International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

Sampling design proportional to order statistic of auxiliary variable

The sampling designs dependent on sample moments of auxiliary variables are well known. Lahiri (Bull Int Stat Inst 33:133–140, 1951) considered a sampling design proportionate to a sample mean of an auxiliary variable. Sing and Srivastava (Biometrika 67(1):205–209, 1980) proposed the sampling design proportionate to a sample variance while Wywiał (J Indian Stat Assoc 37:73–87, 1999) a sampling design proportionate to a sample generalized variance of auxiliary variables. Some other sampling designs dependent on moments of an auxiliary variable were considered e.g. in Wywiał (Some contributions to multivariate methods in, survey sampling. Katowice University of Economics, Katowice, 2003a); Stat Transit 4(5):779–798, 2000) where accuracy of some sampling strategies were compared, too.These sampling designs cannot be useful in the case when there are some censored observations of the auxiliary variable. Moreover, they can be much too sensitive to outliers observations. In these cases the sampling design proportionate to the order statistic of an auxiliary variable can be more useful. That is why such an unequal probability sampling design is proposed here. Its particular cases as well as its conditional version are considered, too. The sampling scheme implementing this sampling design is proposed. The inclusion probabilities of the first and second orders were evaluated. The well known Horvitz–Thompson estimator is taken into account. A ratio estimator dependent on an order statistic is constructed. It is similar to the well known ratio estimator based on the population and sample means. Moreover, it is an unbiased estimator of the population mean when the sample is drawn according to the proposed sampling design dependent on the appropriate order statistic.     

Statistical consulting

The paper and the special issue focus on the activity of statistical consulting and its varieties. This includes academic consulting, consulting to and in industry as well as statistics in public media.     

Some results on optimality in models with heteroscedastic errors from partial optimum designs

This paper studies optimum designs for linear models when the errors are heteroscedastic. Sufficient conditions are given in order to obtainD-, A- andE-optimum designs for a complete regression model from partial optimum designs for some sub-parameters. A result about optimality for a complete model from the optimality for the submodels is included. Supported by Junta de Andalucía, research group FQM244.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.