Intermediaries are social agents who can be found in all types of different environments, cultures, and organizations. More often than enough, intermediaries are middlepersons between two power centers, yet their agency is precarious due to their position as brokers who gain from bridging otherwise unconnected parties, or marginalized vulnerable individuals who suffer from the invasion of the neighboring power holders. How can these two different perspectives of the intermediaries be reconciled? Under what conditions do they shift from one type of agency to another? Previous scholarship attributes the agency of intermediaries to static positionality. This paper treats the position of the intermediary as an opportunity structure, which is shaped by multi-level relational dynamics. We show the changing agency of three intermediary tribal groups (i.e. the Tibetans in northwestern China, Uriyangqad Mongols, and Jurchens) who were situated between the sedentary Chinese and nomadic Mongols during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) through a systematic study with horse trade data. The group-based and officially-regulated horse trade constituted the most important linkage between the intermediaries and these two power centers. We study the changes in the dynamics of their contact during trade, and explain why these intermediaries became client, client to two patrons, and broker in their trade with the Chinese and Mongols in different eras. We argue that the position of the intermediaries did not provide definite advantages for their exploitation, nor did it paralyze them with any concrete disadvantages. Rather, their position offered them unpredictable opportunities that arose from their relational dynamics with the power centers. Moreover, the self-serving and local interests of the intermediaries, and the strategies and tactics that they used, determined their capacity to respond to emerging and unpredictable opportunities and capitalize on them.
We look at a simple service system with two servers serving arriving jobs (single class). Our interest is in examining the effect of routing policies on servers when they care about fairness among themselves, and when they can endogenously choose capacities in response to the routing policy. Therefore, we study the two‐server game where the servers’ objective functions have a term explicitly modeling fairness. Moreover, we focus on four commonly seen policies that are from one general class. Theoretical results concerning the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are proved for some policies. Further managerial insights are given based on simulation studies on servers’ equilibrium/off‐equilibrium behaviors and the resulting system efficiency performance under different policies. 相似文献
Firms often cite cost savings as a reason why they charge separately for add‐ons. Firms also often face situations where consumers' price sensitivity is correlated with their valuation of add‐ons. While cost savings may directly translate into profit gains in some scenarios, this study examines the strategic implications of add‐on pricing and is the first to suggest that cost savings from add‐on pricing may in fact result in profit loss for firms when consumers are heterogeneous in price sensitivity. This is because add‐on pricing can trigger a revenue loss that exceeds any cost savings, thus leading to a negative net profit change for competing firms. Even if firms have the capability to pre‐commit to not adopting add‐on pricing, we show that competing firms can be locked in a prisoner's dilemma where all choose to adopt add‐on pricing and lose profits (as compared to none adopting add‐on pricing). We further show the possibility that the greater the cost of providing the add‐on (and the greater the cost savings generated from add‐on pricing), the worse this profit loss gets. 相似文献