International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

A partial score test for difference among heterogeneous populations

In event time data analysis, comparisons between distributions are made by the logrank test. When the data appear to contain crossing hazards phenomena, nonparametric weighted logrank statistics are usually suggested to accommodate different-weighted functions to increase the power. However, the gain in power by imposing different weights has its limits since differences before and after the crossing point may balance each other out. In contrast to the weighted logrank tests, we propose a score-type statistic based on the semiparametric-, heteroscedastic-hazards regression model of Hsieh [2001. On heteroscedastic hazards regression models: theory and application. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 63, 63–79.], by which the nonproportionality is explicitly modeled. Our score test is based on estimating functions derived from partial likelihood under the heteroscedastic model considered herein. Simulation results show the benefit of modeling the heteroscedasticity and power of the proposed test to two classes of weighted logrank tests (including Fleming–Harrington's test and Moreau's locally most powerful test), a Renyi-type test, and the Breslow's test for acceleration. We also demonstrate the application of this test by analyzing actual data in clinical trials.     

Statistical consulting

The paper and the special issue focus on the activity of statistical consulting and its varieties. This includes academic consulting, consulting to and in industry as well as statistics in public media.     

Some results on optimality in models with heteroscedastic errors from partial optimum designs

This paper studies optimum designs for linear models when the errors are heteroscedastic. Sufficient conditions are given in order to obtainD-, A- andE-optimum designs for a complete regression model from partial optimum designs for some sub-parameters. A result about optimality for a complete model from the optimality for the submodels is included. Supported by Junta de Andalucía, research group FQM244.