An adaptive randomized design with application to estimation

When allocating observations to two populations for estimation or testing, the optimal proportion of the data that should be allocated to the first population, if it exists, often depends on unknown parameters. Adaptive designs have thus been proposed, in which allocation of the next observation is based on an estimate of the optimal proportion computed from the data already gathered. The authors introduce a simple randomized adaptive design and give some of its properties. Applications are given to estimating the difference of two success probabilities, and the difference of two normal means.     

An ethnography of HIV/AIDS and sexuality in the People's Republic of China

China's HIV epidemic is now a growing reality, yet there is virtually no evidence of it in the HIV/AIDS literature. This report documents ethnographic and epidemiologic findings from field visits conducted in Beijing, Chengdu, and Kunming; the latter in Yunnan province, site of China's most severe nidus of HIV infection. This report also elaborates those cultural, social, and political factors involved in China's attempt to manage its growing HIV epidemic. Contemporary attitudes toward sexuality in China which impinge upon such management, as revealed through ethnographic interviews, are reviewed. Data from the First Sino‐American Management of HIV Disease Symposium (to which the author was a delegate) are also blended with the ethnographic material to further clarify the cultural and epidemiologic status of HIV/AIDS in China. It is the conclusion of this report that HIV/AIDS and its management pose a transforming, ineluctable challenge to China's traditional attitudes toward sexuality.     

The Future of Statistics

It is possible for a nonnormal bivariate distribution to have conditional distribution functions that are normal in both directions. This article presents several examples, with graphs, including a counterintuitive bimodal joint density. The graphs simultaneously display the joint density and the conditional density functions, which appear as Gaussian curves in the three-dimensional plots.     

A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting

In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak Separability. In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule.     

French demography in the Eighteenth Century

There are many people who, in studying the past, ask for no more than to satisfy their curiosity. It would be unjust to imply any disparagement in such a statement. Intellectual curiosity is the specific characteristic of the inquiring man, in whatever province he makes use of his faculties; it is, in a way, his reason for existence. He therefore requires no excuse when his curiosity naturally leads him to study the period which saw the birth and growth of his own field of work. After all, to relate the history of demography is, at the same time, to write a chapter in the general history of the development of ideas. There is no doubt that the task is worth undertaking.     

On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members

Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.