What unions do: Insights from economic theory

Conclusion I have attempted to distill a quite sizable body of literature written by modern economists on the theory of labor unions, with particular emphasis given to the “two faces” view of unions developed by Freeman and Medolf in What Do Unions Do? Many important ideas and contributions have necessarily been omitted, but hopefully the main contours and implications are captured.     

Incarceration and the Formation and Stability of Marital Unions

Rising imprisonment rates and declining marriage rates among low‐education African Americans motivate an analysis of the effects of incarceration on marriage. An event history analysis of 2,041 unmarried men from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth suggests that men are unlikely to marry in the years they serve in prison. A separate analysis of 2,762 married men shows that incarceration during marriage significantly increases the risk of divorce or separation. We simulate aggregate marriage rates using estimates from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and find that the prevalence of marriage would change little if incarceration rates were reduced.     

Poverty Catchments: Migration,Residential Mobility,and Population Turnover in Impoverished Rural Illinois Communities

Abstract Research has thoroughly documented how out‐migration of the educated and skilled from rural areas leaves behind a poorer population and creates pockets of rural poverty. Recently, studies have recognized that the poor are also geographically mobile and that poverty migration patterns can reinforce rural poverty concentrations. In this process, certain impoverished rural communities in economically depressed regions receive a disproportionate share of poverty migrants, concentrating poverty in certain locations. This paper examines the conditions and processes through which poor rural communities become likely destinations for a highly mobile segment of the rural poor and near‐poor. Utilizing case studies of depressed rural Illinois communities, it investigates how the interplay of community factors and the behavior of migrants transforms rural communities from residentially stable to highly mobile, impoverished places.     

Labor markets and sunday closing laws

This paper puts forth arguments regarding the occurrence of state Sunday closing laws and reports statistical estimates that predict the occurrence of those laws in 1970 and 1984. Along with other socio-economic variables, two labor market activities are found to be significant determinants of Blue laws. Membership in labor unions is found to have a positive declining influence on the laws; female labor market participation is found to have a negative but growing influence.     

Some economic effects of the California agricultural labor relations act

The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (CALRA) evolved in the 1970s because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) excluded agricultural workers. CALRA effectively placed the United Farm Workers Union in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis farmers than the NLRA had done for industrial unions vis-a-vis nonfarm business firms. Society has suffered a net economic loss from CALRA and the events preceding its enactment. Since passage of the act, at least three effects have been verified: Relative to conditions that would otherwise have been expected to exist, consumers are facing higher prices; agricultural workers are earning lower wages; and landowners have suffered losses in land values.     

Strategic voting in repeated referenda

This paper analyzes learning and voting strategy when a budget maximizing bureaucrat has several chances to obtain referendum approval. The process is modeled as a sequential game with a continuum of heterogeneous voters and a dominant bureaucrat in which all agents are uncertain about the true distribution of voter preferences. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayes Nash, so voting is strategic in the sense of foresighted but nevertheless noncooperative.Thanks to R. Gretlein, J. Hamilton, T. Palfrey, T. Romer, H. Rosenthal, S. Slutsky and the referees of this journal for their comments and encouragement. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions.