaster—stealth disasters. Stealth disasters—such as agriculturally‐induced soil erosion and release of unprecedented amounts of greenhouse gases into Earth's atmosphere—tend to have protracted, unobvious onsets; do not necessarily have dramatic manifestations; and often do not attract public attention until they reach a stage approaching catastrophic consequences. At this late stage it is difficult or impossible to undo damage. Scientists tend to be among the first to understand the physical causes and notice the developments of stealth disasters and their risks and yet scientific knowledge is not enough to prevent or mitigate them. As we search for ways to deal with stealth disasters, the concept of “land health” assembled by the prominent conservationist and author, Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), can, in normative terms, provide an ecologically grounded example of nature in good condition toward which society can aim. Evidence of the reverse—symptoms of land illness—can provide a checklist for risk analysis and management that helps guide people away from harm‐causing attitudes and activities and toward beneficial outcomes. Leopold's criteria of land health motivated by a land ethic that incorporates the whole of nature may be applied at geographic scales ranging from local to global as a framework for contemporary risk management.     

中国人口的不确定性研究

文章对2000年人口普查所反映的生育水平、出生性别比和人口年龄结构等主要人口指标存在的不确定性进行了梳理,并运用概率人口预测方法系统讨论了中国未来人口变动趋势过程中相关人口变量的不确定性问题。结果显示,当前对中国生育率水平、出生性别比和低龄儿童人口数量的估计都存在很大的差异。这些差异直接影响中国人口目前和未来的不确定性。     

The emergence of Sub-Replacement Family Size Ideals in Europe

Period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, while most fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number of children considered ideal for society or for one's own family has remained above two children per woman. These surveys have led to the expectation that, sooner or later, period fertility would recover in Europe. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes given by younger men and women have fallen as low as 1.7 children. This paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.     

Book Review: Calvinism Incorporated: Welsh Immigrants on Ohio's Industrial Frontier. By Knowles,Anne Kelly. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (University of Chicago Geography Research Paper,No. 240), 1997. Paper,ISBN: 0-226-44853-3

Qualitative Sociology -     

Demographic scenarios by age,sex and education corresponding to the SSP narratives

In this paper, we translate the five narratives as defined by the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) research community into five alternative demographic scenarios using projections by age, sex and level of education for 171 countries up to 2100. The scenarios represent a significant step beyond past population scenarios used in the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change context, which considered only population size. The definitions of the medium assumptions about future fertility, mortality, migration and education trends are taken from a major new projections effort by the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, while the assumptions for all the other scenarios were defined in interactions with other groups in the SSP community. Since a full data base with all country-specific results is available online, this paper can only highlight selected results.     

A Population Policy Rationale for the Twenty‐First Century

I propose that the primary goal of twenty‐first‐century population policies should be to strengthen the human resource base for national and global sustainable development. I discuss the shortcomings of the three dominant twentieth‐century population policy rationales: acceptance of replacement‐level fertility as a demographic goal; realizing a “demographic dividend” from the changing age structure; and filling the “unmet need” for family planning. I demonstrate that in all three cases the explicit incorporation of education into the model changes the picture and makes female education a key population policy priority. Population policies under this new rationale could be viewed as public human resource management. I argue that 20 years after the Cairo ICPD the international community needs a new rationale for population policies in the context of sustainable development and that a focus on human capital development, in particular education and health, is the most promising approach.     

A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF EXOGENOUS OIL SUPPLY SHOCKS ON OUTPUT AND INFLATION IN THE G7 COUNTRIES

A comparison of the effects of exogenous shocks to global crude oil production on seven major industrialized economies suggests a fair degree of similarity in the real growth responses. An exogenous oil supply disruption typically causes a temporary reduction in real GDP growth that is concentrated in the second year after the shock. Inflation responses are more varied. The median CPI inflation response peaks after three to four quarters. Exogenous oil supply disruptions need not generate sustained inflation or stagflation. Typical responses include a fall in the real wage, higher short‐term interest rates, and a depreciating currency with respect to the dollar. Despite many qualitative similarities, there is strong statistical evidence that the responses to exogenous oil supply disruptions differ across G7 countries. For suitable subsets of countries, homogeneity cannot be ruled out. A counterfactual historical exercise suggests that the evolution of CPI inflation in the G7 countries would have been similar overall to the actual path even in the absence of exogenous shocks to oil production, consistent with a monetary explanation of the inflation of the 1970s. There is no evidence that the 1973–1974 and 2002–2003 oil supply shocks had a substantial impact on real growth in any G7 country, whereas the 1978–1979, 1980, and 1990–1991 shocks contributed to lower growth in at least some G7 countries. (JEL: E31, E32, Q43)