Models for estimating discount rates for long-term health risks using labor market data

This article utilizes evidence from job choices involving fatality risks to estimate individual discount rates for adverse health outcomes. The study compares the results from five distinct models for estimating discount rates from labor market data. The estimated discount rates range from 1% to 14% with confidence intervals that usually include financial market rates for the same period. This result, and consistent findings of significant compensating differentials for fatality risk, provide strong support for life-cycle models of individual rationality in the choice of job risks. Discounted value-of-life estimates are also developed and compared to the crosssection estimates that are more prevalent in the literature.     

The bureaucratic response to economic fluctuation: An econometric investigation of Hungarian investment policies

This paper develops bureaucratic response functions within a “deviation from trend” econometric model to determine those factors that were related to fluctuations in aggregate investment finding and in the sectoral distribution of that aggretate during 1960–1975. Investment in buildings and investment in machinery are analyzed separately. On the national level, investment funding is found to respond to indicators of well-being, plan targets, bottlenecks, and foreign trade variables. Sectoral investment funding is based mainly on priority considerations.     

Are corrupt acts contagious?: Evidence from the United States

This paper adds to the literature by shedding new light on the causes of corruption. Specifically, we provide evidence on the extent to which corruption might be contagious. In other words, what is the extent to which a demonstration effect is at play at inducing corrupt acts? Using state-level U.S. data over the 1995–2004 period, the results show that the effect of neighboring corruption is positive and statistically significant in all cases, implying that corruption does appear to be contagious. Specifically, a 10% increase in corruption in neighboring states appears to increase corruption in a state by about 4–11%. Of the different types of government activity, the size of defense and non-defense federal sectors in a state seem to have opposite effects on corruption, with the former contributing to corruption and the latter serving as a deterrent. The size of the state and local governments does not seem to be relevant. Of the variables controlling for detection and punishment of corrupt individuals, greater corrections employment reduces corruption, while greater judicial employment seems to increase corruption. Changes in the police force do not seem to have a statistically significant impact. These findings generally hold when we control for the disproportionate effects of the Washington, DC area and when a pooled data set is estimated. Contagion effects are also found for other crimes. Policy implications are discussed.     

Valuing International Safety Externalities: Does the “Golden Rule” Apply?

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - How should a developed country quantify the costs and benefits of the safety externalities that its energy and environmental policies generate for a developing...     

A New Right? Moral Issues and Partisan Change in Canada*

Objective. Beginning with the 1993 election, Canada's Progressive Conservative Party was replaced as the dominant force on the political right by the more ideological Reform Party/Canadian Alliance. This article examines what specific issues most centrally motivated this seismic shift among conservative Canadians. Method. Using data from the 1993, 1997, and 2000 Canadian Election Studies, we employ bivariate analyses and multinomial logit voting models to determine whether constitutional, economic, nativist, or moral issues most clearly differentiate PC supporters from R/A voters. Results. Regional concerns are important and other issues have sporadic impacts, but moral traditionalism is the most consistent and powerful factor distinguishing supporters of the new party from supporters of the old one. Conclusions. Although existing studies have focused primarily on other sources of R/A support, moral traditionalism is clearly a key factor in explaining the party's ascendancy. This phenomenon, we contend, is part of a larger trend toward postmaterial politics in Western democracies.     

The epistemic structure of a theory of a game

This paper is a contribution to the systematic study of alternative axiom-sets for theories of (normal-form, complete-information) games. It provides an introduction to epistemic logic, describes a formulation in epistemic logic of the structure of a theory of a game (the broad theory of that game), and applies methods of epistemic logic to define strategies for dealing with two disturbing features of game theory, its hyperrationality assumptions and its indeterminacy. The analysis of these problems is conducted in terms of two principles which impregnate much game theory, Cleverness and Cloisteredness (the principles that players know respectively all, and only, the logical consequences of their assumed knowledge). Broad theories allow us to formulate and revise these principles despite their metatheoretical character. It is shown how Cleverness may be weakened by using logics which restrict the Rule of Epistemization, and Cloisteredness by using default logic or autoepistemic logic; the latter is used to characterize Nash equilibrium beliefs as parts of certain autoepistemic extensions of players' knowledge bases, but these particular extensions are rejected as ungrounded.I am grateful for most helpful comments to Robin Cubitt, Joe Halpern, Ernest Geffner, Philippe Mongin, David Squires, Elias Thijsse and Tim Williamson.     

Adaptive learning,adaptive utility,and rational behavior in a repeated prisoner's dilemma

Two dimensions of learning are explored in a repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment. Subject update their perceptions of the true model of their opponent's behavior. Subjects also update their beliefs Kraft Funds at the Fuqua School of Business, helpful comments by Robert Axelrod, Michael Cohen, Fred Feinberg, J. Keith Murnighan, Kip Viscusi, Bob Winkler, and two anonymous referees, and the programming assistance of Oris Stuart and Michael Guiry.