Biodiversity conservation in urban parks: a study of ground-dwelling ants (Hymenoptera: Formicidae) in Rio de Janeiro City

Urban Ecosystems - Urban green recreational spaces may provide habitat for animals and plants. We investigated the importance of urban public parks in the city of Rio de Janeiro with regard to the...     

The organizational design of offshoring: Taking stock and moving forward

Offshoring can be defined as the relocation of organizational tasks and services to foreign locations. At the same time as the scale and scope of offshoring have reached unprecedented levels in recent years, firms have increasingly been exposed to the challenges relating to managing an organization consisting of a number of offshored activities. In this special issue introduction paper, we argue that an organizational design perspective on offshoring can benefit research and practice in understanding how firms can coordinate and integrate offshoring activities. Specifically, we argue that offshoring implies an organizational reconfiguration consisting of three stages: disintegration, relocation and reintegration. We discuss the implications of this perspective and outline a research agenda.     

Some results on simultaneous confidence intervals for monotone contrasts in one-way anova model

The one-way ANOVA model with common variance is considered. Simultaneous confidence Intervals (SCI) for monotone contrasts in the means are derived and compared to alternative intervals gene¬rated by Williams (1977)     

Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution

Given a bargaining problem, the relative utilitarian (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer’s utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one. We show that RU is “optimal” in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over the set of all bargaining solutions) under any partial ordering which satisfies certain axioms of fairness and consistency; this result is closely analogous to the result of Segal (J Polit Econ 108(3):569–589, 2000). Second, RU offers each person the maximum expected utility amongst all rescaling-invariant solutions, when it is applied to a random sequence of future bargaining problems generated using a certain class of distributions; this is recalls the results of Harsanyi (J Polit Econ 61:434–435, 1953) and Karni (Econometrica 66(6):1405–1415, 1998).     

Energy in Eurasia: the Dependency Game

Russia, Europe, and a number of transit countries are involved in a high-stake game about energy which is characterized by a high degree of interdependency and security. The dependencies go in all directions, but what makes the game particularly interesting is that it is neither economically rational nor static. It should lie in all parties' interest to recognize the strong element of interdependency and transform some of the energy security politics into energy economics.     

A tow-stage procedure for testing homogeneity of means against ordered alternatives in analysis of variance with unequal variances

In this paper we present a two-stage sampling procedure for testing the equality of normal means against ordered alternatives in one-way analysis of variance with unequal unknown variances. A table of approximated percentiles needed for implementation is provided. Some Monte Carlo results for estimating the power of the proposed test statistic are presented.