Body mass index, disordered eating behavior, and acquisition of health information: examining ethnicity and weight-related issues in a college population

OBJECTIVE AND PARTICIPANTS: To investigate ethnic differences related to weight, the authors assessed body mass index, dysfunctional eating, receipt of health information, and perceived obstacles to healthy lifestyles of 210 ethnically diverse college women. METHODS: The authors used the Eating Attitudes Test to assess dieting, food preoccupation, and bulimic behaviors. RESULTS: The authors found no ethnic differences in body mass index or disordered eating, but African Americans were more likely than were European Americans and Latina Americans to receive nutrition information from professionals and less likely than European Americans to perceive time as an obstacle. Overall, receipt of health information from a professional was related to fewer disordered eating behaviors; however, the specific eating behavior that was reduced varied by ethnicity. CONCLUSIONS: Health professionals should reconsider traditional assumptions of disordered eating behavior as a European American problem and consider cultural appropriateness in the development of effective health programs.     

A copula-based multivariate hidden Markov model for modelling momentum in football

AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis - We investigate the potential occurrence of change points—commonly referred to as “momentum shifts”—in the dynamics of football...     

Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well‐defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.