Making Boards Effective: An Empirical Examination of Board Task Performance

Despite the increasing attention of management scholars to boards of directors, there is still scant evidence on the antecedents of board task performance. The lack of significant results seems to be due to some theoretical and methodological choices followed by scholars, i.e. the almost exclusive reliance on agency theory and the use of demographic data. Following the call for dismantling the fortresses dominating past studies, this paper contributes to opening the 'black box' of boards of directors, developing a conceptual model that considers the impact of board members' diversity, commitment and critical debate on board task effectiveness in performing its service and control tasks. We collected primary data through a questionnaire survey, and we tested the model controlling for board, firm and industry characteristics. Our findings suggest that (i) the predictors we identified, and particularly the board members' commitment, are far more important than board demographics to predict board task performance; (ii) firm and industry contexts exert a significant influence on board task performance; (iii) predictors have a different impact on specific sets of tasks. Thus, our findings support the idea that several board characteristics and contingencies at both industry and firm level must be acknowledged in board design.     

Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach

We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three contributions. First, we provide a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an envelope formula for the derivative of an agent's equilibrium expected payoff with respect to his current type. It combines the familiar marginal effect of types on payoffs with novel marginal effects of the current type on future ones that are captured by “impulse response functions.” The formula yields an expression for dynamic virtual surplus that is instrumental to the design of optimal mechanisms and to the study of distortions under such mechanisms. Second, we characterize the transfers that satisfy the envelope formula and establish a sense in which they are pinned down by the allocation rule (“revenue equivalence”). Third, we characterize perfect Bayesian equilibrium‐implementable allocation rules in Markov environments, which yields tractable sufficient conditions that facilitate novel applications. We illustrate the results by applying them to the design of optimal mechanisms for the sale of experience goods (“bandit auctions”).     

Network influence and organizational performance: The effects of tie strength and structural equivalence

We combine theory and empirical evidence to develop and test three related claims about how ties strength and structural equivalence affect interorganizational performance similarity. First, network partners attain similar levels of performance because direct network ties facilitate information and resource sharing, and the diffusion of organizational practices. Organizations occupying similar network positions attain similar levels of performance because they face similar competitive constraints. Second, because mechanisms underlying performance similarity implied by direct network ties and similarity in network positions are different, strength of network ties and network position affect different dimensions of organizational performance. Third, we expect that tie strength will affect aspects of performance that are more likely to be influenced by processes activated by the direct contact between network partners. We expect structural equivalence to affect more strongly those aspects of organizational performance that are more directly influenced by competition. An analysis of interorganizational networks and organizational performance within a regional community of hospitals provides evidence in support of these claims. Models estimated on a sample of 8190 interorganizational dyads suggest that the effects of tie strength and structural equivalence on organizational performance are highly differentiated and contingent on specific aspects of performance. We show that these conclusions are robust with respect to a wide variety of other factors that may be responsible for performance similarity including competitive interdependence, structural homophily, and resource complementarity.     

Hazards of neoliberalism: delayed electric power restoration after Hurricane Ike

This case study explores how neoliberal policies shape the impacts of a natural disaster. We investigate the reactions to major damages to the electric power system and the restoration of power in the wake of Hurricane Ike, which devastated the Houston, Texas, metropolitan area in September 2008. We argue that the neoliberal policy agenda insured a minimalist approach to the crisis and generated dissatisfaction among many residents. The short-term profitability imperative shifted reconstruction costs to consumers, and prevented efforts to upgrade the electric power infrastructure to prepare for future disasters. We illustrate the serious obstacles for disaster mitigation and recovery posed by neoliberal policies that privatize public goods and socialize private costs. Neoliberalism neither addresses the needs of a highly stratified public nor their long-term interests and safety.     

