Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy

Two measures, the weight of coalitions and the probability of situations in decision making, are used to characterize the representativeness, i.e. the capability of individuals to represent the social preference. It is proved that there always exists an individual who represents a majority on average, and an individual who represents a majority in most cases. This result is applied to Arrow's social choice model. It follows that there always exists a dictator who is a representative of the society rather than a dictator in a proper sense. After the concept of dictator has been refined to a dictator in a proper sense, Arrow's axioms become consistent. The idea of optimal representation is extended to limited groups of representatives which make decisions on behalf of the whole society. We consider the cabinet (named by analogy with the cabinet of ministers) which consists of a few representatives with delimited domains of competence, and the council which makes decisions by means of voting. It is shown that the representativeness of optimal cabinets and councils tends to 100% of maximally possible values as the number of their members increases, independently of the size of the society. We suggest a geometric interpretation of optimal representatives, cabinets, and councils, based on approximation formulas for the indicators of representativeness derived for the model with a large number of independent individuals. Finally, for cabinets and councils we establish the consistency of different concepts of optimality with respect to different indicators of representativeness. Our consideration is applicable to multicriteria decision making. An appointment of a cabinet or a council corresponds to selecting a few partial criteria. Therefore, the obtained results can be used for reducing the set of partial criteria to a certain sufficient minimum. The concepts of dictator, cabinet, and council can be understood as models of president, government, and parliament, respectively. Thus our results justify reducing social choice to individual choice or small group choice. Although it is in use in all democratic systems, its acceptability is not evident at all. In other words, we justify the demoncraticity of such forms of political power as the president, the parliament, and the government.     

Sampling Strategies for Toxic Air Contaminants

Annual concentrations of toxic air contaminants are of primary concern from the perspective of chronic human exposure assessment and risk analysis. Despite recent advances in air quality monitoring technology, resource and technical constraints often impose limitations on the availability of a sufficient number of ambient concentration measurements for performing environmental risk analysis. Therefore, sample size limitations, representativeness of data, and uncertainties in the estimated annual mean concentration must be examined before performing quantitative risk analysis. In this paper, we discuss several factors that need to be considered in designing field-sampling programs for toxic air contaminants and in verifying compliance with environmental regulations. Specifically, we examine the behavior of SO2, TSP, and CO data as surrogates for toxic air contaminants and as examples of point source, area source, and line source-dominated pollutants, respectively, from the standpoint of sampling design. We demonstrate the use of bootstrap resampling method and normal theory in estimating the annual mean concentration and its 95% confidence bounds from limited sampling data, and illustrate the application of operating characteristic (OC) curves to determine optimum sample size and other sampling strategies. We also outline a statistical procedure, based on a one-sided t-test, that utilizes the sampled concentration data for evaluating whether a sampling site is compliance with relevant ambient guideline concentrations for toxic air contaminants.     

UNDERSTANDING MAIL SURVEY RESPONSE BEHAVIOR A META-ANALYSIS

A meta-analysis of prior studies of techniques designed to inducemail survey response rates was conducted. Research encompassing184 effects (study outcomes) in 115 studies (articles) for 17predictors of response rate was examined. The average effectsize across all manipulations was r=.065, indicating an averageincrease of about 6.5 percent in response rates for manipulations.Effect sizes for specific predictors and two potential moderatorsof effects were examined. Results indicated that repeated contactsin the form of preliminary notification and follow-ups, appeals,inclusion of a return envelope, postage, and monetary incentives,were effective in increasing survey response rates. Significanteffect sizes for the predictors ranged from an increase in responseof 2 percent to 31 percent. Implications of the results forthe conduct of mail surveys and future research on mail surveyresponse behavior are discussed.     

The Independence of Aptitudes,Interests, and Career Beliefs

The importance of client beliefs in career counseling depends on their ability to add unique information about the client over and above that contributed by aptitudes and interests. The Career Beliefs Inventory was administered to 200 Australian students in grade 10 together with measures of Holland's RIASEC interest themes and scholastic aptitudes. The correlations between scales from the three domains showed clearly that beliefs made a contribution distinct from that provided by aptitudes and interests. Even though the results may reflect possible sampling or method variance, career beliefs in this sample added unique information to that traditionally used in career counseling.     

QUESTION WORDING AND PARTISANSHIP: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN PARTY LOYALTIES DURING THE 1992 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Gallup macropartisanship varies more over time than aggregatemeasures of partisanship employing the standard Michigan SurveyResearch Center (SRC) party identification measure, but previousanalyses do not provide direct evidence about why Gallup macropartisanshipis more variable. Although these differences could result fromthe short-term focus of the Gallup party affiliation question,aggregate-level analyses cannot test the effects of questionwording directly. Between March and October 1992, we conducteda series of question-wording experiments, employing six statewidecomputer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) surveys of Michiganadults, including a four-wave panel study. Our analyses stronglysuggest that the Gallup measure responds more to short-termpolitical conditions and clearly demonstrate that the Gallupmeasure is less stable over time. These individual-level resultshelp explain why Gallup macropartisanship varies more over timethan aggregate measures of partisanship employing the standardSRC measure and raise questions about the degree to which onecan generalize from analyses using the Gallup data to the researchliterature on party identification.     

A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics

Voter preferences are characterized by a parameter s (say, income) distributed on a set S according to a probability measure F. There is a single issue (say, a tax rate) whose level, b, is to be politically decided. There are two parties, each of which is a perfect agent of some constituency of voters, voters with a given value of s. An equilibrium of the electoral game is a pair of policies, b ₁ and b ₂, proposed by the two parties, such that b _i maximizes the expected utility of the voters whom party i represents, given the policy proposed by the opposition. Under reasonable assumptions, the unique electoral equilibrium consists in both parties proposing the favorite policy of the median voter. What theory can explain why, historically, we observe electoral equilibria where the ‘right’ and ‘left’ parties propose different policies? Uncertainty concerning the distribution of voters is introduced. Let {F(t)} _{t ε T} be a class of probability measures on S; all voters and parties share a common prior that the distribution of t is described by a probability measure H on T. If H has finite support, there is in general no electoral equilibrium. However, if H is continuous, then electoral equilibrium generally exists, and in equilibrium the parties propose different policies. Convergence of equilibrium to median voter politics is proved as uncertainty about the distribution of voter traits becomes small.