Belief‐Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information

We define belief‐free equilibria in two‐player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief‐free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief‐free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations.     

Power and inequality in global value chains: Advancing the research agenda

Power is a central, but largely undertheorized, concept for scholars of global value chains (GVCs). In this introduction to a special issue on power and inequality in GVCs, the authors summarize the key insights from the articles gathered here and explain how the collection advances our understanding of the types and forms of power operating in GVCs and their effect on different dimensions of inequality.     

On two conjectures about perturbations of the stochastic growth rate

The stochastic growth rate describes long-run growth of a population that lives in a fluctuating environment. Perturbation analysis of the stochastic growth rate provides crucial information for population managers, ecologists and evolutionary biologists. This analysis quantifies the response of the stochastic growth rate to changes in demographic parameters. A form of this analysis deals with changes that only occur in some environmental states. Caswell put forth two conjectures about environment-specific perturbations of the stochastic growth rate. The conjectures link the stationary distribution of the stochastic environmental process with the magnitude of some environment-specific perturbations. This note disproves one conjecture and proves the other.