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51.
Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms
of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which,
at any preference profile over alternatives, give the list of admissible preference profiles over sets of alternatives. It
turns out to be that requiring from a set to be a Condorcet winner at every admissible preference profile is too demanding,
even when the set of admissible preference profiles is fairly narrow. However, weakening this requirement to being a Condorcet
winner at some admissible preference profile opens the door to more permissive results and we characterize these sets by using
various versions of an undomination condition. Although our main results are given for a world where any two sets – whether
they are of the same cardinality or not – can be compared, the case for sets of equal cardinality is also considered.
Received: 15 March 2001/Accepted: 31 May 2002
This paper was written while Barış Kaymak was a graduate student in Economics at Boğazi?i University. We thank ?ağatay Kayı
and İpek ?zkal-Sanver who kindly agreed to be our initial listeners. The paper has been presented at the Economic Theory seminars
of Bilkent, Ko? and Sabancı Universities as well as at the Fifth Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory, July 2001, Ischia, Italy and at the 24th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design, August 2001, Bodrum, Turkey. We thank Fuad Aleskerov, İzak Atiyas, ?zgür Kıbrıs, Semih
Koray, Gilbert Laffond, Bezalel Peleg, Murat Sertel, Tayfun S?nmez, Utku ünver and all the participants. Remzi Sanver acknowledges
partial financial support from İstanbul Bilgi University and the Turkish Academy of Sciences and thanks Haluk Sanver and Serem
Ltd. for their continuous moral and financial support. Last but not the least, we thank Carmen Herrero and two anonymous referees.
Of course we are the sole responsible for all possible errors. 相似文献
52.
53.
Saralees Nadarajah 《Statistical Papers》2008,49(2):387-389
54.
55.
James P. McDermott G. Jogesh Babu John C. Liechty Dennis K. J. Lin 《Statistics and Computing》2007,17(4):311-321
We consider the problem of density estimation when the data is in the form of a continuous stream with no fixed length. In
this setting, implementations of the usual methods of density estimation such as kernel density estimation are problematic.
We propose a method of density estimation for massive datasets that is based upon taking the derivative of a smooth curve
that has been fit through a set of quantile estimates. To achieve this, a low-storage, single-pass, sequential method is proposed
for simultaneous estimation of multiple quantiles for massive datasets that form the basis of this method of density estimation.
For comparison, we also consider a sequential kernel density estimator. The proposed methods are shown through simulation
study to perform well and to have several distinct advantages over existing methods. 相似文献
56.
57.
Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Özgür Kıbrıs 《Social Choice and Welfare》2003,20(3):353-362
We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences
and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness,
resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence
of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations
of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on
this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule.
Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002
This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my
advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions. 相似文献
58.
59.
60.
The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization. 相似文献