A routine-based framework implementing workload control to address recurring disturbances

Abstract

This research focuses on responsiveness in high variety manufacturing environments. To achieve it, the article proposes to develop Dynamic Response Capabilities (DRCs) of the manufacturing system defined as the abilities to readjust the planned operating parameters of workload, capacity, and lead time, in the wake of disturbances. To inform their development, built on the Workload Control theory, a routine-based framework is proposed. The framework supports an integrated approach for the implementation of adaptive decision-making routines for workload, capacity, and lead time readjustments at different stages in the order fulfilment process. Findings from two empirical cases show the appropriateness of the framework to develop and utilise DRCs in different settings of disturbances. Results of a simulation study, with one of the case companies, also shows the effectiveness of the framework to drive performance improvements in presence of recurring disturbances leading to demand variability.     

‘The Captain of the Band is un Galant Uomo’: The Good Bandit from Boccaccio to Washington Irving

The article explores the figure of the “good bandit,” connecting representations of the historical personage Ghino di Tacco in late-medieval Italian literature with the bandits in Washington Irving’s travel tales. Ghino di Tacco was a notorious bandit, known for raiding pilgrims and travelers in thirteenth-century Tuscany. Nevertheless, according to literary sources such as Boccaccio's Decameron, the infamous raider left his victims unharmed and with the means necessary to complete their journeys. Sources also indicate that Ghino di Tacco became a bandit because of factional disputes and was eventually pardoned by Pope Boniface VIII for healing the Abbot of Cluny. Similarly, the fictional bandits in Irving’s Tales of a Traveller (1824) are revealed to be men of moral standing, forced into a violent life of banditry in response to the excesses of nineteenth-century Italy’s ruling classes. His tales redeem the figure of the bandit from crude one-dimensional treatments common in the works of English writers such as Ann Radcliffe. Pivoting from established proposals that have characterized bandits as either criminals or revolutionaries, this article argues that, for Boccaccio as with Irving, the figure of the good bandit functions as a symbol of reconciliation and social reintegration.     

The 'Lombardy Model': Subsidiarity-informed Regional Governance

This article provides a concise overview of the Lombardy region's experience of government during the past twelve years. During this period, legislative, political and administrative strategic decisions have been informed by a distinctive vision, anchored in the principle of subsidiarity. The main characteristics of the emerging governance model are discussed: its political, juridical and social contexts; its underlying principles; its main policy goals, instruments and initiatives; and its criticalities and challenges.     

Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning,Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

Global games of regime change—coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it—have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time. We first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria. We then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time, or with changes in fundamentals, leads to interesting equilibrium properties. First, multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Second, fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks. Finally, equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility—where no attack is possible—and phases of distress—where a large attack can occur—even without changes in fundamentals.     

DISTANCE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT WHEN CONTRACTS ARE INCOMPLETE

We introduce incomplete contracts in a model where multinational firms from a certain country (“North”) can decide to serve a foreign market (“South”) through exports or through horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI relies on the supply of specialized intermediate inputs that could be supplied either by northern suppliers or by suppliers located in South. Intermediate sourcing contracts are complete in North but not in South. Were southern contracts also complete, FDI would arise only when trade barriers are high enough. Incomplete contracts in South generate, instead, a non‐linear relation between trade barriers and FDI as foreign investment emerges also when trade barriers are low enough. The reason is the positive effect that low trade barriers have on the bargaining power of final producers with respect to their southern suppliers. (JEL: F23, F12)     

An Empirical Equilibrium Model of a Decentralized Asset Market

I estimate a search‐and‐bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices, and welfare, and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade. Using business‐aircraft data, I find that, relative to the Walrasian benchmark, 18.3 percent of the assets are misallocated; prices are 19.2 percent lower; and the aggregate welfare losses equal 23.9 percent. Dealers play an important role in reducing trading frictions: In a market with no dealers, a larger fraction of assets would be misallocated, and prices would be higher. However, dealers reduce aggregate welfare because their operations are costly, and they impose a negative externality by decreasing the number of agents' direct transactions.